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General Introduction & discussion
Why should we study the psychology of religion?
Globally, 84% of the population identifies with a religious group (Hackett, Grim, Stonawski, 
Skirbekk, Potančoková, & Abel, 2012). As of 2010, there are 2.2 billion Christians (32% of the 
world’s population), 1.6 billion Muslims (23%), 1 billion Hindus (15%), 500 million Buddhists 
(7%) and 14 million Jews (0.2%). If you include folk religions such as traditional African 
religions, Australian Aboriginal religions and religious beliefs like Sikhism, Taoism, or Wicca, 
then the broad scope of religion all over the world becomes plain to see. Even the religiously 
unaffiliated1 – with 1.1 billion people (16%) the world’s third largest group when compared 
with religious categories – hold some religious or spiritual beliefs. For example, 68% of the 
US unaffiliated believe in God or a higher power (Hackett et al., 2012; Paloutzian, 2016). 
 Religions are belief systems in which supernatural agents (e.g., God, Gods, Allah) are 
central, and are presumed to be capable of acting and intervening in the natural world 
(e.g., Atran & Norenzayan 2004; Barrett 2000; Barrett & Lanman 2008; Boyer 2003). These 
supernatural agents are regularly held responsible for major life events, such as birth and 
death, disease and health, or fortune and misfortune (Baumard & Boyer 2013; Bering & 
Shackelford 2004; Bering 2002a).  
 Studies in the psychology of religion have found that religion and spirituality play a 
fundamental and central role in people’s lives (Shermer, 2003). The lives of religious 
individuals are typically highly structured with rituals (Pargament, 2001), particularly 
regulating how to behave and act from the moment of birth until their time of passing and 
providing a sense of guidance in an uncertain world (Kay et al., 2009). In times of suffering, 
people can feel strengthened by their faith, which may help them to cope with stress more 
adequately, which in turn promotes health and longevity (e.g., Koenig, 2008). Furthermore, 
religions often provide strong moral guidelines for people to follow that reduce risk-
taking and promote a healthy lifestyle (Cohen, 2015; Norenzayan, 2013; Powell, Shahabi, 
& Thoresen, 2003). Social connections within religious groups are typically very strong, as 
religion binds people together in cooperative communities (Graham & Haidt, 2010) and 
enhances self-esteem through group identification (Seul, 1999). Finally, religions provide 
an explanation about the origins of the universe and life, and can relieve death anxiety by 
promising life after death (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Vail et al., 2010).
 Despite 20th and 21st-century scientific and technological advances that provide 
explanations for all kind of (natural) phenomena, religious beliefs continue to have a major 
influence on almost every aspect of human life. Some scholars argue that religious thought 
comes naturally, and develops out of a core set of psychological functions found in all 
(typical) human beings, such as the tendency to perceive intentionality and the need to 
provide meaning to life events (The ‘‘naturalness hypothesis’’; Barrett, 2004; Bering, 2006; 
1 Atheists, agnostics, and people who do not identify with the particular religious groups named in surveys.
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Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2001, 2003). According to these scholars, even atheists can be seen to 
display supernatural thinking at times. Moreover, restraining from supernatural thinking, 
in this perspective, is seen as a reflective process that is cognitively effortful (e.g., Bering, 
2010) as it involves the suppression of an automatic cognition (i.e., supernatural thinking). 
Others take a more cautious standpoint (e.g., Geertz & Markússon, 2010), and suggest that 
conclusions drawn from sensory input and the output of cognitive systems can branch 
off in both religiosity and atheism. For example, they argue that repeatedly mistakenly 
detecting agency in the environment when no agent is present can also reinforce natural 
explanations (“it is not a ghost, it is just the wind”). 
 In the opposite school of thought, there are scholars like Richard Dawkins who perceive 
religion as unnatural, a ‘virus of the mind’ (1976; 1993; 2006), with religious ideas being 
transmitted from parent to child (Geertz & Markússon, 2010). Since 2004, many anti-religious 
thinkers like Dawkins have been the subject of media attention (coined “New Atheist” by the 
media), with several anti-religious titles becoming best sellers, such as ‘Breaking the Spell’ 
by philosopher Daniel Dennett (2006), ‘The God Delusion’ by biologist Richard Dawkins 
(2006) and ‘The End of Faith’ by neuroscientist Sam Harris (2004). Nevertheless, whether you 
perceive yourself as religious, atheist or something in-between, religion plays a central role 
in almost everyone’s life. 
 The psychology of religion aims to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying 
religious belief, experience, and behaviour (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003), and draws 
upon diverse adjacent fields such as evolutionary psychology, social psychology, clinical 
psychology, cognitive neuroscience, biology, and anthropology. It is important to mention 
that research on the psychology of religion is directed at understanding human cognition, 
emotion and behaviour, and is not concerned with the actual existence of God or the 
supernatural (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009). In line with this, the focus of the research presented 
in the current thesis is on human cognition, emotions and behaviour, irrespective of the 
question if, or in what way or form, any God or the supernatural may actually exist, or not.
Before we outline the specific objectives of this dissertation, we will first present a brief 
history of the psychology of religion and several key topics to provide a general introduction 
to the most important concepts in this evolving field of science.
Brief history of the psychology of religion
In the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, psychology as a discipline was 
considered a branch of philosophy, and the study of religion was common practice within 
this discipline. The philosophical tradition produced rich theories about the processes that 
may underlie religiosity, as, for example, reflected in the work of Freud and Jung (Freud, 
111
General Introduction & discussion
1927; Jung, 1938; derived from Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003). The work of one of the 
founding fathers of psychology, William James’ “The Varieties of Religious Experience: A 
Study in Human Nature” (James, 1985), was particularly influential in this sphere. James was 
mostly interested in individual religious experiences, and was one of the first to use empirical 
research methods in his studies. From approximately the 1920s onwards, the psychology 
of religion disappeared in the background with the establishment of the doctrine of 
behaviourism. In the zeitgeist of behaviourism, there was little room for mental or religious 
thought (Paloutzian, 2016; Weaver, Pargament, Flannelly, & Oppenheimer, 2006). 
 Recently, the psychology of religion has re-emerged with a new cohort of psychologists 
interested in the cognitive and social evolutionary bases of religion (e.g., Barret, 2000). A 
prominent school within the wave of renewed interest in religion is the Cognitive Science 
of Religion (CSR; Xygalatas, 2014). CSR starts from the assumption that religious thought 
and behaviour originate from everyday cognitive processes that also support other 
functional processes such as Theory of Mind, detection of agency, memory, perception, 
morality, social emotions, to name just a few (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2004; 
Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Bering, 2010; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Guthrie, 1993; Tremlin, 
2008). CSR is primarily interested in attempting to answer why religion is so common 
around the world, and why it has common characteristics across cultures (Barrett & Burdett, 
2011; Xygalatas, 2014). Building on earlier work of Benidict de Spinoza and David Hume 
(see Guthrie, 2013), the first comprehensive cognitive theory of religion was outlined by 
anthropologist Stewart Guthrie (1980), who argued that humans are inclined to perceive 
the world as “agent-like”. According to Guthrie, an evolved system that attributes agency 
and intentionality to ambiguous objects and events in the environment may encourage 
belief in God(s) (Guthrie, 1980; 2013; Xygalatas, 2014). The research topic of the current 
dissertation is closely affiliated with the CSR, as it investigates Guthrie’s core hypothesis, 
namely the relationship between belief in supernatural agents and the human tendency 
towards hypersensitive agency detection. 
Key topics of the Cognitive Science of Religion
Mind-body dualism 
According to researchers of CSR (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Bering, 2002, 2006; Bloom, 2007; Kelemen, 
2004), there are multiple cognitive processes which may naturally predispose humans 
towards belief in non-physical agents. For example, Bloom (2007) has reasoned that people 
are common-sense dualists who see bodies and souls as separate entities. He suggests 
that dualism is a natural by-product of two distinct cognitive systems, one for dealing with 
material objects, and one for agents (social entities). According to Bloom (2004, 2007), 
the perception of people as consisting of bodies and minds, is “an evolutionary accident” 
12
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coming from these distinct cognitive systems. One of the consequences of regarding 
bodies and minds as separate entities is that one can exist without the other. Hollywood 
movies provide anecdotal support for humans’ natural tendency to see body and mind as 
independent entities, as for instance reflected in zombies (bodies without minds), ghosts 
(minds without bodies), body swapping (minds exchanging bodies), and possession (a 
mind taking control over another body). This dualism, which makes it possible for people 
to imagine minds without bodies, is especially relevant for the psychology of religion. God, 
gods and other supernatural agents are mostly ‘minds’ (or powers) without bodies.
 The results of an experiment by Bering and Bjorklund (2004) with kindergarteners 
supports the hypothesis of natural dualism. In this study, children watched a puppet 
show performance in which a mouse was eaten by an alligator. Interestingly, the children 
understood the physical death of the mouse, but also believed that different mental 
properties of the mouse still continued to exist, such as the love the mouse felt for his mother. 
Psychological attributions to the dead mouse were more frequent in kindergarteners than 
in older children and adults. Bering and Bjorklund (2004) therefore suggest that such 
beliefs are not learned by social-religious upbringing but are more likely to reflect a natural 
disposition. 
Teleological reasoning
In a series of experiments, Kelemen (1999, 2004) demonstrated that young children have 
teleological tendencies, in the sense that they perceive objects and body parts as existing 
for a particular purpose. When children are asked to explain why some rocks are pointy, 
they often choose functional explanations (e.g., “so that animals can scratch on them when 
they get itchy”) over physical explanations (e.g., ‘‘bits of stuff piled up over time”). Four-year-
olds generally think that everything has a purpose, even things like lions (“to go in the zoo”) 
and clouds (“for raining”). Adults, on the other hand, typically prefer physical explanations 
(Kelemen, 2004, for an overview). According to Kelemen (2004), this ‘teleological bias’ 
makes children particularly receptive to the idea of a creator deity. Furthermore, Kelemen 
and Rosset (2009) demonstrated that even college-educated adults showed a tendency 
towards teleological reasoning when under cognitive load. In these experiments, 
participants had to judge statements as correct or incorrect in a speeded, a moderately 
speeded, or an unspeeded condition. Adult participants in the speeded conditions judged 
scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations as correct (e.g., the sun radiates heat 
because warmth nurtures life”) more often than participants in the unspeeded condition, 
and this was not the case for control items (e.g., “hills form because floodwater freezes”). 
Kelemen and Rosset (2009) argue that teleological explanations present the default way 
to explain the natural order in the world, and that teleological explanations are suppressed 
rather than replaced by the acquisition of scientific knowledge and alternative explanations.
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Religion and prosociality
Some cognitive scientists of religion suggest that the cognitive availability of omniscient 
and omnipresent supernatural agents facilitates prosocial or altruistic behaviour 
–  behaviour that benefits other people at a personal cost. They reason that, with the 
development of large-scale societies, all-seeing supernatural agents with the capacity to 
punish or intervene may have enhanced norm compliance and stimulated individuals to 
interact in cooperative ways (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; 
Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Similarly, the sudden rise of frequent religious practices and 
rituals centred around monotheistic Gods are perceived to have played an important role 
in binding people together in cooperative communities (Graham & Haidt, 2010). According 
to this theoretical perspective, God(s) played an important part in boosting the success of 
monotheistic religious societies over predating polytheistic groups. In accordance with the 
hypothesized influence of an all-seeing God on cooperative behaviour, different studies 
have found religious priming to stimulate prosocial behaviour towards in-group members 
(for a meta-analysis see Shariff, Willard, Andersen & Norenzayan, 2016).
Minimal counter-intuitive theory
According to one prominent contributor of CSR, Pascal Boyer (1994; 2001; 2003), religious 
concepts generally violate expectations of domain-specific (e.g., person, object) properties. 
For example, the concept of God belongs to the ontological (domain-specific) category of 
‘person’, but violates the expectation that a person cannot pass through physical obstacles, 
or is all-knowing, etc. Hence, God is a person with counter-intuitive properties. These 
counter-intuitive properties are said to make religious concepts attention-grabbing and 
memorable, because the violations of the domain-specific properties stand out against the 
background of intuitively correct information (e.g., Barrett & Keil, 1996). The combination 
of counter-intuitive concepts with domain-specific correct information results in the 
processing ease and efficiency of intuitive ideas, but, at the same time, commands attention 
and stimulates deeper processing. Importantly, the extensive processing of counter-intuitive 
information has been argued to provide an optimal condition for memory and subsequent 
cultural transmission of the concept (Boyer, 1994), and is argued to have contributed to the 
successful transmission of religious concepts, stories, and folktales (Upal, 2010). However, 
empirical studies show mixed evidence in demonstrating that minimal counter-intuitive 
concepts are remembered better than intuitive or radically counter-intuitive concepts (see 
Barrett & Burdett, 2011).
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Hypersensitive Agency Detection
The main research subject of this dissertation will be in the domain of hypersensitive 
agency detection (HAD), a term coined by Barrett (2000; 2004), which builds further on 
Stewart Guthrie’s theory that religion originates from perceiving the world as ‘agent-like’ 
(1980). Agents are living beings, such as humans and animals (Boyer, 1994), capable of 
independently and intentionally initiating actions on the basis of internal mental states like 
beliefs and desires. Objects (e.g., rocks, human-made artefacts), on the other hand, react to 
the world in purely mechanistic and unintentional ways (Boyer, 1994). From an evolutionary 
point of view, agents are what matter most to us. The ability to quickly spot an agent and 
estimate its intentions (friend or foe) is essential for survival. Therefore, it has been proposed 
(Barrett, 2004) that humans are equipped with a Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device 
(HADD). This hypothesised cognitive system is specialised in rapidly detecting agents, 
or assuming their presence based on signs or traces. Agency detection in humans is 
considered to be hyperactive, as identifying an agent (e.g., a predator) as an object can 
have far more serious consequences than incorrectly identifying an object as an agent (e.g., 
Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Guthrie, 1993; Tremlin, 2008). In evolutionary terms, the tendency 
to over-detect agency can be seen as an example of error-management theory (Haselton & 
Nettle, 2006), whereby the least costly error (e.g., falsely perceiving a predator where there is 
none) is selected over the costlier error (e.g., failing to notice a predator when there is one). 
 The theory of (hypersensitive) agency detection focuses mostly on the perceptual 
detection of agents. However, agency detection may also take place on an intentional level. 
Natural disasters are regularly interpreted as communicative attempts or divine retribution 
and provide a horrific example of agency detection at an intentional level (Bering, 2002; 
Gray & Wegner 2010; Laurin, Shariff, Henrich, & Kay, 2012; Sibley & Bulbulia 2012; Stephens, 
Fryberg, Markus, & Hamedani, 2012), whereby God is seen as the intentional agent who is 
responsible for the catastrophe. A study of Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, and Hamedani (2012) 
found that among survivors of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Chilean earthquake in 
2010, the most common explanation of the event was that the disaster was an intentional 
act of God. These findings are corroborated by a laboratory experiment (Gray & Wegner, 
2010) in which participants read a vignette about a family who was caught by a sudden rise 
of the water level while having a picnic in a remote valley. The story had alternate endings. 
In one case, the family (including the family dog) drowns; in another, the picnic is ruined but 
otherwise everyone is safe. In addition, the stories gave different reasons for the rise in water 
level. In one case, the story mentioned that a dam worker caused the water level to rise, while 
in another, participants were told that the reason for the flood was unknown. When asked 
if God could be held responsible for the event, participants attributed more supernatural 
responsibility in the condition where the family dies and when the cause of the rise in water 
level is unknown. These examples suggest that when dealing with moral events, people are 
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inclined to search for a responsible intentional agent, and may even extend their search to 
the possibility of supernatural responsibility. The inclination to ascribe natural disasters to 
supernatural agents may be especially strong when the magnitude of the event exceeds 
the sphere of human influence (Gray & Wegner, 2010). In addition, ascribing control to a 
powerful supernatural agent may restore the feeling of uncertainty that accompanies such 
exceptional experiences. Attributing supernatural agency to these events or phenomena 
may offer a sense of meaning and vicarious control (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010; 
Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008; Rutjens, van der 
Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010; Valdesolo & Graham, 2014).
Objective of this dissertation
Although the theory that hypersensitive agency detection (HAD) encourages religious 
beliefs is a corner stone of CSR, it is mainly based on theoretical considerations and, to 
our knowledge, has received little empirical attention. Evidence for the existence of HAD 
comes from work on geometric moving figures (e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944; see also Bloom 
& Veres, 1999; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000 for a review), which shows that when an object 
is perceived to be self-propelled, changes direction or speed without apparent external 
cause, or responds to the movements of other objects at a distance, these movements 
are typically perceived as goal directed and a signature of agency. However, whether HAD 
plays an important role in encouraging belief in supernatural agents is currently unknown.
 A study of van Elk and colleagues (2014) has found preliminary evidence that priming 
with supernatural agent concepts influenced the detection of agency, but only in 
participants who reported to believe in God. In their study, agency detection was measured 
on a perceptual level (e.g., detecting a human actor walking, detecting faces) and not on an 
intentional level. As the presence of supernatural agents needs to be inferred or interpreted 
on the basis of ambiguous signs and hidden messages (Vail et al. 2010), we assume 
that concepts of supernatural agency will be foremost expressed at an intentional level. 
Therefore, this dissertation aims to study the relationship between supernatural agency 
concepts and (H)ADD at the intentional level. 
 In this chapter we will describe the findings of the three empirical chapters that 
investigated the relationship between religion and agency. The objective of Chapter 2 is 
to test the relationship between supernatural agency and agency attributed to natural 
phenomena. The objective of Chapter 3 is to test the relationship between supernatural 
agency and agency attributed to human beings. In Chapter 4 we investigate the 
consequences of attributing agency to a supernatural agent. More concretely, we test 
whether supernatural agency attributions facilitate forgiveness by means of perceiving a 
human offender as less responsible. In the following paragraphs, these empirical chapters 
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will be summarized. Subsequently, we integrate these findings in a model of supernatural 
agency attributions (see Figure 1).
Introduction and summary of Chapter 2 - Priming with Religion and 
Supernatural Agency Enhances the Attribution of Intentionality to 
Natural Phenomena 
Barrett and Lanman (2008) propose that HAD and concepts involving supernatural agents 
are mutually reinforcing. In other words, not only should hyperactive agency detection 
lead to an increased belief in supernatural agents, but the reverse should also hold. That is, 
supernatural agent concepts should lead to an increase in agency detection. For example, 
being in a place that is associated with supernatural agents (e.g., a church, haunted 
castle, etc.) could unknowingly increase one’s vigilance for the detection of supernatural 
agency. The objective of Chapter 2 is to test the hypothesis that activation of concepts 
of supernatural agency can enhance detection of agency in the perception of natural 
phenomena. In order to achieve this aim, concepts of supernatural agency were primed 
and perceptions of agency were measured by asking participants to what extend they 
perceived agency (intentionality and will of its own) in natural phenomena. By priming, we 
mean that the presentation of a stimulus makes a concept temporarily more accessible 
in the mind, which may influence how subsequent and even unrelated information is 
processed (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Hebb, 1994). Therefore, in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 we 
used a religion prime that aimed to make supernatural agent concepts temporarily more 
accessible, and tested whether this led to more perception of agency in natural objects.
 In addition to manipulating the ontological categories (i.e., natural phenomena and 
agents), stimuli in Chapter 2 were also organised as a factor of threat, presenting both 
threatening and nonthreatening natural phenomena and agents. The factor threat was 
included in the design because HAD makes the prediction that when confronted with 
threatening conditions, people are more prone to detect agency to protect themselves 
from possible danger (e.g., Barrett, 2000, 2004; Guthry, 1980, 1993; Maij, van Schie, & van 
Elk, 2017). In accordance with HAD, we expected that more agency would be attributed 
to threatening stimuli than to non-threatening stimuli. Furthermore, because threatening 
natural phenomena evoke more agency attribution, we expected the effect of religious 
priming to be stronger for threatening natural objects than for non-threatening natural 
phenomena. 
 In two experiments, we used different methods to prime concepts of supernatural agency. 
In Experiment 2.1, we used a religiosity questionnaire that was presented either before the 
experimental task (prime condition) or after the experimental task (no-prime condition). 
In Experiment 2.2 we used a subliminal priming procedure by either presenting the word 
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‘God’ (prime) or the letter string Xxx (neutral-prime) before each trial of the experimental 
task. The experimental task consisted of an image-rating task in which participants indicated 
how much intentionality and ‘will of its own’ (i.e., the operationalization of agency) they 
perceived in images of natural phenomena (e.g., a sunset, a tornado) and agents (e.g., a dog 
or a rabbit; the agent condition consisted mostly of animals and included a few humans). In 
line with the hypothesis that the activation of religious concepts may enhance attribution 
of intentionality in natural objects, we expected that when participants were primed 
with religion, they would ascribe more agency to images depicting natural phenomena 
than participants who were not primed with religion. We expected this effect to be most 
pronounced for images of threatening natural phenomena, as threatening conditions call 
for predictive processing (of intentionality) to evade possible harm. For images of agents 
we expected little or no effect of religious priming.
 In both experiments, participants that were primed with the concept of a supernatural 
agent ascribed more agency to natural phenomena compared to participants that received 
no prime / a neutral prime. The results indicate that concepts of supernatural agency may 
trigger perception of agency in natural phenomena but do not enhance the perception 
of agency in agents. In both experiments, we also found that threatening images (i.e., 
threatening natural phenomena and threatening agents) were ascribed more agency than 
non-threatening images, which confirms the hypothesis that agency detection is more 
vigilant in threatening conditions. However, we found no evidence of an interaction of 
threat and priming with supernatural agency in either experiment. We argue that different 
mechanisms might be responsible for the agency enhancing effect of threat and of priming 
of supernatural agency. In the case of religious priming, the activation of supernatural agent 
concepts may enhance the perception of agency in natural phenomena by attributing 
agency to a (supernatural) source outside the object. With threatening stimuli, on the other 
hand, agency may be attributed more directly to a source within the threatening agent 
or object itself. Item analyses for both experiments furthermore revealed that the effect 
of religious priming was most pronounced for items of natural phenomena that were 
perceived to be outside one’s personal control. These findings suggest that it is not so much 
the experience of threat itself, but rather the lack of control which makes people more 
susceptible to religious priming. In line with the theory of compensatory control (e.g., Kay et 
al., 2010), our results indicate that people may increase their sense of control by attributing 
supernatural agency to natural phenomena when these phenomena are perceived to be 
outside one’s control.
18
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Outsourcing agency to a supernatural agent
The findings in Chapter 2 triggered our interest in the mechanism responsible for the agency 
enhancing effect of religious priming in natural phenomena. According to HAD theory, 
activating supernatural agent concepts would lead to an increase in experiencing agency 
in the environment, thus in the perception of natural phenomena themselves. However, 
as we mentioned above, the discrepancy between threat and religious priming made us 
wonder whether, in the case of religious priming, the agency enhancing effect in natural 
phenomena reflected the attribution of agency to a supernatural power outside the natural 
phenomena. Because of that, natural phenomena are perceived as controlled or guided by 
a supernatural agent/God. We hypothesised that if the latter reasoning is correct, then one 
should expect differential effects in the case of religious priming for natural phenomena 
versus human beings, as attributing agency to a supernatural power should take away 
some of the agency of human beings. Item analyses of Experiment 2.2 provided some 
tentative support for this hypothesis, as images of agents in the God prime condition were 
perceived as less agentic than images of agents in the neutral prime condition. Note that in 
this study images in the agent condition consisted predominantly of animals. Considering 
that people generally perceive less agency in animals than in human beings (Gray, Gray, 
& Wegner, 2007), we expected this effect to be more pronounced for images of human 
beings in Chapter 3.
 The objective of Chapter 3 was to test whether concepts of supernatural agency (by 
means of priming or pre-existing beliefs) would affect both natural phenomena and 
human beings, but in opposite ways, that is, enhancing agency in natural phenomena while 
decreasing agency in human beings. Believing that an event is controlled by a supernatural 
agent means that a higher power is involved and is (partly) responsible for the outcome. 
For natural phenomena which do not contain agency themselves, the assumed presence 
of a supernatural agent may infuse the phenomena with purpose and intention (they 
are used as a “tool” by the supernatural power). Instead, in the case of human beings, the 
involvement of a powerful supernatural agent should be expected to take away some of 
the intentionality that is typically associated with human beings (they get reduced to being 
a “tool” which leaves them with less perceived intentionality).
Introduction and summary of Chapter 3 - Opposite effects of the 
supernatural
People are par ticularly susceptible to making supernatural attributions in the case of 
life events for which no responsible actor can be identified, whereby God is seen as the 
intentional agent who may be responsible for the catastrophe (Gray & Wegner, 2010; 
Laurin, Shariff, Henrich, & Kay, 2012; Morewedge, 2009; Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012). Inter estingly, 
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anecdotal findings suggest that even in cases where a perpetrator can be identified, people 
are still inclined to attribute responsibility to supernatural agents. For example, after the 
September 11 attacks in 2001, some people reported seeing the face of the devil emerging 
out of the clouds of smoke (“Face of Satan” n.d.), and televangelist Jerry Falwell stated that 
the attacks were “prob ably deserved” for all of those who had tried to secularize America 
(Carlson, 2007). 
 The present research examined whether supernatural agent concepts have opposite 
effects on the attribution of agency to natural phenomena and human beings. It was 
expected that considerations of supernatural agency would be associated with an increase 
in perception of agency in natural phenomena and a reduction of agency attributed to 
human beings. Since natural phenomena do not contain agency themselves, supernatural 
considerations may imbue these phenomena with additional (supernatural) purpose and 
agency. Human beings, on the other hand, are highly intentional agents, and supernatural 
considerations may take away some of the autonomy that is typically associated with 
human beings.
 In two experiments, a priming procedure was used to make religious concepts 
temporarily more salient. In Experiment 3.1, half of the participants were randomly assigned 
to a religion prime condition, and the other half to a soccer prime condition. In the religion 
prime condition / soccer prime condition, participants were asked whether they considered 
themselves as religious or spiritual / were interested in soccer, and to elaborate on this. 
In Experiment 3.2, participants had to rate statements that inquired about participants’ 
belief in a controlling God (or Gods / Allah, etc.) before or after they performed the image-
rating task. Furthermore, in Experiment 3.2 we attempted to enhance the religious priming 
effect by first manipulating participants’ sense of control (high vs. low) before presenting 
the prime. We expected that participants, when primed with concepts of supernatural 
agency, would ascribe less agency to images of human beings and more agency to images 
of natural phenomena, as compared to participants who were not primed with religion. 
This contrasting effect of religious priming on agency perceived in natural phenomena 
and human beings was expected to be most evident in the condition where participants 
recalled a state of low personal control, as previous research has found that supernatural 
considerations are especially strong in this condition. 
 In addition, we expected that individual differences in belief in God(s) would be related to 
the amount of agency perceived in natural phenomena and human beings. More specifically, 
we expected that a stronger belief in God would be associated with more perception 
of agency in natural phenomena and less perception of agency in human beings. The 
image-rating task in both experiments consisted of images of human beings and natural 
phenomena which had to be rated on intentionality and ‘will of its own’ (operationalization 
of agency, similar to Experiment 2.1 and Experiment 2.2). In addition to Experiment 3.1, in 
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Experiment 3.2 a question was added to obtain more direct information on the perception 
of supernatural agency and its hypothesised influence on natural phenomena and human 
beings. That is, participants were also asked to rate the image on the extent to which they 
thought God (or God / Allah, etc.) exerted control over the depicted human being or natural 
phenomenon. In both experiments, no difference was found between the two priming 
conditions on the amount of agency attributed to natural phenomena and human beings. 
However, in both experiments, we did find that individual differences in the strength of 
belief in controlling God(s) was positively associated with the level of agency attributed to 
natural phenomena, and negatively associated with the perception of agency in human 
beings. Analyses of the direct measurement of supernatural control revealed that natural 
phenomena were perceived to be more strongly controlled by a supernatural power than 
human beings. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that natural phenomena offer 
more room for supernatural involvement because they contain little agency themselves, 
whereas in the case of human beings, supernatural agency has to compete with the high 
level of agency that is attributed to human beings by default. Interestingly, in general, 
results also indicated that participants attributed higher levels of control by God to non-
threatening images than to threatening images. This effect was especially pronounced for 
images of human beings. 
 The findings in Chapter 3 have implications for the theory of HAD: Whereas HAD poses 
that assumptions of supernatural agency are directly associated with hyperactive agency 
detection (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Guthrie, 1993), 
our findings suggest that supernatural attributions may also be accompanied by reductions 
in the perception of agency, especially when it comes to human beings. Considerations of 
supernatural agency may imbue natural phenomena with additional agency, but may take 
away intentionality in case of a human agent. Note however, that these findings are based 
on individual difference scores and no effect of religious priming was found.
Supernatural attributions and consequences of reduced attribution 
of agency to human beings
We proceeded further along the line of inquiry that supernatural agency attributions are 
associated with lower agency ascribed to human beings, and we inves tigated whether 
supernatural agency attributions may also lower the perceived responsibility of a per-
petrator and thereby encourage forgiveness.  Holding a supernatural agent accountable for 
moral events can have consequences when it comes to assigning blame to the offender, as 
an important consideration in assigning blame is whether the agent had sufficient control 
over the action (Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). The consideration of supernatural 
explanations for a violent offence would constitute an external factor that is outside of 
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the perpetrators’ control. In line with this reasoning, studies on forgiveness have found 
that the possibility to attribute a transgression to external circumstances instead of to the 
perpetrator may enhance people’s willingness to forgive an offender (e.g., Fincham 2000; 
Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia 2002; Kearns & Fincham 2005; Worthington & Wade 1999; for 
similar findings in the domain of self-excuse see Fisher & Exline 2006; Tangney, Boone, & 
Dearing 2005).
Introduction and summary of Chapter 4 - Supernatural Agency and 
Forgiveness 
In Chapter 4, we investigated the possibility that when con cepts of supernatural agency 
are activated, part of the responsibility for a vio lent act is ascribed to the supernatural agent 
instead of to the perpetrator, which facilitates forgiveness of the perpetrator. The present 
research examined the hypothesis that supernatural agency attributions underlie the 
relation between religion and forgiveness. In two experiments, a priming procedure was 
used to make religious concepts temporarily more salient. In Experiment 4.1, a newspaper 
article of the Colorado shooting at the Batman movie “The Dark Knight Rises” in 2012 was 
used to examine the effect of religious priming on forgiveness. Before reading the article, 
half of the partici pants were asked to answer three open-ended questions that required 
them to reflect upon their religious or spiritual views. The other half of the participants 
received the same questions at the very end of the experiment. After reading the article, 
participants were asked to rate the responsibility of the perpetrator, how much they were 
able to forgive the perpetrator, how severely they thought the perpetrator should be 
punished, and to what extent supernatural forces may have played a role in the event. 
Subsequently, participants filled out the View of God scale (Shariff & Noren zayan, 2011). 
 It was expected that (1) religious priming would enhance forgiveness of the offender, 
(2) effects on forgiveness would be mediated by reductions in perceived responsibility of 
the offender, and religious priming (3) would increase the belief that a higher power could 
have had an influence on the situation (supernatural attributions). Furthermore, following 
the hypothesis that the percep tion of supernatural agency may take away responsibility of 
the offender, we predicted that (4) the effect of religion on forgiveness would be mediated 
by the indirect effect of supernatural agency via responsibility of the offender. 
 Results of Experiment 4.1 indicated that the religion prime marginally enhanced 
forgiveness (1), but in contrast to what was expected, participants who were primed with 
religion believed to a lesser extent that a higher power could have had an influ ence on 
the situation (3). A possible interpretation is that religious priming might have increased 
forgiveness through direct associations with positive God concepts such as kindness, 
compassion, and forgiveness. In line with this interpretation, participants were found to 
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perceive their (culture’s) God as far more positive than negative as indicated by the View 
of God scale (Shariff & Noren zayan, 2011). Furthermore, we found that the religion prime 
in Experiment 4.1 enhanced participants’ positive views of God. Hence, it seems likely that 
participants did not wish to associate their (activated) positive God concepts with a nega-
tive event such as the Colorado Shooting. 
 Importantly however, corre lational analyses showed that when participants did make 
supernatural attributions, they were associated with more forgiveness (2), less punishment, 
and less attributions of respon sibility to the offender. Mediation analyses of individual 
differences provided partial support for the prediction that supernatural attributions may 
lower the perceived responsibility of the offender and, in turn, enhance forgiveness of the 
offender. That is, participants who perceived a greater influence of a higher power in the 
event, ascribed less responsibility to the offender and thought the offender deserved less 
severe punishment. However, responsibility of the offender was not found to mediate the 
relation between the perceived supernatural influence and forgiveness (4).
 Previous research has shown that feelings of low personal control increases belief in a 
controlling God (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). Therefore, in Experiment 4.2, 
we attempted to induce the concept of a controlling God by first manipulating participants’ 
sense of control (high vs. low) before presenting a religion prime. Subsequently, half of the 
participants in the low- and high-control condition received a questionnaire that consisted 
of eight items, four of which required religious and spiritual reflec tions (the religion prime). 
For the participants in the neutral prime condition, the four religion questions were replaced 
by four questions unrelated to religion. Subsequently, participants rated images depicting a 
victim and an offender on the extent to which they thought the offender acted in accordance 
with his own will, whether they thought that the victim would be able to forgive the 
offender, and to what extent a higher power could have had an influence on the situation.
 In accordance with the hypothesis that low control may enhance supernatu ral 
attributions, we expected effects of religious priming on forgiveness to be strongest in 
the low control condition. Furthermore, we expected the effect of religious priming on 
forgiveness to be mediated by the perceived influence of a higher power on the event, 
and the intentionality attributed to the offender. As expected, in the low control condition, 
religious priming enhanced participants’ forgiveness towards the offenders. Unexpectedly, 
in the high control condition, religious priming lowered participants’ forgiveness towards 
the offenders. Importantly, mediation analysis further supported the existence of a relation 
between supernatural agency attributions and participants’ tendency to forgive. However, 
the perceived intentionality of the offender did not contribute to the relationship between 
reli gion and forgiveness.
 In conclusion, Chapter 4 investigated the relation between religion and forgiveness, 
and the possible psychological mechanisms that connect religion to forgiveness. Taken 
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together, the results of Experiment 4.1 and 4.2 are in line with the hypothesis that 
supernatural attributions may enhance for giveness (Experiment 4.1), and that this effect 
can be moderated by the level of control that people experience (Experiment 4.2). 
Corroborating with the model of religion as a compensatory control mechanism (Kay 
et al., 2010), it was found that in a state of low control, reli gious priming enhanced the 
perception of supernatural agency and increased forgiveness. Interestingly, it was also 
found that in a state of high control the perception of supernatural agency was decreased 
and forgiveness of a perpetrator was lowered. Additional research is required to further 
understand the relation between supernatural agency and forgiveness. In particular, the 
hypothesis that forgiveness may be mediated by a reduction in perceived responsibility of 
the perpetrator requires further attention as well as alternative models that may underlie 
this relationship.
Discussion
A model of Supernatural Agency Attributions (SAA)
Based on the main findings of the three empirical chapters that have been presented so far, 
we propose a new explanatory model in addition to HAD. Presented in Figure 1 is a model 
of Supernatural Agency Attributions (SAA) in which concepts of supernatural agency (both 
existing beliefs, as well as temporarily activated supernatural agency concepts through 
priming) may differentially influence the attribution of agency to natural phenomena and 
human agents. Natural phenomena, which contain no agency themselves, may derive 
agency as an extension of the assumed presence of a supernatural agent. Human agents, 
on the other hand, do possess agency and may be seen as less agentic in the assumed 
presence of an all-powerful supernatural agent that may control human behaviour. 
Reductions in the perception of agency and the responsibility that a human has for his/her 
actions are hypothesized to enhance forgiveness and lower the demanded punishment of 
perpetrators. Various factors are considered to moderate the differential effects of SAA such 
as the severity of an event, individual views of God, variations and individual differences in 
experienced personal control. These moderating factors, as well as (in)consistencies in the 
outcomes of the different studies that led to SAA, will be discussed in more detail below. 
Conditions under which SAA take place
Religious priming
Our studies show inconclusive results regarding the effects of religious priming on agency 
attribution. Differences in priming methods in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 might (partially) 
explain why priming had an effect on perceived agency in Chapter 2, but not in Chapter 3.
24
Chapter 1
Figure 1. The model of Supernatural Agency Attributions (SAA): Attributing agency to a supernatural 
power increases agency perceived in natural phenomena, and decreases agency perceived in human 
beings. This reduction of perceived agency in perpetrators could facilitate forgiveness and lower the 
desired punishment of a perpetrator. 
In Experiment 2.1, participants received a questionnaire that consisted of seven questions 
about participants’ religious and spiritual reflections. Two of them specifically inquired about 
belief in supernatural agents: ‘Have you ever felt that your life was guided by a spiritual 
force, stronger than any other human being?’ and ‘Do you believe in a higher power or 
higher being, something divine or a god?’ Participants filled out the questionnaire before 
or after the experimental task. Hence, participants who filled out the questionnaire before 
the experimental task were primed with religion or supernatural agency. In Experiment 
2.2 participants received a subliminally presented prime of the word ‘God’ before every 
image of the experimental task, whereas the neutral prime group received the letter string 
‘Xxx’. In both experiments, the concept of (a) supernatural agent(s) was directly activated. 
Part of the explanation why we did not find a priming effect in Experiment 3.1 might be 
that the priming method that was used did not specifically activate supernatural agent 
concepts. That is, in Experiment 3.1, participants in the religion prime condition were 
asked whether they considered themselves to be religious or not, and to reflect on the role 
religion played in their lives (participants in the soccer prime condition were asked whether 
they were interested in soccer, and to elaborate on this). About half of the open answers 
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contained the word ‘God’ or made a reference to a higher power, whereas the other half 
mainly contained references to church attendance or to more cultural and moral aspects 
of religion, for example: “I do not go to church every Sunday, but religion plays an important 
role in my life. I also intend to raise my children with religion, because I think Christian morals 
are good for everyone. The law is also based on these standards and values. I cannot imagine a 
relationship with someone who has a religion other than me, so yes I think religion is important 
in my life.” Descriptions such as these suggest that in approximately half of the participants 
in the prime condition, the concept of supernatural agency was not accessible (enough) 
which could explain the absence of a priming effect. 
 In contrast, in Experiment 3.2 the concept of a supernatural agent was activated directly: 
Questions that specifically inquired about participants’ belief in controlling God(s) were 
used as a religion prime. Furthermore, in line with previous studies that found people to be 
more inclined towards supernatural attribution when experiencing a loss or lack of control 
(e.g., Kay et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2010), we manipulated participants’ sense of control before 
administering the religion prime. Nevertheless, no effect of religious priming was found on 
agency ascribed to natural phenomena or agency attributed to human beings. Still, one 
possibility for the lack of an effect in Experiment 3.2 could be that the priming manipulation 
was not strong enough to compete with pre-existing individual differences in belief in 
God(s). That is, participants in Experiment 3.2 were gathered via Mturk and were (for the 
most part) from the United States – a society with a religious majority (Hackett et al., 2012). 
In our sample we indeed found a higher percentage of participants who indicated to be 
religious in our US sample (Experiment 3.2) as compared to our Dutch (college students) 
sample in Experiment 3.1 (47% vs. 26%). If, in the religion prime group, many people 
already (‘chronically’) believed in supernatural agents, a temporary increase in activation 
of supernatural agent concepts in this group may not have substantially enhanced their 
tendency for making supernatural attributions. 
 If the latter explanation is correct, religious priming would have the largest effect in 
secular groups. However, this suggestion is opposed by the findings of a recent meta-
analysis by Shariff and colleagues (2015), which indicated that religious priming has a robust 
effect primarily in religious participants and not in non-religious participants. It must be 
noted, though, that this meta-analysis primarily included studies that investigated prosocial 
behavioural measures. These measures may be sensitive to demand effects; in particular, 
explicit reference to religion among religious participants may activate prosocial thoughts 
and behaviours that reflect the shared moral values of their religious group. Consistent 
with this interpretation, Shariff et al. (2015) found that subliminal religious primes had 
much smaller effects, as compared to explicit forms of religious priming. In our studies in 
Chapters 2 and 3, social desirability is not likely to play a role as the outcome variables 
did not represent social or moral values. Furthermore, the subliminal priming method in 
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Experiment 2.2. excluded possible demand effects. So, whereas for prosocial behaviour, the 
priming method might have led participants to want to act in line with their moral values, 
in our studies we presume that its mechanism lies in a less conscious cognitive process, in 
which supernatural agency attributions have an effect on how an event will be interpreted 
in terms of intentionality and responsibility. Further research is required to investigate if 
cultural differences in levels of religiosity in the US could indeed be responsible for the 
absence of supernatural priming on the perception of agency in natural phenomena and 
human beings. 
Although we do not find an effect of religious priming on agency detection in 
Chapter 3, results did show that individual differences in the belief in (controlling) God(s) 
were positively related to agency perceived in natural phenomena and negatively to 
agency perceived in human beings. It would be interesting to compare these findings 
with Experiment 2.1 and Experiment 2.2 where we did find an effect of religious priming. 
Presumably (successful) religious priming might diminish individual differences in belief in 
God, as in the religious priming group supernatural agent concepts are temporarily activated 
for everyone. However, in Experiment 2.1 and Experiment 2.2, the response options on the 
religion questionnaire were categorical, whereas in chapter 3 answers could be given on 
Likert-scales, which were used as continuous variable in the analyses. Therefore, the religion 
questionnaires in the two experiments in Chapter 2 were not suitable for comparisons 
based on individual differences. For future research, besides using a priming method that 
activates supernatural agent concepts, we would recommend including a continuous 
measure for individual beliefs in (controlling) God/s.
Finally, there has been a debate recently about the replicability and robustness of 
priming effects in social psychology (see e.g., Molden, 2014). Fundamental research in 
cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics has found robust evidence for the existence of 
priming effects, such as semantic priming where reading the word ‘dog’ makes temporarily 
more accessible different kinds of dog breeds, like the golden retriever or the bulldog. 
Participants who are primed with the word ‘dog’ are then faster at recognizing dog breeds 
in a subsequent word recognition task (Kahan, Sellinger, & Broman-Fulks, 2006; Neely, 
1976). In social psychology on the other hand, priming studies often investigate effects on 
behaviour (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Higgins, Rholes. & Jones, 1977; Dijksterhuis & 
Bargh, 2001). For example, in a study of Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996), participants were 
primed with words associated with the elderly (e.g., ‘grey’, ‘old’, ‘wrinkle’) whereas a control 
group received neutral words. At the end of the task, the group that was primed with the 
elderly walked more slowly through the hallway. Although there is a substantial amount of 
studies showing priming effects on behaviour (for an overview see Bargh, 2014; Dijksterhuis, 
2014), several replication attempts failed to reproduce these findings (e.g., Doyen, Klein, 
Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013). Therefore, questions have arisen about the 
127
General Introduction & discussion
reliability of these priming effects, and how and when priming actually effects occur (e.g., 
Cesario, 2014; Molden, 2014; Shanks et al., 2013). Daniel Kahneman (Nature, 2012) published 
an open letter to the scientific community that uses priming effects in social and behaviour 
domains with the request to jointly examine the replicability of priming results. Following 
this debate, Shariff et al. (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on the effect of religious priming 
on prosocial behaviour. They conclude that religious priming has a small but robust effect 
on prosocial behavioural measures, primarily in religious participants (as discussed above). 
Contextual primes (such as a church or a mosque) resulted in stronger effects than implicit 
primes. However, van Elk et al. (2015) replied with a commentary with methodological and 
statistical concerns. They argue that meta-analyses can still be influenced by publication 
bias and experimenter bias, as supported by a negative correlation between sample 
size and effect size in the meta-analysis of Shariff et al. (2015). They further questioned 
the inclusion criteria the authors used as they failed to specify clearly why some studies 
were excluded from the meta-analysis (see also my own ‘file drawer’ in the Postface of 
this dissertation). Van Elk et al. (2015) re-analysed the original data using two different 
meta-analysis techniques to account for publication bias and found opposite results. One 
method confirming the original results of the meta-analysis of Shariff et al. (2015) and the 
other method yielded no effect of religious priming on prosocial behaviour. They argue that 
meta-analyses are not sufficient to establish an effect, and they recommend large-scale, 
preregistered replication projects such as the Open Science Framework (see https://osf.io) 
and the Registered Replication Reports initiative (Simons, Holcombe, & Spellman (2014). 
We acknowledge the debate concerning replicability, and hope that by using different 
types of primes, our research contributes to a better understanding of the processes and 
conditions that allow and do not allow (religious) priming to occur. We encourage future 
studies on religious priming to use power analyses and preregistration reports to provide a 
detailed and unbiased perspective on (forms of) religious priming in human cognition and 
behaviour.
Personal control
The findings of our experiments suggest that it is not so much the experience of threat, 
as the lack of control which drives people to make supernatural agency attributions (cf., 
Barrett and Johnson 2003). In Experiment 2.1 and Experiment 2.2, we found on an item 
level that attributions of supernatural agency relied on the level of control that participants 
reported over the specific items. In both experiments, we found that the less control 
participants perceived over the depicted natural phenomena (rainbow, tornado, moon 
etc.), the more agency they perceived in the phenomena, but only when they were 
primed with religion. In line with this finding, we found in Experiment 4.2 that the group 
of participants who received the combination of a low-control manipulation and a religion 
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prime generated most supernatural attributions. Furthermore, in Experiment 3.2 we found 
a relationship between ‘individual differences in belief in controlling Gods’ and ‘more (/less) 
agency perceived in natural phenomena (/human beings)’. Again, these effects were most 
prominent in the group of participants who received the low-control manipulation and a 
religion prime. These results must be interpreted with some caution. In Experiment 4.2, only 
the interaction of control manipulation and religion prime on supernatural attributions, 
but not the simple main effects, were statistically significant. In Experiment 3.2, we found 
the pattern only in analyses based on individual differences and not at an experimental 
(group) level. Nevertheless, taken together, these results do point to personal control as an 
important condition for supernatural attributions to take place. Interestingly, we also found 
support for the idea that feelings of high control will actually lower SAA. This suggests 
that feelings of personal control may actually lead to the rejection of ascribing control to 
external sources of (supernatural) agents.
 Early research on religious coping and attribution theories (Pargament, 1999; Spilka, 
Shaver, & Kirkpatrick, 1985) and more recent research on compensatory control (Kay et al., 
2009, 2010; Laurin et al., 2008) suggest that people have a strong desire for a predictable 
environment, and that when personal control is not feasible, people may increase their 
sense of control by attributing control to a supernatural power. Although fear and control 
partly coincide in the sense that in most cases where events are threatening, personal 
control is also in danger, they do not necessarily correspond in all cases. For instance, 
research on awe and wonder has found that beautiful and impressive scenes of nature 
may be particularly effective in lowering one’s sense of personal control. Awe describes 
the intense emotional experience that is induced by vast stimuli such as impressive scenes 
of nature, whereby one feels overwhelmed and the self is reduced in size or significance 
(Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). These results support a theoretical 
model in which reduced feelings of personal control can be compensated through the 
attribution of supernatural agency.
Views of God
In Experiment 4.1, we found that participants ascribed far more positive than negative 
characteristics to (their culture’s) God. Religious priming enhanced this effect even more. 
Interestingly, religious priming decreased supernatural attributions of a violent event (the 
Colorado shooting). We argue that participants’ highly positive view of God may have 
clashed with attributing responsibility to God for an extremely negative event such as a 
mass shooting. Participants’ views of God seem to be an important factor for the attribution 
of agency to a supernatural power for particular events. In line with this reasoning, in 
Experiment 3.2 participants were explicitly asked to which extent they thought God exerted 
control over the depicted threatening and non-threatening natural phenomena and human 
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beings. Opposing the proposition that especially threatening and devastating events are 
likely to be attributed to supernatural agency, we found once again that, in general, the 
non-threatening events were perceived as more controlled by God than the threatening 
events. This effect was especially pronounced for events depicting human beings. This 
interpretation might also explain why in Experiment 3.1 the relation between Belief in 
God/s and the perception of agency in human beings was found only in the condition of 
non-threatening human beings, and not in the condition of threatening human beings. 
Together these findings suggest that personal views of God/s can determine whether one 
is likely to make supernatural attributions, as supernatural attributions are more likely to 
take place when the event is consistent with one’s view of God. 
 Another explanation for the finding that threatening events in which harm is caused 
by an offender are less likely to be attributed to a supernatural agent might be that acts 
of negative behaviour are perceived as more intentional than acts of positive behaviour 
(Knobe, 2003; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). If there is a (psychological) trade-off 
between ascribing agency to the offender and God, then this intentionality bias of morally 
bad behaviour might enhance the attribution of intentionality to an offender and prohibit 
attribution of intentionality to a supernatural agent.
SAA within the context of CSR
The research that is summarized in this chapter was aimed to fulfil the need for more 
empirical data to investigating existing theories in the CSR, in particular hypersensitive 
agency detection. Although we started off to investigate the relationship between religion 
and agency as suggested by HAD, the evidence as presented in the subsequent chapters 
pointed at a somewhat different story. The accumulated findings have been condensed 
in SAA, a theoretical model based on empirical observations that clearly deviates from 
the original HAD model that we started off with. Below we present the main differences 
between HAD and SAA. 
 Whereas HAD proposes that HAD-experiences and supernatural agent concepts are 
reciprocally reinforcing, and that supernatural agent concepts can make one more vigilant 
to detect agency in the environment (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer 
& Bergstrom, 2008), we propose that the consideration of supernatural agency implies 
involvement of a supernatural agent who is considered to influence, and is held (partially 
or fully) responsible for natural events as well as the behaviour of human beings. We 
suggest that supernatural attributions then may also be accompanied by a reduction in the 
perception of agency, especially when it comes to human beings (see Figure 1).
 The model of SAA further diverges from HAD in the sense that concepts of supernatural 
agency may affect both natural phenomena and human beings, albeit in opposite ways. 
Considerations of supernatural agency may imbue natural phenomena with additional 
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agency but may take away intentionality in case of a human agent. Furthermore, whereas 
HAD theory predicts that, especially in the case of threating events, people are inclined to 
ascribe (super)natural agency, our findings suggest that it is not so much threat but the 
experience of low control that drives people towards supernatural agency attributions. In 
addition, when the outcome of the event is consistent with one’s views of God, people will 
be more inclined to ascribe the event to a supernatural power. Further research is needed 
to further investigate the circumstances under which these supernatural attributions are 
especially prone to exist. 
Limitations and further directions
Lab setting
In daily life we find frequent reminders of religion(s) and God(s) everywhere: religious 
buildings and symbols, church bells ringing, the call to prayer recited from a mosque 
five times per day, the start of a thesis defence with prayer, and so on. In court, religious 
reminders are endorsed by the words “So help me God”, a phrase often used when giving 
an oath. It would be interesting to empirically investigate the influence of these naturally 
occurring religious reminders on the attribution of agency, as the experiments in this 
dissertation are all limited to a laboratory setting.
Perceived agency of offender versus victim 
In the studies where we investigated the effect of supernatural attributions on agency in 
threatening moral situations, we selectively focused on agency perceived in the offender. 
We found that ascribing agency for the event to a supernatural power makes the offender 
seem less agentic. However, we did not test what effect supernatural agency attributions 
has on the perceived agency of the victim. Although the offender and the victim are both 
human agents, the context of the situation makes the offender powerful, and the victim 
powerless. Perhaps in this situation, attributing agency to a supernatural agent that is in 
control enhances the perceived agency in the victim.
Perspective of a bystander versus actor
Furthermore, all our studies took the stance of an observer’s perspective. Frequently, 
violence acts are committed in the name of God. Unfortunately, acts of religious terrorism 
are reported in the media almost on a weekly basis. According the model of SAA, we would 
expect from the perspective of the observer (the person who reads about the attack in 
the newspaper or watches it on television) that under normal conditions, the violent act is 
not in line with his/her view of God. We argue that in that case, agency/intentionality will 
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not be attributed to God. Hence, God will not be hold responsible for the act. Instead, the 
observer will hold the terrorist highly responsible for the violent act. However, one might 
speculate that the religious terrorist, who is acting in accordance with his view of God, 
would probably ascribe agency to his controlling God, thereby decreasing his own feeling 
of agency and responsibility. This may be an interesting line of thinking to be explored 
further in future research.
Variety of tasks
In most of our studies we used the same image-rating task to measure agency. To 
assess whether our results generalise to other paradigms/situations, one could also use 
a procedure similar to that of Gray and Wegner (2009; 2012), in which participants were 
asked to rate targets on dimensions of agency and experience. We would predict that for 
targets that (under normal circumstances) are perceived as high in agency (e.g., man, child, 
you!), religious priming decreases their perceived agency. Furthermore, we would expect a 
negative relationship between belief in (controlling) higher powers and perceived agency 
in these targets. For targets that are low on agency (e.g., dead man, man in coma, natural 
phenomena), on the other hand, we would expect religious priming to increase perceived 
agency in these targets, and belief in (controlling) higher powers to be positively related 
with agency ratings.
Narrow sampling
In all the experiments of this dissertation except for Experiment 3.2, a predominantly secular 
sample of students participated. More studies with (highly) religious participants should be 
done to further test the model of SAA, and to compare religious with secular groups. As 
described earlier, religiosity might moderate the effect of religious priming. Also, for further 
research we recommend to include measures of individual religious beliefs, as views of God 
are found to moderate attributions of supernatural agency. Furthermore, (again with the 
exception of Experiment 3.2.), the sample of students contained mainly females. This narrow 
sampling of mainly female college students may put limitations on generalising the results 
to the whole population. There is some tentative evidence that there might be a gender 
effect in ascribing agency, as research shows that, on a population level, females are better 
at empathising and inferring mental states (Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, & Belmonte; 2005). 
For future research, a more equal distribution of male and female participants is needed to 
exclude a gender effect in the attribution of supernatural agency. Furthermore, for some 
of the experiments, the sample size of participants was small, especially for Experiment 4.2, 
which increases the chance of false positives (i.e., finding evidence for effects that actually 
do not exist) and false negatives (not finding evidence for effects to actually do exist). 
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Changing times in psychology
Finally, fuelled by the so called replication crisis in psychology (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 
2012), around 2011 an important discussion has started among psychologists (and other 
social scientists) about their empirical practices (see also the Postface in this dissertation). 
From this discussion, new standards and best practices resulted, such as larger sample 
sizes based on a-priori power analyses, pre-registrations on platforms such as the Open 
Science Framework (see https://osf.io), the application of additional analyses methods such 
as Bayesian statistics (e.g., Wagenmakers & Grünwald, 2006), and open access of not only 
papers but also methods, data and syntax. Different scholars have furthermore published 
“rules” which should be applied when doing psychological experiments (e.g., Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), several online blogs discuss best practices (see for example 
the statistical blog of Daniel Lakens at http://daniellakens.blogspot.com), and NWO has 
launched its first replication study call in 2016 (see https://www.nwo.nl/en/news-and-
events/news/2016/nwo-makes-3-million-available-for-replication-studies-pilot.html).
 All data which were part of the present dissertation were collected between the 
year 2009 and 2012 (with one exception, namely Exp3.2 of which data were collected in 
2014). Therefore, the studies described in the current dissertation do not meet these new 
standards. It is important to stress that the empirical evidence of the dissertation should 
hence be regarded as exploratory. Future studies, both direct replications and conceptual 
replications, are necessary to support or refute the findings as presented in this thesis. 
Therefore, all the conclusions based on the dissertation, including the new model, should 
be regarded as provisional. This also applies to any societal implications that may be derived 
from this research.
Conclusion
This dissertation aims to contribute to the scientific understanding of religious thought 
and the impact it has on perceiving and interpreting events in the world. Our findings 
suggest that the perceived influence of the supernatural on the mundane is variable and 
influenced by multiple factors, such as the ontological nature of stimuli, threat, perceived 
control, and an individual’s view of God. A new model of supernatural attributions (SAA) is 
presented, in which SAA increase agency perceived in natural phenomena but decrease 
agency perceived in human beings. Our model can be used as a framework to explain, 
understand, and predict religious thought and behaviour in the area of (supernatural) 
agency attributions. It extents the theory of HAD in that supernatural agency concepts 
can also lead to a decreased perception of agency, and that supernatural attributions are 
dependent on various factors. However, the model of SAA also raises many new questions 
that still remain unanswered. For example, will supernatural agency attributions always lead 
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to a decreased perception of agency in human beings, or might this vary as a function 
of agency of the perceived person (e.g., helpless victim vs. powerful offender). What is the 
effect of supernatural agency attributions on the perceived responsibility of an offender? 
More research is needed to get more insight into the conditions under which supernatural 
attributions take place and bias our attribution of intentionality and responsibility in the 
monitoring of our own’ and others’ behaviour. The current contribution reveals only the tip 
of the iceberg. 
 Religion is of importance for many people around the world, whether they are religious 
or not. Nevertheless, psychological aspect of religion and especially the topic of supernatural 
agency are understudied. We hope that the model of SAA will encourage follow-up research 
as well as direct and conceptual replications into this intriguing topic.
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Abstract
Cognitive theories of religion suggest that belief in supernatural agents finds a basis in 
the human tendency to (over) detect agency in the environment. The present research 
investigated whether activation of religious concepts enhances the attribution of agency 
in natural phenomena. In two experiments we administered a religion prime (a religion 
questionnaire in Experiment 1; a subliminal God prime in Experiment 2) and measured the 
amount of intentionality and will that participants ascribed to images of natural phenomena 
and agents. In both experiments participants ascribed more agency to natural phenomena 
if they had been presented with a religion prime. Item analyses for both experiments 
furthermore revealed that the effect of religious priming was most pronounced for items of 
natural phenomena that were perceived as beyond personal control. These findings provide 
empirical support for the hypothesized relation between religion and agency detection.
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Introduction
There are 10.000 distinctive religions worldwide, with three new religions coming into 
existence each day (Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson, 2001). The essence of many religions is that 
they involve a belief in spiritual beings or supernatural agents (e.g., God, gods, spirits, etc.; 
Tylor, 1871) who may influence or have power over worldly events. According to cognitive 
theories of religion (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; 
Boyer, 2003; Guthrie, 1993) this belief in supernatural agents may originate from the human 
tendency to (over) detect intentional agents in the environment. The philosophical origins 
of these ideas can be traced back to Benidict de Spinoza and David Hume (see Guthrie, 
2013) who suggested that religion can be best understood as a result of ordinary human 
cognition which causes systematic cognitive biases. One of these cognitive biases is that 
humans are biased to perceive the world as “agent-like” in their attempts to understand and 
control uncertainty (Guthrie, 2013). 
 “Agents” are beings capable of independently and intentionally initiating actions on 
the basis of internal mental states such as beliefs and desires, with humans and animals 
representing the most typical examples. Instead, objects, such as rocks, trees, and human-
made artifacts, react to the world in purely mechanistic and unintentional ways. From an 
evolutionary point of view, agents are what matter to us most, as quickly spotting an agent, 
e.g., a possible predator, prey or mate, is crucial for survival and reproduction. Accordingly, 
it has been proposed that humans have evolved an automatic tendency for the detection 
of agents (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Barrett, 2000; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Guthrie, 1980, 
1993, 2013; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Tremlin, 2006) and that this tendency may even drive 
us to attribute agency to objects or stimuli which possess no agency, but whose features 
suggest that they might. Typical examples of incorrect attribution of agency to objects are 
the perception of faces in the clouds, the hearing of voices in the wind, or the perception 
of intentional action in the movements of a tornado. Seminal work by Heider and Simmel 
(1944; see also Bloom & Veres, 1999) already showed that humans are inclined to attribute 
intentional states, emotions, personality and motivations to moving geometrical shapes 
(for a review see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). When movement is perceived to be self-
propelled, changes direction or speed without no apparent external cause, or responds to 
the movements of other objects at a distance, humans may perceive these movements as 
goal directed, and as a signature of agentic action (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 2005; 
Blakemore, Boyer, Pachot-Clouard, Meltzoff, Segebarth, & Decety, 2003; Premack, 1990; 
Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000). 
 In accordance with these empirical observations, Barrett (2000) has proposed that 
humans are equipped with a cognitive module, an Agency Detection Device (ADD), which 
is specialized in rapidly detecting agents, or assuming their presence based on signs or 
traces. When an agent is detected where none are present, Barrett and Lanman (2008) 
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speak of a Hyperactive ADD-experience (HADD-experience). Cognitive theories of religion 
propose that these HADD-experiences underlie belief in supernatural agents (e.g., Atran 
& Norenzayan, 2004). That is, HADD-experiences can cause over-attribution of agency 
for anomalous events that have no clear physical cause, which may include supernatural 
explanations (Barrett, 2004). Importantly, Barrett and Lanman (2008) propose that these 
HADD-experiences and concepts involving supernatural agents are mutually reinforcing. 
That is, not only should hyperactive agency detection lead to an increased belief in 
supernatural agents, also supernatural agent concepts should lead to an increase in agency 
detection. For example, being in a place that is associated with supernatural agents (e.g., a 
church, haunted castle, etc.) could unknowingly increase one’s vigilance for the detection 
of supernatural agency. Conversely, detection of ambiguous events in such places could 
reinforce one’s belief in supernatural agency. In short, knowing that you are in a house 
that is said to be haunted, may increase the likelihood that you ascribe squeaking stairs to 
supernatural agents.
 Although cognitive theories of religion hypothesize about the important relationship 
between religion and agency detection and vice versa, to our knowledge, as yet 
predominantly correlational, but no experimental evidence for this relationship has been 
presented. One exception is a recent study by van Elk, Rutjens, van der Pligt, and van Harreveld 
(2014) that found preliminary evidence that priming with supernatural agent concepts 
influenced the detection of agency, but only in participants who reported to believe in God. 
In one experiment the perceptual sensitivity of detecting biological motion (a human actor 
walking) in point-light displays was reduced in believers following supernatural priming. In 
two other experiments the speed of detecting faces in a face-house categorization task was 
enhanced and accuracy was reduced in believers following supernatural priming. However, 
both findings were not found to be reliable in a meta-analysis across experiments in this 
study (van Elk et al., 2014).  
 The difficulty in finding effects of supernatural concepts may lie in the operationalization 
of agency. In previous literature, the concept of agency has been used to refer to both 
perceptual and to intentional levels of representation (Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Johnson, 
2003; Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Guthrie, 2013; Leslie, 1995; Lisdorf, 
2007; Tremlin, 2006). That is, agency detection is used to note the perceptual detection 
of an agent (e.g., noticing someone running), and it is used to note the intentions of an 
agent (e.g., the inference that this person wants to attack me). We assume that concepts 
of supernatural agency will be foremost expressed at an intentional level as supernatural 
agents are generally invisible and their presence needs to be inferred or interpreted (Vail et 
al., 2010). 
 Examples of events to which people frequently ascribe (supernatural) agency are 
natural phenomena (Kelemen, 2004; Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012). Natural phenomena are 
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regularly interpreted as communicative attempts of some non-physical, supernatural agent 
(Bering, 2002). When the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March 2011 caused 
thousands of deaths, the governor of Tokyo told reporters that he thought the disaster 
was a divine punishment for the egoism of the Japanese people (McCurry, 2011). Similar 
statements were found following the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and Hurricane Katrina in 
2005 when some religious conservatives saw these natural disasters as punishment by God 
(Smith, 2010). 
 In the current study we investigated the hypothesis that the activation of religious 
concepts, including supernatural agents, may enhance the attribution of supernatural 
intentionality to natural phenomena. As illustrated in the previous examples of natural 
disasters, this attribution may be especially strong in the case of threatening (vs. non-
threatening) natural phenomena. That is, humans may be tempted to ascribe purpose and 
intentionality to threatening natural phenomena in an attempt to explain the behaviour of 
these phenomena to avoid possible negative outcomes (cf. Blakemore & Decety, 2001). We 
present two experiments in which we investigated the influence of religious thought and 
concepts of supernatural agency on the perception of intentionality in natural phenomena. In 
Experiment 1, for half of our participants, religious concepts were activated by administering 
a religion questionnaire. For the other half of the subjects the religion questionnaire was 
administered at the end of the experiment. Subsequently, participants performed a picture-
rating task in which they judged the amount of agency (i.e. intentionality and will) in images 
depicting threatening and non-threatening natural objects (e.g., a tornado and a sunset) 
and images depicting threatening and non-threatening agents (e.g., an aggressive dog and 
a pet rabbit). Images of agents (animals and humans) were included as a control condition 
to confirm that the effect of religious priming is specific to natural phenomena, and to rule 
out the possible interpretation that religious priming results in a general increase in the 
attribution of agency. 
 In line with the hypothesis that the activation of religious concepts will enhance 
attribution of intentionality in natural objects, we expected that when participants 
were primed with religion they would ascribe more agency to images depicting natural 
phenomena, than participants who were not primed with religion. We expected this effect 
to be most pronounced for images of threatening natural phenomena, as threatening 
conditions call for predictive modelling (of intentionality) to evade possible harm. For 
images of agents we expected little or no effect of religious priming, as there is little or no 
ambiguity with respect to agency in the case of animals and humans.
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Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Sixty-four students from Radboud University (54 women and 10 men, mean age = 20.8 
years, age range: 18 to 52 years) participated in this experiment. All participants received 
course credits in return. 
Stimuli
Eighty-three pictures were used: 45 were taken from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), and 38 pictures were gathered from the Internet. All 
images were elected to fit in the 2 (Ontology) x 2 (Threat) stimulus design of the present 
experiment (see Figure 2). When collecting the pictures, we aimed for at least 15 pictures 
within each category.  The selected set contained 39 natural phenomena and 44 agents. 
Figure 2. Examples of images in the picture rating task. Stimuli were agents (top) and natural 
phenomena (bottom), and were threatening (left) and non-threatening (right). 
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Of the images depicting natural phenomena 22 were threatening (e.g., tornados and 
lightning), and 17 were non-threatening (e.g., palm beaches and sunsets). Within the set of 
agents, 24 were threatening (e.g., aggressive looking bears and dogs with exposed teeth) 
and 20 were non-threatening (e.g., friendly looking rabbits and dolphins). Within the set of 
agents, images of animals (27) and humans (17) were included. 
Procedure
The experiment was conducted as an online experiment to which students could subscribe 
via the university research participation system. One half of the participants were asked to 
fill out a religion questionnaire before they performed the picture rating task (the prime 
group). The other half completed the religion questionnaire after they finished the picture 
rating task (the no-prime group). The religion questionnaire consisted of seven items that 
inquired about participants’ religious and spiritual reflections (e.g., “Do you consider yourself 
religious?”; see Table 1). 
Table 1. Religion questionnaire and responses of participants in Experiment 1
1. Do you consider  
yourself religious?
Yes, very religious somewhat religious no, not religious
0% 46% 54%
2.  Do you consider 
yourself spiritual?
Yes, very spiritual somewhat spiritual no, not spiritual
5% 44% 51%
3.  Are you currently going 
to church or religious 
gatherings?*
Regularly
Fairly 
regularly
Sometimes
Practically 
never
Never
2% 0% 14% 48% 37%
4.  Have you ever felt that 
your life was guided by 
a spiritual force, stronger 
than any other human 
being?
Yes No
25% 75%
5.  Is death the definitive 
end or do you think there 
is life after death?
Yes, I think or suspect 
that there is something 
like a life after death
I have no idea about  
life after death
No, I think or suspect that 
there is no life after death
42% 39% 19%
6.  Do you believe in a 
higher power or higher 
being, something divine 
or a god? 
Yes, there is a higher 
power, higher being or 
God
I do not know if a higher 
power or higher being or 
God exists
No, there is neither a 
higher power or higher 
being, nor God
29% 48% 24%
7.  Have you ever had an 
experience that you 
thought was sacred?
Yes No
17% 83%
*Regularly = at least three times a month," "Fairly regularly = about 2 times a month", "Sometimes = less than 2 
times per month, but at least three times a year", "Practically never = less than 3 times per year "," Never "
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 The picture rating task consisted of 83 items (described above) of threatening and 
non-threatening natural phenomena and agents. Participants were instructed that they 
would receive different images and that for every image, a couple of questions would be 
asked.  They were further instructed that there were no right or wrong answers but that the 
researchers were interested in how people experience these images and were interested 
in the amount of intentionality and will that people perceive and attribute to different 
objects and phenomena. For each item, participants were asked to rate six questions on 
separate 9-point scales (in the following order): “to what extent do you find the picture 
pleasant to look at”, “to what extent do you feel restless when you look at the picture”, “to 
what extent do you perceive control over the depicted object”, “to what extent do you 
feel afraid when looking at the picture”, “to what extent do you think the depicted acts 
intentional”, “to what extent do you think the depicted has a will of its own” (1 = not at 
all, 9 = completely). The first four questions (on pleasure, feeling restless, control and fear) 
were administered as filler items to force participants to consider and think about each 
picture before answering the intentionality and will questions) and served as pre-test for 
another study. The average scores per condition on the four filler questions are reported in 
Table 2. The last two questions on intentionality and will were the dependent variables that 
were used as a measure of agency. Images were presented one by one in random order 
and remained on the screen while the questions were presented below each image one 
after the other in a fixed order. The presentation of items and questions was self-paced. 
All images were administered in both the religion prime condition and to the no-prime 
condition, so that effects of the prime manipulation could not be attributed to differences 
in image characteristics. 
Table 2. Valence scores of Experiment 1. Scores of Valence Related Variables on the Different 
Categories Threatening vs. Non-threatening Natural Phenomena and Agents
Natural phenomena Agents
M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI
Variable Threat LL UL LL UL
Pleasure Non-threatening 7.49 1.02 7.23 7.76 7.47 1.05 7.20 7.75
Threatening 3.35 1.37 2.99 3.71 2.47 0.93 2.23 2.71
Restless Non-threatening 1.55 0.57 1.40 1.69 1.59 0.52 1.46 1.73
Threatening 4.68 2.01 4.16 5.21 5.40 1.71 4.96 5.85
Control Non-threatening 2.26 1.66 1.83 2.69 3.83 1.85 3.34 4.31
Threatening 1.82 1.26 1.49 2.15 2.62 1.20 2.31 2.94
Fear Non-threatening 1.47 0.54 1.34 1.62 1.54 0.48 1.42 1.67
Threatening 4.54 1.98 4.02 5.05 5.26 1.75 4.80 5.71
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Data analysis
For each participant, mean intentionality and will scores were calculated per category 
(threatening natural phenomena, non-threatening natural phenomena, threatening 
agents, and non-threatening agents). Box plots for both conditions (prime and no-prime) 
were used to identify outliers and to detect skewness in the data2. Because we predicted a 
specific interaction between prime and ontology, parametric mixed design ANOVAs were 
performed. To account for skewness, additional non-parametric tests of the simple effects 
were added. Results of the non-parametric tests are reported as footnotes. 
 Extreme outliers that extended over three times the interquartile range in either direction 
were excluded from analysis (SPSS Inc., 2003). This resulted in the exclusion of a total of five 
participants with extreme mean intentionality and will ratings for natural phenomena (all > 
6). 
Results
Participants
Of our remaining sample of 59 participants, 32 (54.2%) did not consider themselves to be 
religious, 27 (45.8%) as somewhat religious, and none as strongly religious. A chi-square 
test indicated that the two priming groups did not differ in self-reported religiosity, χ2(1) = 
1.67, p = .20; see Table 1 for more information about religiosity in our sample of participants.
Subject level analysis
Correlation analysis indicated that the two agency questions - intentionality and will - were 
strongly correlated (r=.99, p < .001). Consequently, the two questions were taken together 
as a mean score of agency. The data, after the exclusion of the five outliers, were subjected 
to a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA with Prime (religion prime, no-prime) as between-
subjects factor and Ontology (agents, natural phenomena) and Threat (threatening, non-
threatening) as within-subject factors. 
 In line with our main hypothesis, a significant interaction between Prime x Ontology was 
obtained, F(1, 57) = 7.40, p = .009, ηρ² = .12.3,4 Participants in the prime condition ascribed 
more agency to natural phenomena than participants in the no-prime condition, F(1, 57) = 
2 Standardised skewness scores indicated that the data of the threatening and non-threatening natural 
phenomena were significantly positively skewed at p < .001 (intentionality: 4.65 and 5.89, and will: 7.27 and 
6.76, respectively). 
3 The interaction of Prime x Ontology was not significant with the outliers included in the analysis, F(1, 62) = 
1.97, p = .17. 
4 Confidence Intervals are given in Table 3.
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14.03, p < .001, ηρ² = .20.5 This difference was not found for the images depicting agents, 
F(1, 57) = .30, p = .58; see Figure 3 and Table 3.  
 Not surprisingly, the mixed design ANOVA also revealed a strong main effect of ontology, 
F(1, 57) = 435.43, p < .001, ηρ² = .88, indicating that participants ascribed more agency to 
agents (M = 6.60, SD = 1.23) than to natural phenomena (M = 1.80, SD = 1.20 ). Moreover, 
a main effect for threat was found, F(1, 57) = 22.51, p < .001, ηρ² = .28, indicating that 
participants ascribed more agency to threatening images than to non-threatening images. 
This was the case for images of agents, F(1, 57) = 15.26, p < .001, ηρ² = .21, and natural 
phenomena, F(1, 57) = 9.80, p = .003, ηρ² = .15. The interaction between Ontology x Threat, 
F(1, 57) = 5.06, p = .03, ηρ² = .08, revealed that the effect of threat was larger for agents than 
for natural phenomena (see Table 3). No interaction between Prime x Threat, F(1, 57) = .69, 
p = .41, was found. Nor was the interaction between Prime x Threat x Ontology significant, 
F(1, 57) = .25, p = .62. This suggests that the increase in the attribution of agency to natural 
phenomena following religious priming did not depend on the level of threat in the images. 
Table 3. Agency Scores Experiment 1. Agency Attributed to (Threatening and Non-threatening) 
Natural Phenomena and Agents in the Prime and No-prime Condition 
Prime condition No-prime condition
Ontology Threat M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI
LL UL LL UL
Natural phenomena Non-threatening 2.12 1.33 1.76 2.48 1.16 0.41 0.75 1.58
Threatening 2.46 1.52 2.05 2.87 1.28 0.46 0.80 1.75
Agents Non-threatening 6.17 1.30 5.64 6.69 6.38 1.80 5.77 6.99
Threatening 6.79 1.17 6.37 7.21 6.94 1.31 6.45 7.44
Item level analysis
To identify alternative variables that might influence the attribution of intentionality to 
natural objects, besides threat, an exploratory post-hoc analysis was conducted. This analysis 
investigated the possibility that participants’ sense of control over natural phenomena, or 
rather the lack thereof, could trigger the attribution of agency and search for intentionality. 
For each item, we had asked participants to indicate to what extent they perceived control 
over the depicted object. Using an item analysis, we tested whether perceived control over 
natural phenomena moderated the effect of the religion prime. For every image in the 
item analysis, mean scores of agency (pooled over intentionality and will) were calculated 
5 Non-parametric Mann-Whitney testing confirmed the ANOVA by showing that participants in the religion 
prime condition ascribed more agency to threatening and non-threatening natural phenomena than 
participants in the no-prime condition, U = 207.00, p =.001, r =  -.44, and, U = 235.50, p = .002, r = -.40, 
respectively.
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per condition. Every image had two agency scores: one mean score calculated for the 
participants in the religion prime condition, and one score for the participants in the no-
prime condition. The images were subjected to a 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA with Prime 
(religion prime, no-prime) as within-item factor, Ontology (agents, natural phenomena) as 
between-item factor, and Control as a continuous moderator variable. The mixed design 
ANOVA yielded the three-way interaction of Prime x Ontology x Control, F(1, 79) = 5.84, p = 
.02, ηρ² = .07. Consequently, two separate ANOVAs were performed, one for the images of 
natural phenomena, and one for the images of agents. 
 For the images of natural phenomena the amount of perceived control was negatively 
related to the ascribed agency, β = -.27, t(37) = -3.68, p < .001, ηρ² = .27, 95% CI [-.41, -.12]. 
Participants attributed more agency to natural phenomena when they felt less control over 
these items. Furthermore, a main effect of prime was found, F(1, 37) = 81.56, p < .001, ηρ² 
= .696, replicating the result of the subject analysis that showed increased attribution of 
agency to natural phenomena in the prime group (M = 2.52, SD = .24, 95% CI [2.46, 2.58]) as 
compared to the no-prime group (M = 1.35, SD = .15, 95% CI [1.30, 1.40]). Importantly, the 
ANOVA yielded an interaction of Prime x Control, F(1, 37) = 19.79, p < .001, ηρ² = .35. In the 
no-prime condition there was no significant effect of control, β = -.01, t(37) = -.12, p = .90. In 
the religion prime condition the amount of perceived control was negatively related to the 
ascribed agency, β = -.52, t(37) = -5.20, p < .001, ηρ² = .42, 95% CI [-.72, -.32]. That is, when 
participants were primed with religion, agency scores were higher for items over which 
they perceived to have less control. 
 For the images of agents, only a main effect of control was obtained, F(1, 42) = 6.22, p 
= .02, ηρ² = .13. The amount of perceived control was negatively related to the ascribed 
agency to agents, β = -.22, t(42) = -2.49, p = .02, ηρ² = .13, 95% [-.39, -.04]. Agents over which 
participants felt less control were seen as more agentic.
Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated the hypothesis that activation of religious concepts may trigger 
perception of supernatural intentionality in natural phenomena. This hypothesis was 
supported. Participants who filled out the religion questionnaire beforehand ascribed more 
intentionality and will to natural phenomena than participants who filled out the religion 
questionnaire afterwards. This finding provides empirical support for the theoretical 
assumption (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer, 2003) that 
religion is associated with the detection of agency. 
6 Because the item analysis uses a within-item design (i.e. for each item we have an average agency score for 
the prime group and an average agency score for the no-prime group) error variance due to between-subject 
variability that is found in between-subject analysis, is removed (Lakens, 2013). Therefore, as is typically the 
case, the ηρ² in the within-item design is larger than the ηρ² in the between-subject design.
46
Chapter 2
 In line with our expectations, the effect of religious priming did not involve a general 
enhancement of the attribution of agency, but was restricted to the ontological category 
of natural phenomena. Whereas in the case of agents, intentionality can be attributed 
unambiguously to the respective agent, in the case of natural phenomena, the perception 
of (supernatural) agency may contribute to understanding the cause, development, or 
reason for the occurrence of natural phenomena. 
 In line with the hypothesis that attributions of supernatural agency may be especially 
relevant for the understanding of threatening natural phenomena we had predicted 
stronger effects of religious priming for threatening natural phenomena than for non-
threatening natural phenomena. Although threatening stimuli were found to have an effect 
on agency in the predicted direction, religious priming was found to enhance perception 
of agency in both threatening and non-threatening natural phenomena. The finding that 
threatening stimuli increased the detection of agency in both agents and natural objects 
is in line with models of fear processing (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman, 1996) and the evolutionary 
model underlying HADD as the fast detection of threatening stimuli confers obvious survival 
value (cf. Barrett, 2000; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman, 1996). However, attribution of supernatural 
agency does not appear to be specifically enhanced by threatening stimuli. Rather, item 
analysis indicated that attribution of supernatural agency relied on the level of control that 
participants reported over specific items. This original finding will be discussed in more 
depth in the General Discussion.
 One limitation of Experiment 1 is that the priming manipulation in Experiment 1 did not 
specifically activate concepts of supernatural agency but stimulated religious contemplation 
in various ways. As such we cannot be certain what concept of supernatural agency is 
responsible for the increased perception of intentionality in natural objects. Another 
limitation of Experiment 1 is that there may have been a demand effect in the sense that 
participants in the religious priming condition may have formed an interpretation of the aim 
of the experiment and changed their behaviour in accordance with this interpretation (see 
Orne, 1962). In a second experiment these two limitations were counteracted by a subliminal 
priming procedure in which the word “God” was used as a prime to directly activate the 
concept of a supernatural agent in a more implicit way, and exclude the possibility of a 
demand effect. 
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Experiment 2
Method
Participants and design
Eighty-one students from Radboud University Nijmegen (72 women and 9 men, mean age 
= 19.6 years, age range: 18 to 26) participated in this experiment. They received course 
credits or a voucher of 5 euro in return. Half of the participants were subliminally presented 
with a religion prime and the other half of the participants were subliminally presented with 
a neutral prime. Other than the change in priming procedure, Experiment 2 used a similar 
experimental design as Experiment 1. 
Stimuli
The same images as in Experiment 1 were used, except for three images of threatening 
human beings from the IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) whose head fell outside of 
the photo border7. 
Priming and procedure
The priming manipulation followed a similar procedure as used by Karremans, Stroebe 
and Claus (2006). Before every image, participants were shown for five times a string of B’s 
for a duration of 2 s per string. Most B’s were uppercase B’s, but sometimes (randomly) a 
lower case b appeared. Participants were instructed to count the trials in which a lowercase 
b occurred (e.g., BBBBbB). After each block of five trials of B’s (and before every image) 
participants were asked to report the number of trials containing a lowercase b. Ostensibly 
to help participants’ focus, before each string of B’s two random letter string appeared for 
500 ms as an orienting cue. In fact, the letter strings served as a pre and post mask for the 
actual prime. The prime was the word “God” for half of the subjects (the God prime group), 
whereas for the other half of the participants “Xxx” was used (the neutral prime group). The 
prime was presented for 17 ms. Hence, in total participants received the prime word five 
times before every image. 
 The image rating task used a similar procedure as in Experiment 1, with the difference 
being that this time the experiment was conducted in laboratory cubicles at the university 
and this time the three questions (intentionality, will, and control) were the only questions 
that were presented. To ensure that the primes were really subliminal, after the image 
rating task participants were presented with four trials of the subliminal prime and were 
then asked if they saw a word flashing between the masks. If they saw a word flashing, then 
they were asked to report the word. None of the participants reported to have seen the 
7 The results of Experiment 1 remained the same when these three images were excluded from the analysis.
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word “God” (or the neutral letter string “Xxx”). Finally, the questionnaire that was used in 
Experiment 1 as a religiosity prime was administered to all participants. 
Data analysis
Data analyses were similar to those of Experiment 1. Box plots for both conditions (God 
prime and neutral prime) were used for identifying outliers and to detect skewness in the 
data8. Extreme outliers beyond three times the interquartile range were excluded from the 
data. This resulted in the exclusion of nine participants. Inspection of these outliers showed 
that in all cases mean intentionality or will ratings of natural phenomena were above 6.
Results
Participants
Of the remaining sample of 72 participants, 39 (54.2%) did not consider themselves to be 
religious, 28 (38.9%) as somewhat religious, and 5 (6.9%) as strongly religious. A chi-square 
test indicated that the two priming groups did not differ in religiosity, χ2(2) = 3.67, p = .16. 
Subject level analysis
As in Experiment 1, the two questions on intentionality and will were strongly correlated 
(r = .99, p < .001).  Therefore, similar to Experiment 1, the two questions were pooled as a 
mean agency score. Consequently, a 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed design ANOVA was conducted with 
Prime (God prime, neutral prime) as a between-subjects factor, and Ontology (agents, 
natural phenomena) and Threat (threatening, non-threatening) as within-subject factors.  
A main effect of prime was found, F(1, 70) = 4.06, p = .048, ηρ² = .06. This main effect was 
further qualified by a trend towards the expected interaction of Prime x Ontology, F(1, 
70) = 3.93, p = .051, ηρ² = .05.9 10 Similar to Experiment 1, participants in the God prime 
condition ascribed more agency to natural phenomena than participants in the neutral 
prime condition, F(1, 70) = 5.73, p = .02, ηρ² = .08. This difference was not found for the 
images depicting agents, F(1, 70) = .61, p = .44; see Figure 3 and Table 4.
 As in Experiment 1, the Mixed design ANOVA yielded a strong main effect of ontology, 
F(1, 70) = 491.61, p < .001, ηρ² = .88. Agents were seen as more agentic than natural 
8 Standardised skewness scores indicated that the data of the threatening and non-threatening natural 
phenomena were significantly positively skewed at p < .001 (intentionality: 6.44 and 7.48, and will: 6.16 and 
8.05, respectively). 
9 Analysis with the nine outliers included revealed no significant interaction of Prime x Ontology, F(1, 79) = .69, 
p = .41. 
10 A Mann-Whitney test showed a trend in that participants in the God prime condition ascribed more agency to 
threatening and to non-threatening phenomena than participants in the neutral prime condition, U =  503.00, 
p =.073, and, U = 504.50, p = .071, respectively.
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phenomena (M = 7.29, SD = 0.99 vs. M = 2.09, SD = 1.43, respectively). Furthermore, a main 
effect of threat was found, F(1, 70) = 31.06, p < .001, ηρ² = .31, indicating that participants 
ascribed more agency to threatening images than to non-threatening images (see Table 
4). As in Experiment 1, the interactions between Prime x Threat, F(1, 70) = .05, p = .82, and 
between Prime x Threat x Ontology did not reach significance, F(1, 70) = 3.19, p = .08. 
Subsequent analysis of this non-significant three-way interaction per ontological category 
did not reveal any reliable interaction between Prime x Threat (agents: p = .45; natural 
phenomena: p = .28). This suggests that the effects of religious priming on agency were not 
influenced by the level of threat of images.
Figure 3. Agency scores in Experiment 1 and 2. Mean agency scores (+ 95% CI) for natural phenomena 
and agents of the religion prime group (n = 34) and the no-prime group (n = 25) in Experiment 1 (left). 
Mean agency scores (+ 95% CI ) for natural phenomena and agents for the God prime group (n = 35), 
and the neutral prime group (n = 37) in Experiment 2 (right).
Table 4. Agency Scores Experiment 2. Agency Attributed to (Threatening and Non-threatening) 
Natural Phenomena and Agents in the God-prime and Neutral-prime Condition
God-prime condition Neutral-prime condition
Ontology Threat M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI
LL UL LL UL
Natural phenomena Non-threatening 2.10 1.33 1.74 2.45 1.45 0.72 1.10 1.80
Threatening 2.88 2.26 2.27 3.50 1.95 1.29 1.36 2.55
Agents Non-threatening 6.98 1.21 6.54 7.42 7.03 1.39 6.60 7.45
Threatening 7.45 0.87 7.15 7.75 7.68 0.92 7.39 7.97
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Item level analysis
As in Experiment 1, an item analysis was conducted. All images were subjected to a 2 x 
2 mixed design ANOVA with Prime (God prime, neutral prime) as within-item factor and 
Ontology (agents, natural phenomena) as between-item factor, and Control as a continuous 
moderator variable. Similar to Experiment 1, the item analysis yielded a significant three-
way interaction of Condition x Ontology x Control, F(1, 76) = 9.87, p = .002, ηρ² = .12. 
Consequently, two separate ANOVAs were performed, one for the images of natural 
phenomena, and one for the images of agents. 
 For the images of natural phenomena, perceived control over natural objects related 
negatively to agency, β = -.48, t(37) = 2.56, p = .02, ηρ² = .15, 95% CI [-.86, -.10], replicating 
Experiment 1. Furthermore, a main effect of prime was found, F(1, 37) = 54.24, p < .001, ηρ² 
= .59, indicating stronger attribution of agency to natural phenomena in the God prime 
group (M = 2.54, SD = .44, 95% CI [2.41, 2.67]) than in the neutral prime group (M = 1.74, 
SD = .30, 95% CI [1.64, 1.83]). Importantly, similar to Experiment 1, a significant interaction 
between prime and control was found, F(1, 37) = 11.60, p = .002, ηρ² = .24.  In the neutral 
prime condition the effect of control did not reach significance, β = -.29, t(37) =.83, p = 
.08. However, in the God prime condition the amount of perceived control was negatively 
related to the ascribed agency, β = -.66, t(37) =.97, p = .005, ηρ² = .19, 95% CI [-1.11, -.21].
 For the images of agents, the ANOVA yielded only a main effect of control, F(1, 39) = 
20.25, p < .001, ηρ² = .34, and a main effect of prime, F(1, 39) = 5.55, p = .02, ηρ² = .13. The 
amount of perceived control was negatively related to the ascribed agency, β = -.30, t(39) 
=.50, p < .001, ηρ² = .34, 95% CI [-.43, -.16]. Surprisingly, agents in the God prime condition 
were perceived as less agentic (M = 7.22, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [7.07, 7.37]) than agents in the 
neutral prime condition (M = 7.36, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [7.24, 7.49]).  
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 2 show that mere exposure to a subliminal semantic God 
prime was sufficient to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. Participants who had 
been primed repeatedly with the subliminal word “God” perceived more agency in 
natural phenomena than participants who were primed with the letter string “Xxx”. This 
enhancement in the perception of agency following subliminal priming with “God” was 
found specifically for the ontological category of natural phenomena, and not for images 
of agents. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, results indicated that the amount of agency 
attributed to natural objects was moderated by the control that participants experienced 
over these items. This finding concerning control will be discussed in more detail in the 
general discussion. 
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 An important advance of Experiment 2 is that it provides a further confirmation of a 
core assumption in Experiment 1, namely that the concept of supernatural agency is 
responsible for the increased perception of intentionality in natural objects. In Experiment 
1 we used a religion questionnaire to prime concepts of supernatural agency. Although the 
concept of supernatural agency can be considered a central aspect of many religions and 
religious thought, filling out a religion questionnaire will activate different concepts that 
are associated with religion such as the question of life after death, memories of religious 
experience, or thoughts about inexplicable events. Hence, there is a possibility that the 
effects of Experiment 1 may have been caused by some other factor than supernatural 
agency. Experiment 2 mitigates this concern as in this experiment priming involved direct 
reference to God as a supernatural agent.11
 Replication of the main findings in Experiment 1 using subliminal priming rules out 
demand effects as a possible explanation for the enhanced detection of agency in natural 
phenomena. Even though participants were unaware of the presentation of a religious 
prime, the word “God” enhanced the attribution of intentionality to natural phenomena. This 
suggests that conscious awareness or elaboration on supernatural agents is not required 
for the enhanced perception of supernatural agency in natural phenomena. An implication 
of this finding may be that subtle religious reminders such as religious symbols, clothing, 
or buildings could implicitly activate concepts of supernatural agency and enhance the 
perception of supernatural intentionality. 
 Item analysis indicated that images of agents were rated as possessing less agency in 
the God prime condition than in the neutral prime condition. Further research is required to 
explore this finding as no such effect was found in Experiment 1. An interesting hypothesis 
that could be investigated in future studies is that priming with a supernatural agent may 
transfer agency from humans to God. That is, because the Abrahamic monotheistic God 
is typically considered to be an omnipotent and all-powerful being (Preston, Ritter, & 
Hernandez, 2010), priming with God may lower the attribution of agency to humans. 
General Discussion
Our study investigated one of the main theories in the cognitive science of religion that 
argues for a relation between (hyperactive) agency detection and religious thought. We 
investigated the possibility that religious thought and in particular concepts of supernatural 
agency enhance the attribution of agency to natural phenomena. This hypothesis was 
supported in two experiments. In the first experiment, participants who filled out a religion 
questionnaire at the beginning of the experiment ascribed more agency to natural 
11 Note however that this may require further fine-tuning as to which capacity or aspect of God may be held 
responsible for the increased perception of intentionality in natural phenomena (cf. Richert & Smith, 2009). 
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phenomena than participants who filled out the religion questionnaire afterwards. A similar 
effect was obtained in a second experiment in which participants were primed subliminally 
with the word “God” as compared to a neutral prime word “Xxx”. These findings support 
the conclusion that activation of supernatural agent concepts enhances the perception of 
intentionality in natural phenomena (cf. Barrett & Lanman, 2008). 
 Our findings demonstrate a relation between religion and the perception of agency in 
nature, in line with early theoretical perspectives on religion as expressed by philosophers 
such as Spinoza, Hume, Feuerbach, Tylor and Levi-Straus (see the historical review by Guthrie, 
2013). Levi-Strauss, for example, stated that religion consists in the anthropomorpization of 
nature, and Tylor understood religion as an explanation of the world by means of invisible, 
human-like intelligence (Guthrie, 2013). Our conclusions confirm these ideas and show that 
people’s considerations of supernatural agency may permeate and extend to the concepts 
and properties of natural objects (cf. Barrett, 2000; Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Our results 
indicate that concepts of supernatural agency may trigger perception of agency in natural 
phenomena but do not enhance the perception of agency in agents. This confirms the 
special role that nature plays in the relationship between religion and agency. Natural 
phenomena appear to be particularly eligible for supernatural attributions, especially when 
they are beyond the ability of human control such as in the case of hurricanes and solar 
eclipses. 
 Our results also confirm and extend recent theorizing within the cognitive science of 
religion that emphasizes the evolutionary basis of agency detection as a possible origin of 
religion (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer, 2003; 
Tremlin, 2006).  According to this account (Barrett, 2004), hyperactive agency detection is 
targeted at identifying signs of agency to anticipate possible threats or malicious intent by 
animals or other human beings. However, in many cases there may be ambiguity about 
who or what is responsible for particular events (e.g., consider a sudden illness, a strike 
of misfortune, a natural catastrophe) and in these cases hyperactive agency detection 
may extend to the category of supernatural agents. In accordance with this view we 
had anticipated to find stronger attribution of supernatural agency to threatening 
natural phenomena (e.g., lightning, lava, and tornados) than to non-threatening natural 
phenomena (e.g., sunrise, moonrise, and waterfall). In both experiments we found that 
threatening natural phenomena and threatening agents were ascribed more agency than 
non-threatening stimuli, which confirms that human agency detection is more strongly 
activated in threatening conditions (cf. Barrett, 2004). However, in neither experiment did we 
find clear evidence for the predicted interaction between threat and religious priming. This 
suggests that while threat may enhance the perception of agency in both natural objects 
and agents, this does not necessarily involve attribution of supernatural agency. Different 
mechanisms might well be responsible for the agency enhancing effect of threat and the 
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effect of religious priming. In the case of religious priming, the activation of supernatural 
agent concepts may enhance the perception of agency in natural phenomena by attributing 
agency to a (supernatural) source outside the object. With threatening stimuli, on the other 
hand, agency may be attributed more directly to a source within the threatening agent or 
object itself.
 Our findings suggest that not so much the experience of threat, but the lack of 
control is what drives people to look for supernatural agency (cf. Barrett & Johnson, 
2003). When participants were primed with religion they ascribed more agency to both 
positive and negative natural phenomena, especially for natural objects (rainbows and 
volcanic eruptions) that forbid control. Research on compensatory control (Kay, Gaucher, 
McGregor, & Nash 2010; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 
2008) suggests that people have a strong desire for a predictable environment, and that 
when one’s sense of control is lowered, people will try and compensate by projecting 
structure and order to reduce this uncertainty. Research on compensatory control has 
found that people will detect more patterns in random visual noise, will be more inclined 
to embrace conspiracy beliefs and form superstitions (Whiton & Galinsky, 2008) and will 
increase their faith in benevolent controlling institutions such as the government and 
God when confronted with uncertainty (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). Our 
results indicate that people may increase their sense of control by attributing supernatural 
intentionality to natural phenomena when these phenomena are outside one’s control. 
 In line with this interpretation, research on awe and wonder has found that beautiful 
and impressive scenes of nature may be particularly effective in lowering one’s sense of 
personal control. Awe describes the intense emotional experience that is induced by vast 
stimuli such as impressive scenes of nature, whereby one feels overwhelmed and the self is 
reduced in size or significance (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). The 
experience of awe carries a strong need for accommodation, i.e. a desire to reduce anxiety 
and uncertainty (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007; Valdesolo & Graham, 2014). A recent 
study by Valdesolo and Graham (2014) confirms that awe is accompanied by an increased 
intolerance for uncertainty. More important is that the induction of awe was found to 
increase participants’ perception of intentional agency and belief in supernatural control. 
The effect of awe on both variables was furthermore found to be mediated by intolerance 
of uncertainty. These results support a theoretical model in which impressive natural scenes 
induce a reduction of personal control, which can be compensated through the attribution 
of supernatural agency. 
 In the current study we decided to operationalize agency at an intentional level instead 
of at a perceptual level. Agency detection at a perceptual level involves the detection and 
recognition of agents e.g., through biological motion and shape perception. Detection of 
intentionality on the other hand is concerned with mentalizing, i.e. the attribution of mental 
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states and emotions to others such as beliefs, thoughts, desires, feelings and intentions 
(Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Studies in the cognitive science of religion suggest that 
similar cognitive functions that support mentalizing about the beliefs and intentions of 
other people also support mentalizing about God (Han et al, 2008; Lisdorf, 2007; Schjoedt, 
Stødkilde-Jørgensen, Geertz, & Roepstorff, 2009; Tremlin, 2006). Importantly, as God 
and other supernatural agents are typically invisible (Vail et al, 2010: 86), their presence, 
judgment, and influence need to be inferred and represented at an intentional level. In 
accordance with this view Norenzayan, Gervais, and Trzesniewski (2012) recently showed 
that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted belief in God. Interestingly, this 
study found that the well-known gender effect in religious belief – women being more 
religious then men – could be explained by differences in mentalizing ability between 
women and men. As the current study included a majority of female participants, gender 
effects might have also contributed to its success. It would be interesting to investigate in 
future experiments if perception of supernatural intentionality is stronger in women than in 
men as the theoretical perspective on mentalizing would suggest. 
 In conclusion, our study provides experimental support for theoretical relation 
between religious concepts and the perception of agency in displays of nature, as has 
been proposed by philosophers and scholars in the cognitive science of religion (Guthrie, 
2013). Our findings demonstrate that conscious deliberation about one’s religious position 
as well as unconscious processing of the word “God” will bias people to attribute more 
intentionality to natural phenomena as compared to others who are not primed with 
concepts of supernatural agency. This phenomenon of seeing supernatural intent is found 
to be especially strong for natural phenomena that are experienced to be beyond one’s 
control. These findings support a theoretical model in which supernatural intentionality is 
used to construct a meaningful representation of an otherwise unpredictable world. We 
hope that these findings will stimulate further empirical research on the role of supernatural 
agency in human cognition. 
3
Opposite effects of the supernatural
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Abstract
In two experiments the hypothesis was investigated that concepts of supernatural agency 
may have opposite effects on the perception of agency in natural phenomena versus 
human beings. Concepts of supernatural agency were made temporarily more accessible 
in half of the participants via questions that inquired about the role that religion played in 
participants’ lives (Experiment 1), and by asking to what extent participants believed that God 
intervenes in their personal life and the world in general (Experiment 2). The other half of the 
participants either received a control prime (Experiment 1), or similar questions at the end 
of the experiment (Experiment 2). Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we attempted to enhance 
the religious priming effect by first manipulating participants’ sense of control (high vs. low) 
before presenting the prime. A rating task was used to measure the perception of agency 
(i.e. intentionality and will) attributed to images of natural phenomena and human beings. In 
Experiment 2, participants were also asked to rate the images on perceived control by God. 
It was expected that priming with supernatural agency would lead to higher attribution 
of agency to natural phenomena and lower attributions of agency to human beings. In 
addition, it was predicted that a stronger belief in God and higher ratings of control by God 
would be associated with higher agency scores to natural phenomena and lower agency 
scores for human beings. In both experiments religious priming was found to have no 
effect on the perception of agency. However, analysis of individual differences measures 
in both experiments indicated consistent relationships of individual levels of belief in God 
and ratings of control by God with agency attributed to natural phenomena and human 
beings. In support of our hypothesis, stronger belief in God and higher ratings of control by 
God were associated with the attribution of more agency to natural phenomena and less 
agency to human beings. Interestingly, the perception of control by God was rated higher 
for natural phenomena than for human beings and was rated lower for threatening than 
for non-threatening stimuli, especially in the case of human beings. These findings suggest 
a model of supernatural agency attribution (SAA) in which attributions of supernatural 
involvement increase the perception of agency in natural phenomena and decrease the 
perception of agency in human beings. Moderators and implications of SAA are discussed. 
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Introduction
In March 2011, an earthquake and resulting tsunami struck Japan, and caused thousands 
of deaths. The governor of Tokyo told reporters that he thought the disaster was a divine 
punishment for the egoism of the Japanese people, a statement for which he later 
apologized (Kyodo News). A similar statement was found after the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001. 
Televangelist Jerry Falwell stated that the attacks were “probably deserved” for all of them 
who had tried to secularize America. He again, after heavy criticism, apologized (CNN). 
 As illustrated by the above examples, people are inclined to seek meaning in random 
events, even to the extent that they may assume an invisible supernatural agent (e.g., God 
or the Devil) to be responsible (Bering, 2002; Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b).  The latter inclination 
may be especially strong for natural disasters in which case there is no agent who is 
responsible for the event (Gray & Wegner, 2010). Without an immediate person to blame, 
people may continue to search for other intentional agents to hold responsible for the 
event and restore their sense of control (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & 
Nash, 2010; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky,2009). A study of Stephens, Fryberg, Markus & 
Hamedani (2012) for instance found that among survivors of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
the Chilean earthquake in 2010, the most common explanation of the event was describing 
the disaster as an intentional act of God.
 According to cognitive theories of religion (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2004; 
Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Guthrie, 1993; Tremlin, 2008), the belief 
in supernatural agents (God, demons, angels, ghosts, etc.) may partly originate from the 
hyperactive tendency of humans to detect agency in the environment. It is argued that 
this over–attribution of agency has an evolutionary basis. That is, because both the rapid 
detection of agents, and the ability to infer their presence, are essential for survival, natural 
selection may have fostered minds that are hypersensitive in the detection of agency (Boyer, 
2003; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Guthrie, 1993; Tremlin, 2008). Barrett (2000), has proposed 
the existence of a hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD) in humans (Barrett, 2000, 
2004, 2012; Barrett & Lanman, 2008) that is tuned specifically to the detection of agents, 
and to signs that may suggest that an agent is (or was) present but simply not visible. 
Likewise, patterns that appear to be goal-directed or purposeful such as the movements 
of a tornado, have been argued to activate HADD, especially when there is an urgency to 
do so, as in the case of an impending danger (Barrett, 2004). Accordingly, it is argued that 
HADD may trigger concepts of supernatural (invisible) agents who can be held responsible 
for unexplained significant events. Conversely, it has also been proposed that concepts of 
supernatural agents may trigger agency detection (Barrett, 2004; Barrett & Lanman, 2008). 
For instance, being in a place that is associated with supernatural agents (e.g., a church, 
haunted castle, etc.) may increase vigilance of HADD. In line with this idea, recent research 
by Nieuwboer, van Schie, and Wigboldus (2014) found that people ascribed more agency 
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to images of natural phenomena (e.g., a tornado or a sunset) if they had been primed with 
religion. These findings support the idea that religion and agency detection are closely 
associated and that religious reminders may enhance the perception of (supernatural) 
agency (cf. Barrett & Lanman, 2008). 
 Interestingly, many disasters are man inflicted and thus have a clear offender to hold 
accountable for the situation. However, even in these situations, as illustrated in the 
introductory example of Sept. 11, there may still be a strong tendency to ascribe agency 
or responsibility for the event to a supernatural agent. A recent study by Nieuwboer, van 
Schie, Karremans, and Wigboldus (2015) partly confirms this idea. Participants who believed 
that a mass shooting may have been part of a larger supernatural plan, or that a higher 
power might have been involved, attributed less responsibility to the offender for the event 
and demanded less severe punishment. These findings suggest that people may indeed 
be tempted to search for supernatural influences, even in situations in which there is a 
clear agent who is responsible for a devastating event. Furthermore, and importantly, these 
findings suggest that the consideration of a possible supernatural agent may lower the 
perceived responsibility of the perpetrator. 
 Other studies have accumulated evidence to suggest that assumptions of supernatural 
agency may be accompanied by reductions in human agency. For instance, when concepts 
of supernatural agency are activated, people may experience less agency over their own 
behaviour, attribute less agency to the actions of others, and may be more inclined to 
constrain the freedom of expression by others. For instance, it was found that a group of 
religious believers was less inclined to attribute action effects to themselves if they had 
been primed subliminally with the word God (Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, & Aarts, 2008). 
Also, helping behaviour by others was judged to be less intentional and less moral if helpers 
were perceived to help from a religious conviction (Gervais, 2014). Moreover, individuals 
with a wrathful image of God were more inclined to deny freedom of expression by fringe 
groups than individuals with a more benign view of God (Froese, Bader, & Smith, 2008). 
 Hence, it appears that religious views or considerations of supernatural agency may 
have opposite effects with respect to the perception of agency in natural phenomena and 
human beings. That is, whereas the activation of supernatural agent concepts appears to 
enhance the perception of agency in natural phenomena, the same supernatural concepts 
may lower the perception of agency in human beings. Although these effects may seem 
paradoxical at first sight – e.g., how can the consideration of supernatural agency in the 
one domain enhance agency while reducing agency in the other – further consideration 
suggest a model in which supernatural agency is in a position to influence both natural 
phenomena as well as human beings. In the case of natural objects and phenomena, in 
which usually little or no intentionality is perceived, the consideration of supernatural 
agency may imbue these phenomena with additional (supernatural) purpose and intent 
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(Nieuwboer et al., 2014). Human beings on the other hand are typically seen as highly 
intentional agents (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). In this domain category, the assumption of 
supernatural agency would come at a cost of the intentionality that is typically associated 
with human beings. That is, part of the agency and self-determination that is usually 
ascribed to human beings may now be under the influence of the supernatural agent. God, 
for instance, is characteristically perceived as an omnipotent moral agent, who can control 
or guide the actions and experiences of individual men (Baumard & Boyer, 2013; Gray, Gray, 
& Wegner, 2007; Pinnock, 1996; Sartorio, 2007).  
 The aim of the current study was to test the hypothesis that activated concepts of 
supernatural agency may have opposite effects on the perception of agency in natural 
phenomena and in human beings. It was expected that supernatural agency concepts 
would be associated with an increased perception of agency in natural phenomena 
and reduced perception of agency in human beings. Two experiments were run to test 
this hypothesis. In both experiments participants performed a task in which they rated 
images of natural phenomena and human beings on agency. Prior to this task, in half of 
the participants the concept of supernatural agency was activated, whereas the other 
half received a control prime that was unrelated to supernatural agency. In line with the 
hypothesis that the activation of supernatural agency will enhance the perception of agency 
in natural phenomena and lower the perception of agency in humans, it was expected that 
participants who were primed with concepts of supernatural agency would ascribe more 
agency to images of human beings and less agency to images of natural phenomena, as 
compared to participants who were not primed with religion. Furthermore, we expected 
that individual differences in belief in God/s are also related to the amount of agency that is 
perceived in natural phenomena and human beings. More specifically, we expected that 
a stronger belief in God would be associated with higher perception of agency in natural 
phenomena and a lower perception of agency in human beings. 
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Seventy-five students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (61 women and 14 men), 
mean age 23 (ranging from 17 to 56) participated in this experiment. The number of 
participants was not set beforehand but reflects the number of students that volunteered 
to participate in the week during which the lab was available for this study. They received 
course credits or a gift voucher of 5 euro in return. 
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Experimental design and stimuli
The first experiment used a mixed experimental design with one between subject factor: 
Prime (religion vs. soccer), two within-subject factors: Ontology (natural phenomena vs. 
human beings) and Threat (threatening vs. non-threatening items)12, and one continuous 
predictor variable expressing individual differences in Belief in God/s.  
 Ninety-five images were used: 29 were taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), the other 66 were gathered from the internet. 
All images were elected to fit in the 2 (Ontology) x 2 (Threat) stimulus design of the present 
experiment (see Figure 4). When collecting the pictures, we aimed for at least 20 pictures 
within each category. The selected set consisted of 47 humans and 48 natural phenomena. 
Of the 47 human images, 21 were threatening, and 26 were non-threatening. Of the natural 
phenomena, 23 were threatening and 25 were non-threatening natural phenomena. 
Procedure
Participants were told that they would participate in two separate studies. The first study was 
ostensibly commissioned by a research company that was interested in the world view of 
students. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to a religion prime condition, and 
the other half to a control condition. In the religion prime condition participants were asked 
whether they considered themselves as religious or spiritual. Depending on their answer 
they had to write about the role that religion played in their lives/ their reasons for (not) 
believing in God. In the control condition, participants were asked to indicate whether they 
were interested in soccer, and depending on their answer, were then asked to describe the 
role that soccer played in their lives / their reasons for not being interested in soccer. This 
condition was labelled the soccer prime condition. Subsequently, participants were told 
that another task began and they received the picture rating task. In this task, participants 
were asked to rate the images of the threatening and non-threatening humans and natural 
phenomena on three separate 9-point Likert scales indicating to what extent they thought 
the object depicted on the image acted ‘intentionally’ (1 = not at all, 9 = completely), had ‘a 
will of its own’ (1 = not at all, 9 = completely), and to what extent they perceived ‘control’ over 
the depicted object (1 = not at all, 9 = completely).
12 Threat was included as a factor in the design because the theory of hypersensitive agency detection makes 
the assumption that when people are confronted with threat they will be more biased towards perceiving 
agency. Note that in our previous study (Nieuwboer, van Schie, & Wigboldus, 2014) we found that participants 
attributed more agency to threatening natural phenomena than to non-threatening natural phenomena, but 
that threat did not interact with the priming of supernatural agency. The latter suggests that attribution of 
supernatural agency was comparable for threatening and non-threatening stimuli. In the current study we 
wanted to test for a possible effect of threat in the domain category of human beings. However, we had no 
specific hypotheses concerning the relation between prime agency and threat. 
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Figure 4. Examples of images in the picture rating task. Stimuli were human beings (top) and natural 
phenomena (bottom), and were threatening (left) and non-threatening (right).
The questions were presented in separate blocks. In the first block all images were presented 
with the intentionally question displayed below each image. Participants entered their 
response to the question on a keyboard by pressing a number ranging between 1 and 9. 
There was no time constraint. The order of images was randomized per participant and kept 
constant in the three consecutive blocks. In the second block the images were presented 
with the will question. In the third block the images were presented with the perceived 
control question. 
 At the end of the experiment, participants filled in the subscale ‘existence of a higher 
reality’ of the survey for Social and Cultural Developments in the Netherlands (SOCON, 
2005; see Appendix A) and answered several demographic questions about age, gender 
and nationality. 
Data analysis
For each participant, mean intentionality and will scores were calculated per stimulus 
category (threatening natural phenomena, non-threatening natural phenomena, 
threatening agents, and non-threatening agents). Correlation analysis indicated that the 
62
Chapter 3
two agency questions - intentionality and will - were strongly correlated (r=.86, p < .001)13. 
Consequently, the two questions were taken together as a mean score of agency, which 
was used as the dependent variable.
 In accordance with data analysis methods of previous studies of the picture rating task 
in our lab (Nieuwboer et al., 2014), for each stimulus category, extreme outliers extending 
beyond three times the interquartile range were excluded from analysis (SPSS Inc., 2003). 
Outlier detection was conducted separately per priming condition (religion, soccer). Five 
participants were excluded: one in the soccer prime condition with an extreme low mean 
rating of intentionality for human beings (a mean score of 1,5), and four in the religion prime 
condition with extreme high mean ratings of will for natural phenomena (mean scores of ≥ 7).
 Per participant the individual score belief in God/s was calculated as the mean of item 1, 2, 
3, 7 and 8 (reversed) of the subscale existence of a higher reality (see Appendix A) (Cronbach’s 
α =.91). 
 The agency ratings in the picture rating task were analysed with a 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed design 
ANOVA with Prime condition (religion prime, soccer prime) as between-subjects factor and 
Ontology (human beings, natural phenomena) and Threat (threatening, non-threatening) 
as within-subject factors, and Belief in God/s as a continuous predictor.14
Results
Religiosity
 Of the participants that were included in the analyses, 18 participants indicated to be 
religious (26%), and 51 participants (73%) indicated to be not religious. For 1 participant 
there was a missing value. In the prime before condition, 10 of the 33 participants indicated 
to be religious (30%). In the prime after condition, 8 of the 37 participants indicated to be 
religious (22%).
Agency
 The Mixed design ANOVA indicated a main effect of Ontology, F(1, 66) = 147.45, p < 
.001, ηρ² = .69. Not surprisingly, participants perceived more agency in human beings than 
in natural phenomena (M =7.43, SD =.94 vs. M =2.13, SD =1.30)15. 
13 The correlation was calculated on the raw data (per item), and not on the average score per category. Hence, 
every answer given on the 9-point likert scale for the intentionality question was correlated with the answer 
of the same image on the will question.
14 In previous experiments in our lab, we also ran a repeated measures analysis on item level that is more powerful 
than a regular between-subject ANOVA. However, because in the current study the differences between the 
condition means were extremely small, an additional item analysis was not considered informative. .
15 Means presented in the paper are uncorrected for covariates.
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 Contrary to the hypothesis that activation of supernatural agency concepts would 
increase the perception of agency in natural phenomena and decrease the perception of 
agency in human beings, the predicted interaction effect of Prime condition x Ontology 
was not significant, F(1, 66) = 1.44, p = .23.
 In line with the hypothesis that a stronger belief in God would be associated with 
increased perception of agency in natural phenomena and a lower perception of agency in 
human beings, the mixed model ANOVA indicated the expected interaction of Ontology x 
Belief in God/s, F(1, 66) = 6.02, p = .02, ηρ² = .08. The more participants believed in God/s, the 
less agency they ascribed to human beings, F(1, 66) = 4.87, p = .03, ηρ² = .07. Furthermore, 
for natural phenomena a trend towards the opposite relation was found. Participants who 
believed more in God/s ascribed somewhat more agency to natural phenomena, F(1, 66) = 
3.10, p = .08, ηρ² = .05 (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. The relationship between Belief in God/s and Agency attributed to human beings (dotted 
line) and natural phenomena (solid line) in Experiment 1.
 In addition, the mixed ANOVA indicated two significant three-way interactions. The 
interaction of Ontology x Threat x Belief in God/s was found significant, F(1, 66) = 4.29, 
p=.04, ηρ² = .06, as was the interaction of Prime x Threat x Belief in God/s,  F(1, 66) = 5.71, p 
= .02, ηρ² = .08. To determine the source of these effects, the relationship between belief in 
God/s and agency ratings was determined with a regression coefficient per condition in our 
design (see Table 5).16
16 For ease of interpretation we described the relationships per condition. Note however that the four-way 
interaction of Prime x Ontology x Threat x Belief in God/s did not reach significance, F(1, 66) = .47, p = ns. 
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 For participants in the soccer prime condition we found that participants who believed 
more in God/s ascribed less agency to non-threatening human beings. No relationship was 
found however for stimuli showing threatening human beings. Oppositely, for threatening 
natural phenomena we found that participants with a stronger belief in God/s ascribed more 
agency to threatening natural phenomena. A trend towards a similar positive relationship 
between belief in God/s and agency was found for stimuli showing non-threatening natural 
phenomena (see Table 5). 
 For participants in the religion prime condition, we found a trend towards a negative 
relationship between belief in God/s and agency for stimuli showing non-threatening 
human beings. For the three remaining stimulus conditions no significant relationship 
between Belief in God/s and agency was found (see Table 5). 
Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated the hypothesis that supernatural agency attributions have 
opposite effects on the perception of agency (i.e. attribution of intentionality and will) in 
natural phenomena and in human beings. Our results provide some preliminary support for 
this hypothesis, as reflected in the relationship between individual differences in belief in 
God and the agency attributed to natural phenomena and human beings. Participants with 
a relatively strong belief in God/s ascribed somewhat more agency to natural phenomena 
but less agency to human beings, as compared to participants with lower or no belief in 
God/s. This suggests that pre-existing implicit beliefs about the existence of a supernatural 
being may oppositely affect the perception of (supernatural) agency in natural phenomena 
and human beings. 
 Interestingly, the predicted relation between belief in God/s and perception of agency 
was visible only for non-threatening human beings, and not for threatening human 
beings. This result corroborates previous findings from our lab (Nieuwboer et al., 2015) 
which indicated that students’ views of God in the Netherlands are predominantly positive 
and that students typically do not wish to associate their (culture’s) God with negative/
violent events. In the present study, it could also be the case that students’ positive 
views of God restrained them to attribute supernatural responsibility for threatening and 
aggressive human behaviour. Although the priming manipulation was found to influence 
the expression of the relationship between participant’s belief in God/s and the agency 
attributed to threatening and non-threatening events, the priming manipulation did not 
reliably affect the average levels of agency per condition. Possibly the priming manipulation 
was not strong or persistent enough or activated aspects of religion and spirituality other 
than the possible influence of supernatural agents. 
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Table 5. Relationship between agency and participant’s Belief in God/s per prime condition and 
stimulus category in Experiment 1
Prime condition Stimulus category B CI (95%) t p ηρ²
Religion prime Threatening
Human beings
-.11 (-0.41, 0.20) -0.70 .49 .02
Non-threatening
Human beings
-.30 (-0.64, 0.04) -1.83 .08 .10
Threatening
Natural phenomena
-.05 (-0.57, 0.48) -0.19 .85 .01
Non-threatening natural 
phenomena
.03 (-0.30, 0.36) 0.17 .87 .01
Soccer prime Threatening
Human beings
-.01 (-0.34, 0.32) -0.05 .96 .00
Non-threatening
Human beings
-.50 (-0.83, -0.16) -3.03 .005 .21
Threatening
Natural phenomena
.70 (0.23, 1.16) 3.05 .004 .21
Non-threatening natural 
phenomena
.34 (-0.05, 0.74) 1.77 .09 .08
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided preliminary support for the hypothesis that concepts of supernatural 
agency may differentially affect the perception of agency in natural phenomena and 
human beings. Although caution should be used making causal inferences as the data 
was correlational, support was obtained in analyses that included individual difference 
measures of belief in God/s (and not in analyses that investigated the average effects of 
the religious priming across participants).  Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the individual 
difference findings of the first experiment and investigated possible conditions under which 
effects of religious priming can influence the perception of agency in natural phenomena 
and human beings. More specifically, in line with previous studies that found people to be 
more inclined towards supernatural attribution when experiencing a loss or lack of control 
(e.g., Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay et al., 2010; Nieuwboer et al., 2015), 
we manipulated participants’ sense of control. Furthermore, as previous studies found that 
only participants who believe in controlling Gods engage in supernatural attributions (e.g., 
Laurin, Shariff, Henrich, & Kay, 2012), in Experiment 2 a religion prime was included that 
activated concepts of a controlling God. As a religion prime, eight questions were used that 
specifically inquired about participants’ belief in controlling God/s (see Appendix B). Half of 
the participants answered these questions before the images rating task, and the other half 
answered the questions after the images rating task. 
 In accordance with the hypothesis that low control may enhance supernatural 
attributions, we expected effects of religious priming on perceived agency to be strongest 
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in the low control condition. It was expected that when participants were in the low control 
condition and primed with religion they would ascribe more agency to natural phenomena 
and less agency to human beings, than participants who were not primed with religion 
or participants in the high control condition. Independently of the control and prime 
condition, we expected that the higher participants’ belief in God/s, the more agency they 
would perceive in natural phenomena and the less agency they would attribute to human 
beings.  
 In Experiment 2, we furthermore added a fourth block of trials in which participants 
were asked to rate the images on the perceived influence of God (/higher power). This 
question was added to obtain more direct information on the perception of supernatural 
agency in the picture rating task and its hypothesized influence on the attribution of agency 
to natural phenomena and human beings. 
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through MTurk in exchange for $1. Only participants from the 
US were selected to participate. In Mturk the amount of participants was set at 500, aiming 
for 100 participants per condition. Of the 426 participants who finished the task, 241 were 
women and 185 men. Their average age was 35 years (range 15 –72 years). 
Stimuli
Images in Experiment 2 overlapped to a large extent with the stimulus set that was used 
in Experiment 1. Changes with respect to the previous experiment were that we selected 
images with maximally one human being per image. This ensured that there could be no 
confusion with respect to which person the intentionality and free will questions pertained. 
In addition, in Experiment 2 we included an equal number of images per condition, 40 
human beings and 40 natural phenomena, to ensure that the conditions were balanced in 
this respect. Of each ontological category 20 images were threatening and 20 were non-
threatening. 18 images were from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008); the other 62 were gathered from the internet.
Procedure
To manipulate perceived control, participants were randomly assigned to a condition in 
which they were asked to recall a negative situation over which they lacked / or had control: 
the low and high control condition, respectively (cf. Kay et al., 2008). Subsequently, half of 
the participants in the low and high control condition received a religion prime before 
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the picture rating task, whereas the other half received a religion prime after the picture 
rating task. The religion prime consisted of eight statements that had to be rated on a 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) that inquired about participants’ belief 
in a controlling and intervening God (or Gods / Allah, etc.). Four questions inquired about 
participants’ belief that God intervened in their personal life, and four questions inquired 
about participants’ belief that God intervened in the world in general. For example; “I think 
that God (or Gods / Allah, etc.) has an influence on my personal life” and “I think that God (or 
Gods / Allah, etc.) has an influence on the events that happen in this world “ (see Appendix 
B). 
 After the three blocks of questions on will, intentionality and control, that were run in 
Experiment 1, a fourth block was administered, asking participants to rate on a separate 
9-point Likert scale to what extent they thought that God (or Gods / Allah, etc.) exerted 
control over the depicted object (1 = not at all, 9 = completely). A catch question was 
included after the picture rating task to inquire if participants had seriously answered the 
questions: “Please write down the questions that you had to answer for the images you just 
received”. Participants who did not recall three of the four questions that were asked in the 
previous four blocks were excluded from the data analysis. This resulted in a total of 112 
(26%) participants to be excluded.17
 Finally, demographic questions (age, gender, religiosity and nationality) were asked. 
Except for the differences mentioned, the procedure and methods of Experiment 2 were 
similar as in the previous experiment. 
Data analysis
Correlation analysis indicated that the two agency questions - intentionality and will - were 
strongly correlated (r=.83, p < .001)2. Consequently, as in Experiment 1, the two questions 
were taken together as a mean score of agency as the dependent variable.
 Box plots for both prime condition (before and after) and control condition (low vs. 
high) were used to identify outliers and to detect skewness in the data. Outlier detection 
identified 16 persons with extreme agency scores that extended over three times the 
interquartile range reflecting extremely low intentionality and will scores for human beings 
(between 1 and 2.5), six in the prime-afterwards condition and ten participants in the prime-
beforehand condition. Two hundred ninety-eight participants were subjected to further 
analyses. 
17 The decision to exclude participants who could not answer the three of the four questions was made when 
we designed the experiment, hence before the data analyses. The main effect of ontology becomes stronger 
with the exclusion of outliers, F(1, 290) = 344.02, p < .001, ηρ² = .54 compared to F(1, 418) = 198.68, p < 
.001, ηρ² = .32, indicating that the exclusion of outliers reduced noise to the experiment. Analysis of the data 
with outliers included did not change the pattern of significance. Some of the correlations were found to be 
stronger with the outliers included, most likely because of the larger sample size.
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 Separate mixed design ANOVA’s were run per dependent variable (agency; God in 
control) with Prime (before, after) and Control (low, high) as between-subjects factor, and 
Ontology (human being, natural phenomena) and Threat (threatening, non-threatening) as 
within-subject factors. In the analyses of agency and perceived control, Belief in controlling 
God/s was included as a continuous predictor variable.
Results
Religiosity
Of the participants who were included in the analyses, 140 participants indicated to be 
religious (47%), and 158 participants (53%) indicated to be not religious. In the prime before 
condition, 74 of the 158 participants indicated to be religious (47%). In the prime after 
condition, 66 of the 140 participants indicated to be religious (47%).
Agency 
Mixed design ANOVA of agency scores revealed a significant main effect of Ontology, F(1, 
290) = 344.02, p < .001, ηρ² = .54, reflecting higher scores of agency for human beings than 
natural phenomena (M = 6.30, SD = 0.88 vs. M = 2.55, SD = 1.91). 
 No differential effects of priming were found for natural phenomena and human beings 
as reflected in the non-significant interaction of Prime x Ontology, F(1, 290) = 1.19, p = .28. 
A significant three-way interaction of Control x Prime x Ontology was found, F(1, 290) = 
4.38, p = .04, ηρ² = .02. Subsequent step-down analyses, however, revealed no significant 
differences at the level of simple effects (see Table 6)18. 
 As in Experiment 1, an interaction of Ontology x Belief in controlling God’s was found, 
F(1, 290) = 14.94, p < .001, ηρ² = .05. Separate analyses for images of human beings and 
natural phenomena indicated that participants with a stronger belief in controlling God/s 
perceived less agency in human beings than participants with a weaker or absent belief 
in controlling God/s, F(1, 290) = 17.58, p < .001, ηρ² = .06. Oppositely, participants with a 
stronger belief in controlling God/s, perceived more agency in natural phenomena than 
participants with a weaker or absent belief in controlling God/s, F(1, 290) = 7.16, p = .008, 
ηρ² = .02 (see Figure 6).
18 Separate analyses for the low control and high control group were performed. For the high control group, an 
interaction of Ontology x Prime was found, F(1, 138) = 4.29, p < .05, ηρ² = .03. Although the means were in the 
hypothesized direction (see Table 6), simple main effects indicated that there was no significant difference 
between the two priming conditions and agency ascribed to natural phenomena, F(1, 138) = 3.40, p > .05, nor 
to human beings, F(1, 138) = 1.40, p > .05. For the low control group, the interaction of Ontology x Prime was 
not significant, F(1, 152) = .60, p > .05. 
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Figure 6. The relationship between Belief in God/s and Agency attributed to human beings (dotted 
line) and natural phenomena (solid line) in Experiment 2.
Table 6. Amount of perceived agency for threatening and non-threatening human beings and 
natural phenomena in the high control and the low control condition and in the religion prime and 
the control prime conditions of Experiment 2
Control Prime Ontology Threat Mean SD 95% CI
LL UL
Low control Before Human beings Threatening 6.18 1.03 5.98 6.38
Non-threatening 6.24 0.96 6.06 6.42
Natural phenomena Threatening 2.43 1.74 2.03 2.83
Non-threatening 2.43 1.69 2.04 2.82
After Human beings Threatening 6.37 0.82 6.14 6.61
Non-threatening 6.33 0.83 6.12 6.54
Natural phenomena Threatening 2.26 1.79 1.79 2.73
Non-threatening 2.24 1.74 1.78 2.70
High control Before Human beings Threatening 6.26 0.96 6.03 6.49
Non-threatening 6.33 0.76 6.13 6.54
Natural phenomena Threatening 2.76 2.13 2.30 3.22
Non-threatening 2.81 2.08 2.36 3.26
After Human beings Threatening 6.34 0.97 6.12 6.56
Non-threatening 6.37 0.88 6.17 6.57
Natural phenomena Threatening 2.76 2.10 2.31 3.20
Non-threatening 2.76 2.07 2.32 3.19
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 Note that the interaction between Ontology x Belief in controlling God/s was qualified 
by a four-way interaction of Control x Prime x Ontology x Belief in controlling God/s, 
F(1, 290) = 6.47, p = .01, ηρ² = .02. Separate analyses per condition (high control – prime 
before; high control – prime afterwards; low control – prime before; low control – prime 
afterwards) indicated that the interaction between Ontology and Belief in controlling 
God/s was significant in the low control – prime before condition and in the high control 
– prime afterwards condition (see Table 7 for the separate regressions per condition). In 
these conditions, belief in controlling God/s was positively associated with the perception 
of agency in natural phenomena, and negatively associated with perception of agency in 
human beings. In the two remaining conditions (high control – prime before; low control – 
prime afterwards) the interaction between Ontology and Belief in controlling God/s did not 
reach significance, all p’s > .10.
Table 7. Relationship between agency and participant’s Belief in God/s per condition and stimulus 
category in Experiment 2
Control 
condition
Prime 
condition
Ontology B CI (95%) t p ηρ²
High Before Human beings -.07 (-0.17, 0.03) -1.42 .16 .03
Natural phenomena .02 (-0.25, 0.28) 0.12 .91 .01
After Human beings -.14 (-0.23, -0.05) -3.01 .004 .11
Natural phenomena .34 (0.14, 0.55) 3.32 .001 .13
Low Before Human beings -.14 (-0.23, -0.05) -3.17 .002 .10
Natural phenomena .17 (0.01, 0.03) -2.04 .04 .05
After Human beings -.05 (-0.13, 0.04) -1.02 .31 .02
Natural phenomena .03 (-0.17, 0.22) 0.30 .77 .01
God in control 
For the God in control question, mixed design ANOVA indicated a main effect of Ontology, 
a main effect of Threat, and an interaction between Ontology x Threat. The main effect of 
Ontology reflects that natural phenomena were perceived as more controlled by God than 
human beings, F(1, 294) = 123.08, p < .001, ηρ² = .30. The main effect of Threat indicates that 
control by God was rated higher for non-threatening than for threatening items, F(1, 294) = 
37.20, p < .001, ηρ² = .11. This was the case for both natural phenomena, F(1, 294) = 13.46, 
p < .001, ηρ² = .04 and for human beings, F(1, 294) = 39.74, p < .001, ηρ² = .12. However, the 
interaction of ontology and threat revealed that the effect was stronger for human beings, 
F(1, 294) =6.33, p = .01, ηρ² = .02 (see Table 8). Especially acts of threatening human beings 
were less likely to be attributed to God than acts of non-threatening human beings.
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 In addition, the mixed design ANOVA indicated a three-way interaction of Control 
x Prime x Threat, F(1, 294) =16.25, p < .001, ηρ² = .05. Step-down analyses revealed an 
interaction of Control x Prime for threatening images, F(1, 294) =4.52, p < .05, ηρ² = .02, but 
not for non-threatening images, F(1, 294) = .66, p > .05. Simple main effects showed that 
participants in the high control – prime before condition ascribed somewhat less control to 
God over threatening images than participant in the high control – prime after condition, 
F(1, 140) =3.73, p = .056, ηρ² = .03. For participants in the low control condition however 
no significant difference was obtained in the perceived control by God over threatening 
images in the two priming conditions, F(1, 154) =1.14, p > .05 (see Table 8).
Table 8. Amount of perceived control by God over human beings and natural phenomena in 
conditions of high control and low control and in conditions in which the religion prime was 
presented before the rating task and after the rating task in Experiment 2
Control Prime Ontology Threat Mean SD 95% CI
LL UL
Low control Before Human beings Threatening 2.44 2.04 2.06 2.82
Non-threatening 2.51 2.00 2.11 2.91
Natural phenomena Threatening 3.60 2.51 3.08 4.12
Non-threatening 3.66 2.52 3.12 4.19
After Human beings Threatening 1.83 1.40 1.39 2.27
Non-threatening 2.24 1.62 1.77 2.70
Natural phenomena Threatening 3.55 2.62 2.94 4.15
Non-threatening 3.76 2.72 3.14 4.39
High control Before Human beings Threatening 2.04 1.55 1.60 2.47
Non-threatening 2.53 1.88 2.07 2.99
Natural phenomena Threatening 3.40 2.30 2.80 4.00
Non-threatening 3.69 2.47 3.07 4.30
After Human beings Threatening  2.65 2.08 2.23 3.07
Non-threatening 2.77 2.12 2.33 3.21
Natural phenomena Threatening 4.01 2.57 3.44 4.59
Non-threatening 4.05 2.61 3.46 4.64
Correlation analyses
Correlation analysis confirmed the general pattern of results as obtained with mixed model 
ANOVA where belief in controlling God/s was found to be negatively associated with the 
attribution of agency to human beings and positively associated with attribution of agency 
to natural phenomena. Similarly, individual variation in ratings of control by God was 
found to relate positively with perception of agency in (threatening and non-threatening) 
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natural phenomena, and negatively with the attribution of agency to (threatening and non-
threatening) human beings (see Table 9). That is, the more God was perceived to be in control 
of a natural phenomenon, the more agency was ascribed to that natural phenomenon. For 
human beings, the opposite pattern was found. That is, the more God was perceived to be 
in control of a human being, the less agency was ascribed to that person. 
Table 9. Correlations among variables of Experiment 2 for the different stimulus categories
Ontology Threat God Control
Human beings Threatening Agency -.25**
Non-threatening Agency -.27**
Natural phenomena Threatening Agency .25**
Non-threatening Agency .24**
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level
Discussion
Overall, the findings in Experiment 2 replicate the outcome of the first experiment. As was 
the case in Experiment 1, we did not find an effect of religious priming on the perception 
of agency in human beings and natural phenomena. Also, our attempt to enhance effects 
of religious priming by manipulating participants’ sense of control did not influence the 
attribution of agency to natural objects or human beings. However, similar as in Experiment 
1, we found prominent relations between individual difference measures in belief in God/s 
and agency attributed to natural phenomena and human beings, providing support for 
the hypothesis that considerations of supernatural agency may have opposite effects 
on the perception of agency in natural phenomena and human beings. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 2, individual differences in Belief in controlling God/s as well as ratings of the 
perceived influence of God/s per item were found to be related to the perception of agency 
in natural phenomena and the attribution of agency to human beings. Overall it appears 
that the more participants believed in controlling God/s and held God/s responsible for 
events, the more agency they perceived in natural phenomena and the less agency they 
ascribed to human beings. 
 Interestingly however, the opposing relation between Belief in God and agency 
attributed to humans and natural phenomena, was only found in two specific conditions. 
First, in line with the rationale that combining a low control manipulation with a religious 
priming manipulation would enhance vigilance for concepts of supernatural controlling 
agents, belief in God/s was found to relate negatively with agency ascribed to humans 
and positively with agency ascribed to natural phenomena. Second, a similar pattern 
of positive and negative relationships between belief in God and agency was obtained 
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when participants were asked to recall a situation in which they experienced high control 
but did not receive a religious prime. Importantly, these findings appear consistent with 
the results of a previous study (Nieuwboer et al., 2015, experiment 2) in which control 
and religious priming were manipulated in a similar design as in the current experiment 
(Nieuwboer et al., 2015). In that study we found that control and prime interacted such 
that under conditions of low control, religious priming increased the perceived influence 
of a higher power, whereas under conditions of high control, religious priming lowered 
the perceived influence of a higher power. These findings indicate that the conditions for 
making supernatural attributions in the present study were most optimal in the low control 
– religion prime condition and in the high control – no religion prime condition. In further 
support of this conclusion, note that a similar pattern of results was found in the God-in-
control ratings in Experiment 2 of the present study (see Table 8). God in control ratings for 
threatening images were highest in the low control – religion prime condition and the high 
control – no religion prime condition. 
 In sum, our findings suggest that individual levels of belief in God are positively related 
with the perception of agency in natural phenomena and negatively related with the 
perception of agency in human beings. Importantly, these relations appear to be modulated 
by the specific conditions in which humans and natural phenomena are perceived. In 
line with our previous findings (Nieuwboer et al., 2015), supernatural attributions appear 
to be most expressed when people experience low (high) control and are (not) primed 
with concepts of supernatural agency. Hence, our data suggest that in conditions that are 
optimal for people to perceive supernatural influence, individual differences in belief in 
God/s will bias the perception of agency in natural phenomena (positively) and human 
beings (negatively).
 Whereas Experiment 1 included a questionnaire to measure belief in God / the existence 
of a higher reality, Experiment 2 used a more specific questionnaire to assess individuals’ 
belief in controlling God/s. This latter measure captures the concept of a supernatural 
controlling agent more directly and strengthens construct validity of the hypothesized 
model. In addition, Experiment 2 included a fourth block of questions asking participants to 
indicate to what extent they thought that God (or Gods / Allah, etc.) exerted control over 
the depicted object. Correlation analysis between agency ratings and ratings of exerted 
control by God confirmed the results of the mixed model ANOVA by indicating a positive 
relation between perceived control by God and perceived agency in natural phenomena. 
Oppositely, control by God was found to be negatively related with perceived agency 
in human beings. Together the findings of the mixed model ANOVA and the correlation 
analyses between questions confirm the hypothesis that considerations of supernatural 
agency may stimulate the perception of agency in natural phenomena but lower the 
perception of agency in human beings. 
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 An interesting and apparently important finding in Experiment 2 is that natural 
phenomena were more likely to be perceived as controlled by God than human beings. 
Previous research has suggested that devastating and misfortunate events (natural 
disasters, death of a loved one) for which no human agent can be held responsible are 
likely to be attributed to supernatural agents such as God (e.g., Boyer, 2003; Gray & Wegner, 
2010). Opposed to the proposition that especially devastating and misfortunate events are 
likely to be attributed to supernatural agency, an interesting finding of Experiment 2 is that 
in general the non-threatening events were perceived as more controlled by God than the 
threatening events. This effect was especially pronounced for images of human beings. This 
finding aligns with results of a previous study (Nieuwboer et al., 2015) in which we found 
that people with a strong positive view of God may be inclined not to associate their God 
with negative events, such as a mass shooting.
General Discussion
Two experiments were performed to test the hypothesis that considerations of supernatural 
agency have opposite effects on the perception of agency in natural phenomena and 
human beings. In line with this hypothesis we found in two experiments that participants 
with a relatively strong belief in (controlling) God/s ascribed more agency to natural 
phenomena and less agency to human beings as compared to participants with lower or 
no such belief. For natural phenomena, which typically possess no agency themselves, the 
consideration of a supernatural agent that is in control may imbue a natural phenomenon 
with meaning and intentionality. In a similar manner, but oppositely, the consideration of 
a supernatural agent that may exert control over human beings will take away some of the 
intentionality that is typically attributed to human beings. 
 Interestingly, findings from our studies suggest that the attribution of supernatural 
agency to human beings and natural phenomena is influenced by different factors. In 
Experiment 2 we found that natural phenomena were more likely to be perceived as 
controlled by God than human beings. In line with this finding, Nieuwboer et al. (2014) 
found that natural phenomena are particularly eligible for supernatural attributions when 
they are perceived to exist beyond human control such as in the case of hurricanes and solar 
eclipses. Many of the stimuli that were included in the present study shared this property. 
Another explanation for why supernatural agency may be more easily perceived in natural 
phenomena than in human beings is that in the case of human beings, attributions of 
supernatural agency need to compete with agentic explanations that reflect intentionality 
of the person. That is, in the case of natural phenomena there is no alternative agent that 
has to be reckoned with when attributing supernatural agency. In support of this latter 
reasoning, correlation analyses in Experiment 2 showed a negative relationship between 
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estimations of control by God and the agency attributed to human beings, whereas a 
positive relationship was noted for the relationship with natural phenomena. 
 In addition, in Experiment 2 we found that participants were more inclined to attribute 
supernatural agency to non-threatening human beings and natural phenomena than to 
threatening human beings and natural phenomena. This result may be explained by the 
findings of Nieuwboer et al. (2015) who found that students did not wish to associate 
their (loving and supportive) God with negative/violent events. This interpretation might 
also explain why in Experiment 1 the relation between Belief in God/s and the perception 
of agency in human beings was only found in the condition of non-threatening human 
beings, and not in the condition of threatening human beings. Together these findings 
are consistent with a moral rationalization account (Tsang et al, 2005) in which people 
selectively adjust their interpretation of supernatural influence on natural phenomena and 
human beings in accordance with their views of God. 
 Unexpectedly, in both experiments religious priming did not influence attribution of 
agency to natural phenomena nor human beings. In Experiment 1 supernatural agency 
was primed by letting participants elaborate on the role that religion played in their lives or 
their reasons for not believing in God. In Experiment 2 we attempted to enhance the effect 
of religious priming by first manipulating participants’ sense of control (as used successfully 
in our previous study; Nieuwboer et al., 2015) and asking participants about their belief 
in controlling God/s. In our previous studies where priming was successful (Nieuwboer et 
al., 2014, 2015), we used primes that directly activated concepts of supernatural agents. 
However, in Experiment 1 of the current study, participants in the religion prime condition 
were asked whether they considered themselves to be religious or not, and to elaborate 
about the role that religion plays in their life’s. Inspection of the open answers indicated that 
only approximately half of participants’ open answers contained the word God or made 
a reference to a higher power. In the other half of the written answers participants made 
references to church attendance or towards cultural or moral aspects of religion, such as “I 
do not go to church every Sunday, but religion plays an important role in my life” and “I intend to 
raise my children with religion, because I think Christian morals are good for all” and “The law is 
also based on these standards and values” and “I cannot imagine a relationship with someone 
who has a religion other than me, so yes I think religion is important in my life.” Hence, a possible 
explanation for the lack of a priming effect in the first experiment is that the open question 
activated other aspects of religion than the influence of supernatural agents. 
 To ensure activation of supernatural agency concepts in Experiment 2, we used questions 
that specifically inquired about participants’ belief in controlling God/s as a religion prime. 
Furthermore, in line with previous studies that found people to be more inclined towards 
supernatural attribution when experiencing a loss or lack of control (e.g., Kay et al., 2008, 
2010), we manipulated participants’ sense of control before administering the religion 
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prime. Nevertheless, no effect of religious priming was found on agency ascribed to natural 
phenomena nor on the agency ascribed to human beings. A possible reason for this lack 
of effect is that participants in Experiment 2 were gathered via Mturk and were (for the 
most part) from the United States which is a society with a religious majority. In our US 
sample we indeed found a higher percentage of participants who indicated to be religious, 
as compared to our sample of Dutch college students in Experiment 1 (47% vs. 26%). If 
many people in the religion prime group already (‘chronically’) believe in supernatural 
agents, there may be little room to further stimulate concepts of supernatural agency and 
to enhance the perception of supernatural influence over and above the usual. Hence, the 
absence of priming effects in Experiment 1 and 2 could reflect the priming method that 
was used or the population that was sampled. Further research may investigate the efficacy 
of different priming methods and test for effects in different populations to determine the 
contribution of these factors. 
 The findings in the present study may have several implications for current theories 
that discuss the relationship between religiosity and agency, especially HAD. Whereas HAD 
poses that assumptions of supernatural agency are directly associated with hypersensitive 
agency detection (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; 
Guthrie, 1993), our findings suggest that supernatural attributions may also be accompanied 
by reductions in the perception of agency, especially when it comes to human beings. 
We propose a model of supernatural agency attributions (SAA) in which concepts of 
supernatural agency may affect both natural phenomena and human beings, albeit in 
opposite ways (see Figure 7). Considerations of supernatural agency may imbue natural 
phenomena with additional agency, but may take away intentionality in case of a human 
agent. Furthermore, we add that especially when phenomena/events are beyond human 
control (Nieuwboer et al, 2014), and when events or actions by humans are consistent 
with one’s views of God people will be more inclined to make supernatural attributions. 
In addition, our current findings are consistent with the results of Nieuwboer et al, (2015) 
that people’s supernatural attributions may vary as a function of experienced control and 
priming with concepts of supernatural agency. 
 The value of the model of SAA may extend to other domains and other phenomena. For 
instance, SAA might explain feelings expressed by religious leaders and religious individuals 
to act in accordance with God’s will (Han et al., 2008). Furthermore, SAA might explain why 
people who belief in God are typically more forgiving of perpetrators and demand less 
punishment (Nieuwboer et al, 2015). That is, supernatural agency may reduce the attribution 
of intent and responsibility to perpetrators. Admittedly, though, such an inference would 
have to be consistent with the observers’ views of God. 
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Figure 7. The model of supernatural agency attributions (SAA) predicts that supernatural attributions 
are associated with an increased perception of agency in natural phenomena and a reduced perception 
of agency in human beings. The amount of supernatural attributions made is dependent on various 
circumstances (such as belief in God, feelings of control, personal views of God, etc). 
Conclusion
Our study investigated the hypothesis that considerations of supernatural agency may 
affect both the ontological category of natural phenomena and the domain of human 
beings, albeit in an opposite manner. For natural phenomena the assumed presence of a 
supernatural agent may extend to imbue an object with (supernatural) agency and intent. 
In the case of human beings, the assumption of supernatural agency may take away part 
of the autonomy that is associated with human beings. We propose a model of SAA as 
an addition to the HAD theory, to account for these findings. Future research is needed 
to replicate and further extend SAA as an empirical model that describes the relationship 
between concepts of supernatural agency, natural phenomena and human agents. 
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Abstract
The present research examined the hypothesis that supernatural agency attributions 
underlie the relation between religion and forgiveness. In two experiments a priming 
procedure was used to make religious concepts temporarily more salient. In Experiment 
1, a religion prime marginally enhanced forgiveness but did not enhance supernatural 
attributions, compared to a control group. However, correlational support was found for 
the hypothesis that supernatural attributions were associated with more forgiveness, less 
punishment and less attributions of responsibility to the offender. In Experiment 2, we 
attempted to enhance supernatural attributions by first manipulating participants’ sense 
of control (high vs. low) before presenting a religion prime. As expected, in the low control 
condition, religious priming enhanced the perceived likelihood that a higher power had 
an influence on violent situations, and enhanced participants’ forgiveness towards the 
offenders. Importantly, mediation analysis further supported the existence of a relation 
between supernatural agency attributions and participants’ ability to forgive. 
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Introduction
During a midnight screening of the Batman movie “The Dark Knight Rises” in Colorado in 
July 2012, a mass shooting occurred. A man dressed as the Joker shot into the audience, 
killing 12 and injuring 58 people (Pearson, 2012). One survivor, a religious man who was 
shot three times, said he forgives the shooter with all his heart. “The first thing I want to say 
to him is ‘I forgive you,’ and the next is, ‘Can I pray for you?’” The victim further stated that 
what he saw when the offender came in was not “all the way human,” and that he felt a dark 
pres ence in the room (Cotton, 2012). 
 Throughout history, we find examples of individuals who have forgiven despite 
profound injustice. Probably the most well known example in Chris tianity is that of Jesus 
who asked for God’s forgiveness of those who cruci fied him (Luke 23: 34, English Standard 
Version). Not only in Christianity, but in all major world religions forgiveness is a value that 
is strongly encouraged (e.g., McCullough & Worthington 1999; Rye et al., 2000; Tsang, 
McCullough, & Hoyt, 2005). Survey studies have found that individuals who score high on 
religiosity also place a high value on forgiveness. For instance, in a study on Christian values, 
“forgiving” came in second place after “loving” (Shoemaker & Bolt, 1977), which illustrates 
the important position that forgiveness plays in Christian morality and culture. Accordingly, 
research has found a positive relationship between religiosity and forgiveness19 (Tsang et 
al., 2005) and it is proposed that religion may provide role models and moral values that can 
help victims to reframe their attitudes towards offenders (Pargament & Rye, 1998). 
 In addition to providing moral guidelines, there may be alternative routes through 
which religion may contribute to forgiveness. In the present study we investigated one 
such alternative mechanism: the possibility that when con cepts of supernatural agency are 
activated, part of the responsibility for a vio lent act (as in the case of the Batman shooter) is 
ascribed to the supernatural agent instead of to the perpetrator. In the following paragraphs, 
we explicate this hypothesis in more detail. 
 Supernatural agents (e.g., God, Gods, Allah) are central to most world reli gions (e.g., 
Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer, 2003). Supernatural 
agents are presumed to be capable of acting and intervening in the world (Barrett & 
Lanman, 2008), and are regularly held responsible for major life events such as birth and 
death, disease and health, fortune and misfortune (Baumard & Boyer, 2013; Bering, 2002a 
; Bering & Shackelford, 2004). According to Gray and Wegner (2009, 2010), people are par-
ticularly susceptible to making supernatural attributions in the case of negative life events 
19 Although religious people report themselves to be more forgiving, measures of specific interpersonal 
transgressions often fail to support this relationship. Tsang, McCullough and Hoyt (2005) give a psychometric 
explanation for this religion-forgiveness discrepancy and claim that it is in part due to a lack of aggregation in 
measures of reported behaviours, as well as the presence of encoding and recall biases. They argue that these 
methodological shortcomings often obscure the relationship between religion and transgression-specific 
forgiveness.
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for which no responsible actor can be identified. Accordingly, natural disasters are often 
interpreted as divine retribution (Gray & Wegner 2010; Laurin, Shariff, Henrich, & Kay, 2012; 
Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012), whereby God is seen as the intentional agent who is responsible 
for the catastrophe. Inter estingly, anecdotal findings suggest that even in cases where 
a perpetrator can be identified, people are still inclined to attribute responsibility to 
supernatural agents. For example, after the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001 some people reported 
seeing the face of the devil emerging out of the clouds of smoke (“Face of Satan” n.d.), and 
televangelist Jerry Falwell stated that the attacks were “prob ably deserved” for all of those 
who had tried to secularize America (Carlson, 2007). In the introductory example of the 
Batman shooting, the forgiving vic tim appears to ascribe part of the responsibility for the 
event to a supernatural “dark presence,” and on the Internet one can find a petition called 
“Don’t Blame God for Colorado Shootings’’ (Hamilton, 2013) illustrating the commonality 
of supernatural attributions for devastating events even in cases where an immedi ate 
perpetrator can be identified. 
 In cases of natural disasters, the presumed involvement of a supernatural agent may 
satisfy the human desire for identifying the agent who is causally responsible for the event 
(Grey & Wegner, 2010). However, in the case of a serious transgression by a human actor, 
God may be held morally responsible as the omnipotent being who is accountable for all 
the fortunes and misfortunes in the world and who might control the actions of individual 
men to enforce supernatural justice (Baumard & Boyer, 2013; Pinnock, 1996; Sartorio, 2007). 
In accordance with this perspective, studies in psychology have found that con cepts of a 
supernatural agent or God may lower the perception of human author ship. Dijksterhuis, 
Preston, Wegner and Aarts (2008) showed that subliminal priming with the word “God” 
reduced feelings of personal authorship when subjects were asked to decide whether they 
or the computer had been responsi ble for the removal of a letter string on the screen. More 
recently, Gervais (2014) found that participants attributed less intentionality to performers 
of good deeds if they knew that these acts were religiously motivated. Recent findings 
from our own lab furthermore suggest that religious priming may lower the attribu tion of 
agency to violent perpetrators. Participants who had been instructed to write about the 
significance of religion in their lives subsequently attributed less intentionality and free will 
to perpetrators of moral transgressions, as compared to participants in a control condition. 
These findings suggest that activating con cepts of supernatural agency or God may lower 
one’s personal sense of author ship as well as the perception of authorship in the action of 
others. 
 In the present study, we proceeded further along this line of inquiry and inves tigated 
if supernatural agency may lower the perceived responsibility of per petrators and thereby 
encourage forgiveness. Studies in the field of morality have found that multiple factors 
contribute to the attribution of responsibility, punishment, and forgiveness such as the 
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(purposeful or accidental) nature of the intent with which a harmful action was initiated 
(Gonzales, Haugen, & Man ning, 1994), the perceived severity of the offense (Girard & Mullet, 
1997), and mitigating and external conditions (e.g., mental illness, self-defence, blackmail) 
that accompanied the action (Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Worthington & Wade, 1999). The 
consideration of supernatural explanations for a violent offense would constitute an 
external factor that is outside of the perpetrators’ control. In line with this reasoning, studies 
on forgiveness have found that the possibility to attribute a transgression to external 
circumstances instead of to the perpetrator may enhance people’s willingness to forgive 
an offender (e.g., Fincham, 2000; Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia, 2002; Kearns & Fincham, 2005; 
Worthington & Wade, 1999; for similar findings in the domain of self-excuse see Fisher 
& Exline, 2006; Tangney, Boone, & Dearing, 2005). Along similar lines, Shariff et al. (2014) 
recently found that reductions in people’s belief in free will attenuated their support for 
retributive punishment. Letting go of retributive punishment is considered an action 
component of forgiveness that may accompany the emo tional relinquishment of anger (cf. 
Rye et al., 2000; Corlet, 2006). In accordance with these findings, we predicted that external 
supernatural attributions would reduce the perceived responsibility of a perpetrator, 
enhance forgiveness, and lower desire for punishment. 
 In two experiments, a priming procedure was used to make religious concepts 
temporarily more salient in one group of participants, whereas no priming, or neutral 
priming, was administered to a control group. The experiments included direct measures of 
forgiveness, responsibility, and punishment in Experiment 1, and intentionality, forgiveness 
and influence of a higher power in Experiment 2, rather than indirect measures of such 
concepts (e.g., see McCullough et al., 1997). Hence, participants’ answers reflect laypersons’ 
views (e.g., Kearns & Fin cham, 2004) of these concepts as they apply in these settings. In 
Experiment 1, participants received a newspaper article reporting the Colorado shooting. 
The context of the article was a court setting in which the offender stood trial that day. For 
Experiment 2, images of violent transgressions were used depicting an offender and a victim. 
 We expected that religious priming would enhance forgiveness and reduce punishment, 
and that this effect would be mediated by reduced responsibility of the offender, and the 
presumed influence of a supernatural agent. Besides the novel perspective on supernatural 
agency, responsibility, and forgiveness, the current study extends previous research on 
religion and forgiveness by using an experimental design. This allows us to investigate a 
possible causal relation between religion and forgiveness which has been suggested by 
previous research (e.g., Tsang et al., 2005). 
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Experiment 1
Experiment 1 used a newspaper article of the Colorado shooting to examine the effect 
of religious priming on forgiveness. The newspaper article states that the suspect of the 
shooting will be brought before court that day, and that the motive for the shooting is still 
unclear. Before reading the article, half of the participants were asked to answer three open-
ended questions that required them to reflect upon their religious or spiritual views. The 
other half of the participants received the same questions at the end of the experiment and, 
as a consequence, were not primed with religion when reading the newspaper article. After 
reading the article, participants were asked to rate the responsibility of the perpetrator, how 
much they were able to forgive the perpetrator, how severely they thought the perpetrator 
should be punished, and to what extent supernatural forces may have played a role in 
the event. Punishment was included as an additional measure of (inverse) forgiveness that 
matched the juridical content of the newspaper article, in line with the idea that forgiveness 
may be comprised of an emotional and an action component: the renunciation of anger 
and the removal of retribution (cf. Rey et al., 2000; Corlet, 2006). 
 It was expected that (1) religious priming would enhance forgiveness of the offender, 
that (2) effects on forgiveness would be mediated by reductions in perceived responsibility 
of the offender and (3) an increase in the attribution of supernatural agency. Furthermore, 
following the hypothesis that the perception of supernatural agency may take away 
responsibility of the offender, we predicted that (4) the effect of religion on forgiveness 
would be mediated by the indirect effect of supernatural agency via responsibility of the 
offender. That is, priming with religion would enhance the perception of supernatural 
agency, thereby lowering the perception of responsibility of the offender and enhancing 
forgiveness towards the offender. 
 In addition to the experimental effects of religious priming, individual difference measures 
were analysed to investigate the relationship between the perception of supernatural 
agency and participants’ forgiveness and perceived responsibility of the offender, using 
correlation analyses. We expected supernatural attributions to relate positively to levels of 
forgiveness, and negatively to the perceived responsibility of the offender. Furthermore, it 
was predicted that the relation between supernatural attributions and forgiveness would 
be mediated by the perceived responsibility of the offender.
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Method
Participants 
One-hundred-and-twenty-nine students from Radboud University (109 women), mean 
age 22.1 (range: 18 to 32) participated in this experiment. All participants received course 
credits in return. One participant (a Jehovah’s Witness) was excluded from analysis because 
she reported extreme religious views that could preclude the subtle effect of the priming 
manipulation.20 The experiment was run in conjunction with another study in the computer 
lab of the Behavioural Science Institute at Radboud University, which determined the 
number of par ticipants. 
Stimuli 
A newspaper article of the Colorado shootings was used. The article described that the 
suspect of the shooting (James Eagan Holmes) will be brought before court that day. It 
further stated that the 24-year-old Holmes is accused of the shooting at the Batman movie 
“The Dark Knight Rises” that killed 12 and injured 58 people and that the motive of Holmes, 
who is being held in solitary confinement, is still unclear. 
Procedure 
Half of the participants received three open-ended questions inquiring about their religious 
and spiritual views before they received the newspaper article of the Colorado shootings 
(before condition). In the three open-ended questions participants were asked to describe 
to what extent they believed there are more things in heaven and earth21, whether they 
believed that things in life happen with a higher, supernatural reason or purpose, and 
finally, whether they considered themselves to be religious or spiritual. The other half of 
participants received these three questions at the end of the experiment (after condition). 
After reading the newspaper article of the Colorado Shooting, participants were asked to rate 
on separate 9-point scales to what extent they thought Hol mes could be held responsible 
for his behaviour (1 = not at all, 9 = completely), how severely they thought Holmes should be 
punished (1 = not severe, 9 = very severe), and to imagine from the perspective of a victim22, 
to what extent they would be able to forgive Holmes (1 = not at all, 9 = completely). Next, to 
meas ure supernatural attributions, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they 
20 In line with this reasoning, it was found that the inclusion of this participant with extreme religious views 
lowered the effect of priming on forgiveness, F(1,127) = 2.74, p = .10, ηρ² = .02 and caused a significant 
correlation between forgiveness and believed influence of a higher power, r = .19, p = .03, to occur.
21 In the Netherlands people use the phrase “there is more between heaven and earth” to indicate (metaphysical) 
things exist that cannot be seen.
22 For readability, in the remainder of this paper the terms forgiveness and forgiving will imply participants’ 
expressed level of forgiveness from the imagined perspective of a victim.  
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thought that it was possible that the actions of Holmes were influenced by a higher power 
or force (1 = not at all, 9 = completely), and to what extent they thought that events like this 
shooting could possibly serve a higher, supernatural purpose (1 = not at all, 9 = completely). 
The questions appeared one by one on the screen in a fixed order, and the presentation of 
questions was self-paced.23
 Finally, participants filled out ‘The Views of God scale’ (Shariff & Noren zayan, 2011). 
This scale comprises 14 traits, seven of which reflect “positive” qualities (forgiving, loving, 
compassionate, gentle, kind, comforting, and peace ful), and seven reflect “negative” 
qualities (vengeful, harsh, fearsome, angry, punishing, jealous, and terrifying). Participants 
were asked, on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = completely), to describe how much 
each trait applied to their God or Gods, or, if the subject was a nonbeliever, how much they 
felt each trait applied to their culture’s view of God/s. 
Results
Experimental effects 
Because in Experiment 1 multiple related variables are selected for analysis, we chose an 
hierarchical approach to control for the problem of multiple com parisons. Two multivariate 
analyses were run as separate omnibus tests. A first MANOVA included the associated 
variables forgiveness, punishment, and responsibility of the offender. A second MANOVA 
included the associated vari ables “influence of a higher power” and “supernatural purpose.” 
To test whether participants who were primed with religion were more forgiv ing towards 
the offender, thought that he deserved less punishment, and held him less responsible for 
the action, a Multivariate ANOVA was conducted with prime (before vs. after) as between-
subject factor, and the ratings of forgiveness, punishment, and responsibility as dependent 
variables. The multivariate test did not reach the conventional level for significance, F(3,124) 
= 2.47, p = .07, ηρ² = .07. The test of between-subjects effects showed a trend of the prime 
on for giveness, F(1,126) = 3.58, p = .06, ηρ² = .03. Participants who answered the religion 
questions before they received the newspaper article were somewhat more forgiving 
towards the offender (M = 2.41, SD = 1.42) than participants who answered the religion 
23 Following these questions, participants received four more questions in the following order: “imagine you are 
one of the victims, to what extent do you think you would be inclined to hold a higher power responsible for 
the event,” “imagine you are one of the victims, to what extent do you think you would be inclined to seek for a 
supernatural purpose behind this event,” “to what extent did you feel emotionally touched by the event,” “how 
much control do you think the people experienced in this situation (the shooting).” We did not address these 
questions in this research article. We regarded the questions inquiring about higher power and supernatural 
purpose from the perspective of the victims as redundant with the questions inquiring about higher power 
and supernatural power from the perspective of the participant him/herself. The last 2 questions (“emotionally 
touched” and “control”) were included in the questionnaire as possible moderators.
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questions afterwards (M = 1.97, SD = 1.17).24 There was no significant difference between 
the two prime groups on severity of pun ishment, F(1,126) = .28, p > .10, and responsibility, 
F(1,126) = 2.53, p > .10. 
 Next, we tested whether religious priming enhanced supernatural attributions, and 
whether these attributions mediated the effect of the religion prime on for giveness. A 
Multivariate ANOVA was conducted with prime (before vs. after) as between-subject 
factor and as dependent variables, participants’ perception of supernatural purpose 
and influence of a higher power. The Multivariate yielded a significant effect, F(2,125) = 
3.41, p = .04, ηρ² = .05. Unexpectedly, participants who answered the religion questions 
beforehand believed to a lesser degree that a higher power could have had an influence 
on the event (M = 1.93, SD = 1.41) than participants who answered the religion questions 
afterwards (M = 2.49, SD = 1.75), F(1,126) = 4.09, p < .05, ηρ² = .03. No differences were 
found between the prime groups in their perception of supernatural purpose, F(1,126) = 
.07, p = ns. 
Mediation
To investigate the relation between religious priming and forgiveness, separate mediation 
analyses were run: (1) mediation by the perceived moral responsibil ity of the offender, (2) 
mediation by attribution of supernatural agency, and (3) the combined indirect effect of 
responsibility and supernatural agency. 
 A bootstrapping analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008) of 5000 samples indi cated that (1) 
neither responsibility, (2) nor the perception of supernatural agency (supernatural purpose 
and influence of a higher power) mediated the small effect of prime on forgiveness, 95% 
CI [-.0029, .2290], CI [-.1869, .0984], and CI [-.0740, .0685], respectively. Supernatural purpose 
and influence of a higher power together also did not mediate the effect, 95% CI, total 
model [-.2314, .1483]. Furthermore, (3) the indirect effect of prime on forgiveness was not 
mediated through higher power and responsibility in series nor through supernatural 
24 To test whether it made a difference if participants were atheist or not, participants who explicitly answered 
that they did not believe in any higher power (n=74) were compared to the other participants. Thus, we 
conducted an ANOVA with Forgiveness as dependent variable and Belief (atheists or non-atheists) and Prime 
(before vs. after) as between-subject factors. Besides the trend of the prime on forgiveness, F(1,124) = 3.52, p = 
.06, the ANOVA yielded no main effect of belief, F(1,124) = .22, p = .64, nor an interaction of belief with prime, 
F(1,124) = .05, p = .82. We also conducted a Multivariate ANOVA with the percep tion that the event served a 
supernatural purpose and the assumed influence of a higher power on the event as dependent variables and 
Belief (atheists or non-atheists) and Prime (before vs. after) as between-subject factors. This analysis yielded a 
main effect of belief, F(2,123) = 12.32, p < .001, ηρ² = .17, indicating that participants who explicitly answered 
that they do not believe in a higher power attributed less supernatural purpose and influence of a higher 
power over the event. More importantly, the factor belief did not interact with prime F(2,123) = 2.37, p = .10, 
which suggests that the effects of religious priming were unaffected by pre-existing beliefs of participants. This 
finding corroborates the idea that reli gious thought may bias people’s perceptions of supernatural agency, 
irrespective of explicit self-reported religious or non-religious affiliation (e.g., see Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).
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power and responsibility in series (model 6, Hayes, 2013), 95% CI [-.0001, .0916], and CI 
[-.0261, .0041], respectively. 
Views of God
Exploratively, an analysis was conducted to investigate whether participants’ God views 
were influenced by the priming manipulation. Mean scores were calcu lated for the positive 
(forgiving, loving, compassionate, gentle, kind, comforting, and peaceful; α _= .93) and 
negative (vengeful, harsh, fearsome, angry, punishing, jealous, and terrifying; α _= .84) 
qualities. A Repeated Measures ANOVA was per formed with Qualities (positive vs. negative) 
as within subject factor and Prime (before vs. after) as between-subject factor. A strong main 
effect of qualities was found, F(1,126) = 2.57, p < .001, ηρ² = .67. Participants viewed their 
(culture’s) God as more positive (M = 5.18, SD = 1.26) than negative (M = 2.72, SD = 1.07). 
Moreover, an interaction was found between Prime x Qualities, F(1,126) = 3.95, p = .05, ηρ² 
= .03. Participants who answered the religion questions beforehand viewed their (culture’s) 
God as more positive than participants who answered the religion questions afterward (M = 
5.54, SD = 0.92 vs. M = 4.76, SD = 1.46, respectively), F(1,126) = 13.47, p < .001, ηρ² = .10. There 
was no difference between the two prime groups on the negative qualities, F(1,126) < 1. 
Individual differences
Correlations between individual differences in the attribution of supernatural agency and 
levels of forgiveness, punishment, and responsibility of the offender are listed in Table 10.25 
In line with the expectation that supernatural attributions facilitate forgiveness, a positive 
correlation was found between perception of supernatural purpose and forgiveness, and 
a trend for a positive relation was found between perceived influence of higher power 
and forgiveness. Supernatu ral attributions were also negatively related to punishment. 
A stronger belief that the event served a supernatural purpose and a stronger belief that 
a higher power could have influenced the event were associated with lower ratings of 
punishment. Furthermore, in accordance with the prediction that supernatural attributions 
may decrease responsibility of the offender, the more participants believed that a higher 
power could have had an influence on the event, the less responsible they held the offender 
for the event. 
 To test whether perceived responsibility of the offender mediated the relation between 
perceived influence of a higher power on the one hand and forgiveness or punishment of 
the offender on the other hand, two bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) of 
5000 samples were performed. Bootstrapping indicated that responsibility of the offender 
25 A requirement for correlation analyses is that the involved variables do not measure the same construct. 
Reliability analysis of forgiveness, punishment, and responsibility indicated that internal consistency of these 
variables is low (α = .01) which indicates that these vari ables measure distinct constructs.  
489
Supernatural agency and forgiveness
did not mediate the relation between the perceived influence of a higher power and 
forgiveness, 95% CI [-.0065, .0945]. However, responsibility of the offender did mediate the 
relationship between the perceived influence of a higher power and punishment, 99% CI 
[-.2022, -.0095]. 
Table 10. Correlations among variables of Experiment 1
Forgiveness    Punishment Responsibility
Influence
Higher power
Supernatural
purpose
Forgiveness ___
Punishment -.33*** ___
Responsibility -.16+ .64*** ___
Influence
Higher power
.17+ -.24** -.26** ___
Supernatural
purpose
.36*** -.29** -.12 .54*** ___
*** p < .001;  ** p < .01;  * p < .05;  + p < .10. 
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 1 suggest that priming with religion may facilitate forgiveness. 
Participants who reflected on their religious and spiritual view points before they received 
a newspaper article about the Colorado Shooting showed a trend towards expressing 
more forgiveness of the offender. However, we did not find support for the hypothesis that 
supernatural attributions mediate this effect. In contrast to what we expected, participants 
who were primed with religion believed to a lesser extent that a higher power could have 
had an influ ence on the situation. 
 When looking at participants’ view of God, we found that participants ascribed far more 
positive than negative characteristics to God. This effect was enhanced for the group that 
was primed with religion, suggesting that the religion prime made these positive God 
concepts more salient. Arguably, this could be the rea son why participants who were 
primed with religion ascribed less influence to a higher power for the shooting as they 
associated their (culture’s) God more with positive events than with negative events. This 
is an interesting finding as it suggests that attributions of supernatural responsibility may 
directly depend on different views of God. 
 Although caution must be taken in interpreting the data of the correlation analyses as 
the different prime conditions are taken together here, in the correlation analysis we did 
find tentative support for the hypothesis that supernatural attri butions may be associated 
with forgiveness, punishment, and responsibility of the offender. The more participants 
believed that the event was part of a super natural plan, or that a higher power could have 
had an influence on the event, the more forgiving they were towards the offender, and the 
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less severely they thought the offender should be punished. Also, the belief that a higher 
power could have had an influence on the situation correlated negatively with per ceived 
responsibility of the offender. 
 Mediation analyses of individual differences provided some support for the theoretical 
prediction that supernatural attributions may lower the perceived responsibility of the 
offender and in turn enhance forgiveness of the offender. That is, participants who 
perceived a greater influence of a higher power in the event, ascribed less responsibility 
to the offender and thought the offender deserved less severe punishment. However, 
responsibility of the offender was not found to mediate the relation between the perceived 
supernatural influence and forgiveness.
 In sum, the first experiment provided only preliminary support for the hypothesis that 
the relation between religion and forgiveness is mediated by the presumed influence of 
a higher power. On a correlational level, this hypothesis did seem to be supported for 
punishment but not for forgiveness. On an experimental level, priming had an unexpected 
reverse effect on the perception of supernatural influence. One reason for this reversed 
effect of religious priming on the belief in supernatural involvement might be that the 
questions that were used for the religion prime activated views of a loving and supporting 
God instead of a controlling God. The findings on the View of God scale supports this 
explanation as priming enhanced positive views of God. In accordance with this idea Webb, 
Chickering, Colburn, Heisler, and Call (2005) found that dispositional forgiveness is positively 
correlated with positive God concepts but negatively with concepts of a controlling God. 
Hence, religious priming might have led to more forgiveness by direct associations with 
positive God concepts such as forgiveness, compassion, and kindness. 
 In Experiment 1, the effect of religious priming on forgiveness was not mediated by 
supernatural influence, most likely because participants did not wish to associate their 
positive God concepts with the negative consequences of the shooting. Interestingly, and 
relevant for our hypothesis, is that Laurin et al. (2012) recently found that only participants 
who believe in controlling Gods engage in making supernatural attributions. In other words, 
people may only activate concepts of supernatural agency when (negative) concepts of 
a controlling God are activated. In Experiment 2, we attempted to indirectly induce the 
concept of a controlling God in two ways. First, to activate the concept of a controlling 
God, one of the questions in the religion prime questionnaire specifically inquired about 
participants’ belief in controlling God/s. Second, previous research has shown that lowered 
perceptions of control increase belief in the existence of a controlling God (Kay, Gaucher, 
Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). Therefore, in Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ 
sense of control before presenting the religion prime.
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Experiment 2
As supernatural agency attributions may be enhanced when people experience low 
control (Kay et al. 2008), in the second experiment we first manipulated participants’ 
perceived control. We expected that participants in a low control condition would be more 
susceptible to making supernatural attributions after receiving a religion prime. 
 Feelings of control were manipulated by letting participants think back on a negative 
event in which they experienced high control or in which they experi enced low control. 
Previous research has demonstrated a causal relation between lowered perceptions of 
personal control and increased beliefs in the existence of a controlling God (e.g., Kay et al., 
2008; Laurin et al., 2012). Within each group, half of the participants subsequently received a 
religion prime, whereas the other half received a neutral prime. Following the manipulation 
of control and the religion prime, all participants were presented with 25 images of offenders 
threatening a victim. They were asked to rate for every image to what extent they thought 
the offender acted in accordance with his own will, whether they were able to forgive the 
offender, and to what extent they thought a higher power could have had an influence on 
the situation. The question to what extent the offender acted in accordance with his own 
will provided a measure of intentionality (Haggard, 2005). Intentionality is closely related 
to responsibility and judgments of cause and blame. That is, when transgressions are 
committed intentionally, perpetrators are held more accountable and responsible for their 
behaviour as compared to transgressions that are committed unintentionally (Lagnado & 
Channon, 2008). 
 In accordance with the hypothesis that low control may enhance supernatural 
attributions, we expected effects of religious priming on forgiveness to be strongest in 
the low control condition. Furthermore, we expected the effect of religious priming on 
forgiveness to be mediated by the perceived influence of a higher power on the event, and 
the intentionality attributed to the offender. 
Method
Participants 
Sixty-seven students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (55 women), mean age 19.9 
(ranging from 18 to 28) participated in the experiment. All received course credits in return. 
One participant was excluded from the analysis because of incomplete data. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Control: low vs. high) x 2 
(Prime: religion vs. neutral) factorial between-subject design. The amount of participants in 
this second experiment was determined by the maximal number of participants that could 
be tested in one week in the computer lab. 
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Stimuli 
Twenty-five pictures were used: 23 were gathered from the Internet, and two were from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). On every 
picture, one offender and one victim were depicted. To avoid using the explicit term 
“offender” in the questions, an arrow pointing to the offender was placed in the image. 
Procedure 
To manipulate perceived control, participants were randomly assigned to a condition in 
which they were asked to recall a negative situation over which they lacked / or had control: 
the low- and high-control condition, respectively (Kay et al., 2008). Subsequently, half of the 
participants in the low- and high-control condition received a religion prime, whereas the 
other half received a neutral prime. In the religion prime condition, participants filled out 
a questionnaire that consisted of eight items of which four required religious and spiritual 
reflec tions (e.g., “Do you consider yourself religious?”; “Do you believe in a higher power?”). 
The other four items were filler questions (e.g., “How often do you play sports?”; “What is 
your political affiliation?”). In the neutral prime condition, the four religion questions were 
replaced by four neutral questions unrelated to religion (see Appendix C). After participants 
filled in the religion questionnaire or the neutral questionnaire, they were presented with 
twenty-five images depicting victims and offenders in random order. For each picture, 
participants were asked o rate on a 9-point scale to what extent they thought the indicated 
person (the offender) acted in accordance with his own will (1 = not at all, 9 = completely). This 
measure of intentionality was administered first as it is a candidate mediat ing variable in the 
relation between religion and forgiveness. After this first block on intentionality, participants 
received all images for a second time and a third time, in the same order as the first block. 
In the second block, they were asked to take the perspective of the victim, and to rate for 
each image on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all, 9 = completely) to what extent they thought 
they would be able to forgive the indicated person (the offender). In the third block, they 
were asked how likely they thought it was that a “higher power” had an influence on the 
depicted situation. Although the “higher power” question was also a possible mediator, this 
question was presented after the dependent variable forgiveness to be sure that it would 
not act as a religion prime. Each image remained on the screen during the time a question 
was presented. The experiment was self-paced. After the picture rating task, all participants 
were asked to rate on two separate 6-point scales (1 = not at all, 6 = very much) how religious 
they considered themselves to be, and how much they believed in a higher power. 
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Results
Experimental effects 
To test the prediction that the effects of religious priming on forgiveness would be stronger 
in the low control condition than in the high control condition, we performed an ANOVA 
with control (low vs. high) and prime (religion vs. neutral) as between-subject factors, 
using the ratings of forgiveness as dependent variable. No main effects were found for the 
factors control and prime on forgiveness, F(1,62) = 1.75, p = .19 and F(1,62) = .01, p =.99, 
respectively. However, the analysis did reveal the predicted interaction between Control x 
Prime, F(1,62) = 10.89, p = .002, ηρ² = .15 (see Figure 8). Simple main effects showed that, 
in the low control condition, participants who were primed with religion forgave more (M 
= 4.01, SD = 2.29) than participants who were not primed with religion (M = 2.70, SD = 
1.12), F(1,32) = 4.48, p < .05, ηρ² = .12. There was an unexpected finding in the high control 
condition, where we found that participants who were primed with religion forgave less (M 
= 2.17, SD = 0.91) than participants who were not primed with religion (M = 3.49, SD = 1.77), 
F(1,30) = 7.23 p =.012, ηρ² = .19. Looking at the interaction differently, participants in the 
low control condition who were primed with religion reported higher levels of forgiveness 
(M = 4.01, SD = 2.29) than participants in the high control condition who were primed with 
religion (M = 2.17, SD = 0.91), F(1,32) = 9.43, p = .004, ηρ² = .23. For participants in the neutral 
prime condition, there was no difference between levels of forgiveness in the low and high 
control condition, F(1,30) = 2.32, p = .14. 
Figure 8. Forgiveness ratings in Experiment 2. Mean forgiveness scores (+ 95% CI) for the low control 
group (left) and high control group (right) in the religion prime condition (dark grey) and neutral 
prime condition (light grey).
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Mediation
To test whether perceived influence of a higher power mediated the interaction effect of 
control and prime on forgiveness, we first tested whether the interaction effect of control 
and prime on influence of a higher power was reliable. Therefore, an ANOVA with control 
(low vs. high) and prime (religion vs. neutral) as between-subject variables, and influence of 
a higher power as dependent variable was conducted. This ANOVA yielded the expected 
interaction of Control x Prime, F(1,62) = 4.37, p = .04, ηρ² = .07 (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. Ratings of perceived influence of a higher power in Experiment 2. Mean higher power 
scores (+ 95% CI) for the low control group (left) and high control group (right) in the religion prime 
condition (dark grey) and neutral prime condition (light grey).
 Comparable with the scores on forgiveness, religious priming generated opposite 
effects in the low and high control conditions. In the low control condition, religious priming 
enhanced perception of the influence of a higher power. In the high control condition, 
religious priming lowered the perception of the influence of a higher power, relative to the 
neutral condition. None of the simple main effects reached significance, all p’s > .10. Next, 
we tested whether the perceived influence of a higher power mediated the interaction 
effect of control and prime on forgiveness. We performed a bootstrapping analysis (model 
8; Hayes 2013) with Control x Prime as predictor, forgiveness as dependent variable, and 
influence of a higher power as mediator. A bootstrapping analysis of 5000 samples indicated 
that the influence of a higher power was indeed a mediator in predicting forgiveness, 95% 
CI [0.1594, 2.4866]. We also tested the reverse mediation, whether forgiveness mediated 
the perceived influence of a higher power by performing a bootstrapping analysis with 
Control x Prime as predictor, perceived influence of a higher power as dependent variable, 
and forgiveness as a mediator. Bootstrapping analysis of 5000 samples indicated that 
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forgiveness was a mediator in predicting the belief that a higher power influenced the event, 
99% CI [0.7327, 3.7200]. Hence the directionality of the mediation between forgiveness and 
believed influence of a higher power is ambiguous in this dataset. 
 To test whether intentionality mediated the interaction effect of control and prime 
on forgiveness, we first tested whether the interaction effect of control and prime on 
intentionality was significant. Therefore, an ANOVA with control (low vs. high) and prime 
(religion vs. neutral) as between-subject factors, and intentionality as dependent variable 
was performed. The main effect of control did not reach conventional levels of significance, 
F(1,62) = 3.49, p = .066, ηρ² = .05. However, participants in the high control condition did 
seem to attrib ute somewhat more intentionality to the offender (M = 7.05, SD = 0.92) than 
participants in the low control condition (M = 6.48, SD = 1.46). The ANOVA yielded no other 
significant effects, all Fs < 1. Bootstrapping procedures with 5000 samples with Control x 
Prime as predictor, forgiveness as dependent vari able, and intentionality as mediator further 
confirmed that intentionality was not a mediator in predicting forgiveness, 95% CI [-0.2292, 
0.2494]. Neither was forgiveness a mediator in predicting intentionality 95% CI [-0.7032, 
0.6112]. 
Individual differences 
Correlational analyses were run to investigate the relation between individual differences 
in the perception of supernatural influence and individual levels of forgiveness and 
attribution of intentionality. In line with the previous findings and the expectation that 
supernatural attributions facilitate forgiveness, a posi tive correlation was found between 
perceived influence of a higher power and forgiveness, r = .67, p < .001. No correlation was 
found between perceived influ ence of a higher power and intentionality attributed to the 
offender, or between attributed intentionality to the offender and forgiveness, all p’s > .10. 
Discussion
The second experiment aimed to manipulate the conditions under which con cepts 
of a controlling God are activated to investigate the hypothesis that for giveness can be 
facilitated by the attribution of control to a higher power. In line with our prediction, effects 
of religious priming on forgiveness were found to be moderated by the manipulation of 
control. In the low control condition, where according to the model of compensatory 
control (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010) a controlling higher power or God should be 
maximally activated, religious priming resulted in more forgiveness towards offenders than 
after neu tral priming. Likewise, religious priming in the low control condition was found 
to enhance forgiveness relative to similar religious priming in the high control condition. 
These findings are in line with the theoretical model of compensatory control (Kay et al., 
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2010) and suggest that effects of religious priming, in this case forgiveness of a violent 
offender, can be enhanced by the manipulation of control. 
 The hypothesis that priming effects of religion on forgiveness reflect the attri bution 
of responsibility to a higher power was also supported by participants’ supernatural 
attributions. Similar to the pattern of effects on forgiveness, the assumed influence of a 
higher power was found to be shaped by the interac tion between control and religious 
priming, with the combination of low control and religious priming generating most 
supernatural attributions. Importantly, mediation analysis confirmed that the interaction 
effect of the religion prime and control manipulation on forgiveness was mediated by 
the extent to which participants assumed that a higher power had an influence on the 
situation. Note that the reverse mediation from forgiveness to influence of a higher power 
on the situation, was also significant. However, from a functional perspective this model is 
considered as less plausible.26 
General Discussion
The present research attempted to uncover the functional relation between reli gion and 
forgiveness. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the attribution of supernatural 
influence may reduce the perceived responsibility of an offender, and thereby induce 
forgiveness. Although the evidence was mixed (no media tion in Experiment 1; mediation 
in Experiment 2), taken together the studies provide tentative evidence in line with our 
theorizing. 
 To our knowledge, as yet, no study has tried to manipulate religious thought in order 
to investigate a possible causal connection between religion and forgive ness. Similar to 
previous research (e.g., Inzlicht & Tullet, 2010), religion was primed by letting participants 
reflect on the meaning of religion in their lives (in Experiment 1, by means of open-ended 
questions, in Experiment 2, with a questionnaire). In Experiment 1, participants who had 
contemplated on the role of religion in their lives were somewhat more inclined to forgive 
the Bat man shooter for his violent transgression, as compared to participants who did not 
receive a religion prime. In Experiment 2, it was found that when people experience little 
control, religious thought may reinforce belief in controlling supernatural agents and will 
increase forgiveness of violent offenders. In con trast, when participants experienced a 
strong sense of control, religious priming lowered their belief in a controlling supernatural 
agent and attenuated their for giveness of perpetrators. Thus, these findings suggest that 
26 Mediation analysis indicated that the relationship between supernatural attribution and forgiveness was 
bidirectional. Although in the current research there is no formal way to distinguish between the two 
alternative mediation models, we consider the reverse media tion explanation (forgiveness as a determinant 
of supernatural attribution) as less plausible. That is, the assumption that forgiveness of a perpetrator, e.g., 
through activation of religious morality, would result in the increased perception of supernatural agency over 
a violent situ ation, to us seems less likely than the proposed mediational pattern.
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religious thought can either enhance or reduce forgiveness, depending on the sense of 
control people experience. 
 The current findings suggest that religious priming does not automatically enhance 
supernatural agency attributions. More specifically, in Experiment 1, considerations of 
religious belief at the start of the experiment resulted in an unexpected lower perception 
of supernatural agency. Most likely, participants did not wish to associate their (activated) 
positive God concepts with a nega tive event such as the Colorado Shooting. This 
interpretation resonates with the rationalization model as proposed by Tsang et al. (2005) 
which states that people are apt to find explanations or change mental perspectives to 
support their religious morality. In Experiment 2, the manipulation of control was found to 
have a strong moderating effect on religious priming and the attribution of supernatural 
agency. In conditions of low control, religious priming resulted in an enhancement of the 
perceived influence of a higher power. In contrast, in the condition of high control, religious 
priming lowered the perception of supernat ural involvement. These findings corroborate 
the idea that low feelings of con trol may increase the belief in the existing of a controlling 
God (Kay et al., 2008, 2010; Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008; Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van 
Harreveld, 2010). Importantly, our findings contribute to this literature by indicating that the 
induction of feelings of high personal control may actually reduce belief in a controlling God. 
These effects of control on perception of supernatural agency in the laboratory appear to 
map well onto the prominent relationship that exists between religion and security across 
the globe. That is, in countries that offer a relatively stable and secure environment, religious 
views play a much less prominent role than in countries where people experience large 
personal insecurities (e.g., because of war or economic uncertainty; Ruiter & van Tubergen, 
2009). 
 Although the current findings partly support the hypothesized contribution of 
supernatural agency in forgiveness, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that this may 
not be the only mechanism by which religion may foster forgiveness. In Experiment 1, 
consideration of religious belief was found to enhance forgive ness of the perpetrator but to 
lower the belief that a higher power might have had an influence on the Batman shooting. 
This suggests that effects of religious priming on forgiveness do not necessarily rely on 
supernatural attribution alone and that other mechanisms might be in play as well. One 
such mechanism may be that of Pargament and Rye (1998), who proposed that religion 
can provide role models that contribute to forgiveness. Religious belief and/or priming may 
activate roles of moral conduct, and enhancement of forgiveness may reflect the Christian 
heritage (e.g., “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,” Luke 23: 34, English 
Standard Version) which provided the dominant culture for many of our participants. 
 Nonetheless, the present study did obtain some preliminary evidence in sup port of 
the hypothesis that considerations of supernatural agency may facili tate forgiveness of a 
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perpetrator when the responsibility for negative events is attributed to God. Correlation 
analyses in Experiment 1 revealed that individual differences in the assumed influence 
of a higher power over the Batman shoot ing, or the belief that this violent act served 
some higher supernatural purpose, related positively to forgiveness of the offender, and 
negatively to the desired level of punishment of the offender. The assumed influence of a 
higher power was also negatively related to the amount of responsibility attributed to the 
Bat man shooter for his actions. Furthermore, mediation analysis revealed that attri bution 
of responsibility to the offender mediated the relation between the per ceived influence 
of a higher power and desired punishment of the offender. This mediation supports the 
idea that concepts of supernatural agency may lower the attribution of responsibility to 
violent offenders and facilitate their forgiveness. Experiment 2 contributed further evidence 
on the hypothesized role of supernat ural agency by indicating that effects of religious 
priming on forgiveness were mediated by the perceived influence of a higher power. 
Together these findings support a model in which forgiveness of offenders is facilitated 
when people consider possible supernatural influences over events. However, relevant for 
our theorizing about the relationship between supernatural agency and forgiveness is that 
the responsibility of the perpetrator in Experiment 1 and the intentionality of offenders in 
Experiment 2 contributed little to the relationship between reli gion and forgiveness. This 
suggests that alternative models must be considered to explain how the consideration of 
supernatural agency could facilitate forgive ness. One possible alternative could be that 
supernatural attributions imbue an event with meaning and resignation that “this was 
meant to be.” Such an expla nation would include forgiveness of the offender without 
the need for a reduc tion in the perceived responsibility or intentionality of the offender. 
Another possibility would be that forgiveness becomes easier because people can leave 
the retribution to a higher power (cf. Laurin et al., 2012). 
 Further research is necessary to determine if the attribution of responsibility to the 
perpetrator plays a role in the enhancement of forgiveness when people are primed 
with religion. Research by Knobe (2003) has shown that the severity of the negative 
consequences that follow an offence will enhance the attribution of intentionality to an 
offender. This could curtail the opportunity to shift respon sibility to a supernatural level. 
 In conclusion, the present study investigated the relation between religion and 
forgiveness and the possible psychological mechanisms that connect religion to forgiveness. 
Although the reported effects were not strong, taken together they seem to be in line with 
the notion that religious thought may enhance for giveness (Experiment 1), and that this 
effect can be moderated by the level of control that people experience (Experiment 2). In a 
state of low control, reli gious priming was found to enhance the perception of supernatural 
agency in accordance with the model of compensatory control (Kay et al., 2010) and to 
stimulate forgiveness. Interestingly, our results indicate that the experience of high control 
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may actually reduce the perception of supernatural agency and lower forgiveness of a 
perpetrator. These findings imply that just as with natural disasters, people may intuitively 
look for supernatural influence when violent offences by human perpetrators are observed. 
Additional research is required to further understand the relation between supernatural 
agency and forgiveness. In particular, the hypothesis that forgiveness may be mediated by 
a reduction in perceived responsibility of the perpetrator requires further attention as well 
as alternative models that may underlie this relationship. Finally, we encour age broader 
initiatives to model effects of perceived supernatural agency both within and beyond the 
domain of person perception as we expect that percep tions of supernatural agency will 
have a general influence on the attribution of thoughts, emotions, and behaviours to both 
self and others.
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A turbulent period
I started as a Phd student in Social Psychology in 2008. At that time the chapter of Bem 
‘Writing the Empirical Journal Article’ (Bem, 2003) was still used as an example of how to 
write a research article. The purpose of Bem’s paper was ‘to tell the world what you have 
learned’ and ‘to enhance the chances that some journal editor will let you do so’(Bem, 2003, 
p. 171). According to Bem, there were two empirical papers you could write: “the article you 
planned to write when you designed your study or (b) the article that makes the most sense 
now that you have seen the results. They are rarely the same, and the correct answer is (b)” 
(Bem, 2003, p. 171, 172). Bem encouraged a story telling way of reporting research findings, 
as people were interested in your findings, but not in how you got there. 
 At the beginning of 2011, we discussed another paper of Bem in our labgroup. In 9 
experiments with over 1000 participants, Bem claimed to have found proof for the 
existence of “precognition” (Bem, 2011). Participants for instance reacted to unpredictable 
erotic or negative stimuli before they occurred. In our labgroup, and among psychologists 
in general, this paper gave rise to doubt the standard research practices that are used in 
the field. It was either that, or revising our beliefs in precognition. In a reaction on Bem’s 
paper by Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas (2011), it was explained that 
commonly used methodological and statistical strategies in psychology are too weak, and 
provide researchers with too many opportunities to (even unwillingly) fool themselves and 
their peers. They reanalysed the data of Bem’s studies with a (more conservative) Bayesian 
t-test, and the results did not hold up.
 Later that year, an influential paper of Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn (2011) appeared 
in which they argue that researches can easily and (often) without malicious intent enhance 
their chances of obtaining false positive results by playing with ‘researches degree of 
freedom’. They showed that with four commonly used researchers’ degrees of freedom, 
that is flexibility in choosing among dependent variables, sample size, using covariates, 
and reporting only parts of the experiment, the chance of finding a false positive result 
may increase from 5% to even 61%! At around the same time the news came that a 
respected Social Psychologist, Diederik Stapel, had been conducting large scale research 
fraud by fabricating and manipulating data (Stapel Investigation, 2012; Stroebe, Postmes, 
& Spears, 2012). In the case of Diederik Stapel, intentional fraud was committed. On top of 
this all, in the past years several well-known psychology findings could not be replicated 
(Camerer et al., 2018; OSC, 2015), resulting in what some called “a replications crisis” (e.g. 
Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), further deepening the already existing crisis in confidence 
in psychological science.  
 A positive outcome of these alarming developments in the field of psychology is that new 
standards and best practices have been developed to counteract ‘questionable research 
practices’ such as running a-priori power analyses, pre-registration of studies on platforms 
such as the Open Science Framework (see https://osf.io), the application of additional 
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analyses methods such as Bayesian statistics (e.g., Wagenmakers & Grünwald, 2006), and 
open access of not only papers but also data and syntax. Since all my experiments were 
conducted between 2009 and 2012, with one exception, Exp3.2 in 2014, the research in this 
dissertation does not meet these new standards. The results and conclusions as presented 
in this these should hence be regarded as provisional, awaiting replication by properly pre-
registered and powered studies. 
Another important value that has newly emerged from the crisis in psychological 
research is that a study that is properly conducted should be published, even when no 
significant differences are found between conditions. The tendency to publish only 
significant findings (so-called publication bias) has been described as one of the causes 
of the replication crisis (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). Most journals are still reluctant 
to publish non-significant findings. The problem is that null findings are more difficult to 
interpret (e.g. there could be any reason why an effect does not occur) and/or not seen as 
innovative or news worthy enough. Therefore, null findings often end up in ‘the file drawer’. 
For reasons of transparency, below I will now briefly describe my own file drawer, because 
not all studies I performed ended up in this dissertation. I will only report studies that fall 
within the research topic of this dissertation: supernatural agency attributions and agency 
perceived in natural phenomena or human beings.
The first file drawer study is a study in which we used a translated version of the 
scrambled sentences task by Shariff & Norenzayan (2007) designed to prime religion. The 
task and dependent variables were the same as in Chapter 2. The hypothesis was that 
participants in the religion scrambled sentences condition would ascribe more agency to 
natural phenomena compared to participants in the neutral scrambled sentences condition. 
There was no statistical difference between the two groups. I uploaded this study to a portal 
of Shariff in which they were searching for religious priming studies to conduct a meta-
analysis (Shariff et al. 2015). The study was not included, and is also not mentioned in the 
meta-analysis. A second study concerns a study performed in the ‘Stevenskerk’ (Stevens 
church) in Nijmegen. We asked visitors of the market (nearby the church) if they would 
answer a couple of questions and then took them to the church or to a café. For this study, 
we changed the questions to try and make them more comprehensible (e.g. instead of 
“To what extent do you think the depicted has a will of its own?” we asked “To what extent 
do you think the depicted controls its own movement?”). Because the experiment had to 
be short (as people participated voluntarily) we only collected responses to 16 pictures 
(instead of 80). Results indicated no difference in the ‘agency’ score to natural phenomena 
and human beings, which provides a strong indication that participants did not understand 
the questions, or at least the questions were not the operalization of agency as we meant 
it (intentionality and will of its own). This study hence rightfully ended up in the file drawer. 
Two other studies were performed with the snowy pictures task as a paradigm (instead of 
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rating images). The snowy pictures were images of noise used to measure illusory pattern 
perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). One used a fear manipulation (a scary movie scene 
(The shining) vs. a neutral movie scene) and we expected participants in the fear condition 
to perceive more agents in the snowy pictures than participants in the neutral condition. No 
differences were found in perceiving agents in both conditions, but the scary movie made 
people see more chopped of limbs and other bloody scenes in the snowy pictures. The 
other study had 3 conditions: a religion questionnaire condition, an incense condition, and 
a neutral condition (no priming). We expected participants in the two religion conditions 
to perceive more agents in the snowy pictures than in the neutral condition. No differences 
were found in perceiving agents between all three conditions. In both studies we did 
find that participants overall perceived more agents than objects. Finally, we performed 
two studies with the Social Simon task (a tool to investigate co-representation of actions; 
Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). In one study we primed participant with religion by letting 
them watch a picture of ‘the hand of God’ (Michelangelo), whereas in the control condition 
another art work was shown. In the second study we primed participants by letting them 
fill out a religion questionnaire before or after the Simon task. We expected a Simon effect 
to occur when co-acting with a non-biological agent in the religious priming task. In both 
studies, no differences (and no Simon effect) was found between the two conditions. 
With this I will end this Postface. It was a very turbulent period to be a PhD student in Social 
Psychology, and to witness psychology methods and standards to change so dramatically. 
Re-reading the paper of Bem ‘how to write the empirical journal article’ with the zeitgeist of 
now, it is almost impossible to understand that his chapter was once commonly accepted. 
In the end, the most important lesson that I have learned is that science is not per definition 
objective. It falls and stands by researchers’ best practices, and what is seen as best practice 
can change over time. 
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Religiositeit vindt men in vele vormen over de hele wereld. Ondanks de vele verschillende 
uitingsvormen van religie hebben bijna alle religies ook ten minste één gemeenschappelijke 
factor, namelijk het geloof in bovennatuurlijke entiteiten. Volgens de ‘Cognitive Science of 
Religion’ (CSR; o.a., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer, 
2003; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Tremlin, 2008) komt dit geloof deels voort uit de menselijke 
neiging om snel dieren en mensen (‘agenten’) te ontdekken in de omgeving.
 Globaal gezien kan de omgeving ingedeeld worden in twee ontologische categorieën: 
objecten en agenten. Objecten (zoals stenen, bomen, planten, gebruiksvoorwerpen) 
bestaan passief en kunnen niet uit zichzelf tot actie overgaan en invloed uitoefenen op de 
omgeving. Agenten (meest duidelijke voorbeelden zijn mensen en dieren) daarentegen 
kunnen intentioneel, doelbewust en onafhankelijk handelen en invloed uitoefenen op de 
omgeving (Boyer, 1994; Tremlin, 2008). Het snel kunnen ontdekken van agenten is voor de 
mens van groot belang (denk aan roofdieren en prooien). Volgens sommige onderzoekers 
heeft dit evolutionair geleid tot overactieve aanwezigheidsdetectie (OAD; Barrett, 2000; Barrett 
& Lanman, 2008), een mechanisme dat gespecialiseerd is in het snel detecteren van agenten 
in de omgeving. Dit mechanisme werkt volgens het ‘better save than sorry’-principe; door het 
snelle en automatische karakter van dit mechanisme is er regelmatig sprake van loos alarm, 
dat wil zeggen dat er agenten waargenomen worden die er niet zijn. Het is immers veelal 
minder schadelijk om een agent te veel te spotten dan één te weinig. Een rots voor een 
beer waarnemen en wegvluchten is geen levensbedreigende vergissing, terwijl een beer 
voor een rots waarnemen dat wel kan zijn. Wordt er foutief een agent gedetecteerd, dan 
spreken Barrett en Lanman (2008) van een OAD- ervaring. Deze ervaringen zouden aan de 
basis kunnen liggen van ons geloof in onzichtbare en bovennatuurlijke machten. Wanneer 
informatie ambigu is, of wanneer er geen duidelijke, fysiek aanwijsbare oorzaak voor een 
bepaalde gebeurtenis is, kan OAD leiden tot een verklaring met bovennatuurlijke agenten. 
Barrett en Lanman (2008) theoretiseren dat wanneer dit gebeurt op een plaats die al wordt 
geassocieerd met bovennatuurlijke agenten (bijv. een kerk of tempel), dit het geloof in deze 
agenten zal versterken. Aanwezig zijn op een plek die met deze bovennatuurlijke agenten 
geassocieerd is, zou mensen daarnaast gevoeliger maken om gebeurtenissen aan deze 
bovennatuurlijke agenten toe te schrijven. Concepten van bovennatuurlijke agenten (en 
het geloof hier in) en OAD versterken elkaar dan wederzijds. 
Ondanks dat de OAD  theorie een van de belangrijkste theorieën is binnen CSR voor het 
ontstaan van religieuze overtuigingen, is deze vooralsnog vooral gebaseerd op theoretische 
overwegingen en heeft weinig empirische aandacht gekregen. Dit proefschrift heeft tot 
doel de relatie tussen OAD en religie empirisch te onderzoeken.
In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten we in twee studies de vraag of het “primen” van concepten 
van bovennatuurlijke agenten leidt tot een toename in het toeschrijven van agency 
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(intentionaliteit en eigen wil) aan natuurverschijnselen die op zichzelf geen agency 
bezitten. Om deze vraag te onderzoeken hebben we bij de helft van onze deelnemers 
concepten van religie tijdelijk toegankelijker gemaakt (geprimed) en gemeten in hoeverre 
dit van invloed was op het toeschrijven van ‘agency’ aan natuurverschijnselen zoals bliksem 
en tornado’s maar ook zonsondergangen en stranden, die op plaatjes afgebeeld stonden. In 
Experiment 2.1 werd als prime gebruik gemaakt van een religievragenlijst. Door de helft van 
de deelnemers te laten starten met het invullen van een vragenlijst over religie, werd beoogd 
om het concept religie tijdelijk meer toegankelijk te maken, in vergelijking met een groep 
die deze vragenlijst in eerste instantie niet invulde, maar dat pas helemaal aan het einde 
van het experiment deed. In Experiment 2.2 werd een subliminale religie prime gebruikt. 
De groep die geprimed werd met religie kreeg heel kort het woord ‘God’ voor elk plaatje op 
het computerscherm aangeboden. Dit gebeurde zo kort (gedurende 17 milleseconden), 
dat deelnemers er zich er niet bewust van waren. De andere groep kreeg de letters ‘Xxx’ 
aangeboden. In beide experimenten bestonden de plaatjes uit agenten (voornamelijk 
dieren en een paar mensen) en natuurverschijnselen. Omdat vanuit OAD wordt voorspeld 
dat met name in bedreigende situaties het snel herkennen van agency uiterst belangrijk is 
om zichzelf tegen mogelijk gevaar te beschermen, werden de plaatjes (objecten / agenten) 
verder ingedeeld in bedreigend versus niet bedreigend. Dit resulteerde in vier categorieën 
plaatjes: bedreigende natuurverschijnselen, niet bedreigende natuurverschijnselen, 
bedreigende agenten, niet bedreigende agenten (zie Figuur 10). De taak zelf bestond eruit 
dat deelnemers voor ieder van de ongeveer 80 plaatjes werd gevraagd op een Likert-schaal 
van 1 tot en met 9 aan te geven in hoeverre ze dachten dat het afgebeelde intentioneel 
gedrag vertoonde en in hoeverre ze dachten dat het afgebeelde een eigen wil had. Het 
gemiddelde van deze twee scores samengenomen vormde de afhankelijke variabele 
‘agency’. Daarnaast werd er gevraagd op een Likert schaal van 1 tot en met 9 aan te geven 
in hoeverre men controle dacht te kunnen uitoefenen over het afgebeelde. 
Resultaten uit beide experimenten lieten zien dat deelnemers die geprimed waren met 
concepten van bovennatuurlijke agenten meer agency toeschreven aan afbeeldingen van 
natuurverschijnselen, dan personen die niet geprimed waren met religie. Deze resultaten 
bevestigen de door CSR voorgestelde relatie tussen religie en agency detectie. 
 Daarnaast kregen bedreigende plaatjes zoals verwacht meer agency toegeschreven 
dan de niet-bedreigende plaatjes (dit betrof zowel de bedreigende natuurverschijnselen 
als de bedreigende agenten). Dit resultaat bevestigt het idee dat bij bedreiging OAD meer 
actief is. We vonden echter geen verschil in het effect van priming voor bedreigende en 
niet bedreigende plaatjes. Priming bleek de perceptie van agency op vergelijkbare wijze 
te versterken in het geval van bedreigende en niet-bedreigende natuurverschijnselen. 
Wel vonden we in beide experimenten dat het effect van religieuze priming het meest 
uitgesproken was bij natuurverschijnselen waarover weinig controle werd ervaren. Dit 
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resultaat suggereert dat niet zozeer bedreiging maar veeleer het gebrek aan controle een 
belangrijke voorwaarde is voor mensen om agency toe te schrijven aan natuurverschijnselen.
             Bedreigend         Niet-bedreigend 
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Figuur 10. Voorbeelden van plaatjes gebruikt in Experiment 2.1 en 2.2. Stimuli waren agenten (boven) 
en natuurverschijnselen (beneden), en waren bedreigend (links) en niet-bedreigend (rechts). 
Zoals vaak het geval roepen de uitkomsten van onderzoek weer nieuwe vragen op. 
Volgens de OAD theorie zou het primen van concepten van bovennatuurlijke agency 
moeten leiden tot het toeschrijven van meer (bovennatuurlijke) agency aan objecten in de 
omgeving. Het is echter niet duidelijk in hoeverre agency rechtstreeks toegeschreven wordt 
aan het natuurverschijnsel of aan de bovennatuurlijke macht die verantwoordelijk zou 
kunnen zijn voor het natuurverschijnsel. In Hoofdstuk 3 richtten we ons op de mogelijkheid 
dat religieuze priming leidt tot het toeschrijven van agency aan een bovennatuurlijke 
macht. Vanuit dit idee kunnen we begrijpen dat mensen natuurverschijnselen gaan zien 
als gestuurd of geleid door een hogere macht en hierdoor proefpersonen meer agency 
toekennen aan natuurverschijnselen na religieuze priming. Belangrijker, wanneer het 
idee klopt dat mensen na religieuze priming meer agency toeschrijven aan een hogere 
macht dan zou dat niet alleen onze waarneming van natuurverschijnselen maar ook onze 
perceptie van mensen kunnen beïnvloeden. Ten aanzien van mensen zou dit kunnen 
impliceren dat religieuze priming leidt tot een afname van waargenomen agency. Op 
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grond van deze redenering was de verwachting dat religieuze priming zowel de perceptie 
van natuurverschijnselen als mensen zou moeten beïnvloeden maar op tegengestelde 
wijze (zie fig. 11). Natuurverschijnselen die van zichzelf geen agency bezitten krijgen door 
de suggestie van een bovennatuurlijke invloed een aura van betekenis en bedoeling (de 
natuur als een werktuig van het bovennatuurlijke). Mensen daarentegen zijn wel in staat 
tot intentioneel gedrag en voor hen zou de suggestie van het bovennatuurlijke dus juist 
een afname van intentionaliteit impliceren (mensen als werktuig van het bovennatuurlijke). 
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 3 was om dit model van Bovennatuurlijke Agency Attributies te 
toetsen.
Figuur 11. Het model van Bovennatuurlijke Agency Attributies (BAA): toeschrijven van agency aan 
een bovennatuurlijke macht verhoogt waargenomen agency in natuurverschijnselen, en vermindert 
waargenomen agency in mensen. De vermindering van waargenomen agency in daders kan 
vergeving faciliteren en gewenste straf van de dader verminderen. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we in twee experimenten de hypothese getoetst dat priming van 
bovennatuurlijke machten tegengestelde effecten kan hebben op de perceptie van agency 
in natuurverschijnselen versus mensen. Concepten van bovennatuurlijke agency werden 
tijdelijk toegankelijker gemaakt (priming) bij de helft van de deelnemers door middel van 
een vragenlijst die informeerde naar de rol die religie speelt in de levens van deelnemers 
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(Experiment 3.1), en door te vragen in hoeverre deelnemers geloven dat God controle heeft 
over hun persoonlijke leven en de wereld in het algemeen (Experiment 3.2). De andere 
helft van de deelnemers ontving ofwel een controle prime (Experiment 3.1) of vergelijkbare 
vragen aan het einde van het experiment (Experiment 3.2). Bovendien manipuleerden we 
in Experiment 3.2 het gevoel van controle van de deelnemers (hoog versus laag) voordat 
de prime werd gepresenteerd door deelnemers te vragen om een negatieve gebeurtenis 
op te schrijven waarover ze veel versus weinig controle ervoeren.
 We verwachtten dat bij een laag gevoel van controle het priming effect sterker zou zijn 
dan bij een hoog gevoel van controle. De plaatjes taak was hetzelfde als in hoofdstuk 2, alleen 
werden de dierenplaatjes vervangen door plaatjes waarop mensen stonden afgebeeld (zie 
fig. 12). Verder werd in Experiment 3.2 een vraag toegevoegd in hoeverre proefpersonen 
dachten dat een bovennatuurlijke macht (God / Allah, ..) controle had over het afgebeelde. 
Deze vraag maakt het mogelijk om directer te kunnen bepalen of proefpersonen inderdaad 
uitgingen van een bovennatuurlijke macht en hoe deze van invloed zou kunnen zijn op 
afgebeelde natuurverschijnselen en mensen. 
De verwachting was dat priming met concepten van bovennatuurlijke macht zou 
resulteren in het toegeschreven van meer agency aan natuurverschijnselen en minder 
agency aan mensen. In Experiment 3.2 werd verder verwacht dat dit effect het sterkst zou 
zijn in de lage controle conditie. Daarnaast was de verwachting dat individuele verschillen 
in (sterker) geloof in God / hogere machten eveneens geassocieerd zouden zijn met het 
toeschrijven van (meer) agency aan natuurverschijnselen en (minder) agency aan mensen. 
In beide experimenten vonden we geen effect van religieuze priming op de perceptie 
van agency, noch in het geval van natuurverschijnselen noch in het geval van mensen. 
Wel vonden we op het niveau van individuele verschillen dat mensen die aangaven 
een sterker geloof in God / hogere machten te hebben meer agency waarnamen in 
natuurverschijnselen, en minder in mensen. Analyse van de vraag over de mogelijke invloed 
van God liet zien dat mensen een sterkere controle door God waarnemen in het geval van 
natuurverschijnselen dan in het geval van mensen. Deze bevinding kan begrepen worden 
vanuit het idee dat natuurlijke fenomenen veel ruimte bieden voor het waarnemen van 
een bovennatuurlijke invloed aangezien objecten zelf geen intentionaliteit bezitten, terwijl 
in het geval van mensen de waarneming van bovennatuurlijke agency moet concurreren 
met het hoge niveau van agency dat aan mensen wordt toegekend. Verder liet de analyse 
zien dat deelnemers in mindere mate geneigd waren om aan bedreigende mensen en 
bedreigende natuurverschijnselen controle door God toe te schrijven dan aan niet 
bedreigende mensen en niet bedreigende natuurverschijnselen. Dit laatste resultaat komt 
overeen met uitkomsten uit Hoofdstuk 4 en suggereert dat individuen met een positief 
Godsbeeld minder snel geneigd zijn om God verantwoordelijkheid toe te schrijven voor 
negatieve gebeurtenissen of gedrag met negatieve consequenties. 
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 Figuur 12. Voorbeelden van plaatjes gebruikt in Experiment 3.1 en 3.2. Stimuli waren mensen (boven) 
en natuurverschijnselen (beneden), en waren bedreigend (links) en niet-bedreigend (rechts). 
De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 3 zijn gedeeltelijk in overeenstemming met ons model 
van bovennatuurlijke agency attributie (BAA) waarin bovennatuurlijke controlerende 
machten de waarneming van agency in natuurverschijnselen verhogen en de perceptie 
van agency in mensen verminderen. We vonden geen effect van religieuze priming op 
de perceptie van agency, maar vonden wel een verband tussen individuele verschillen in 
geloof in hogere machten en perceptie van agency in de verwachtte (tegenovergestelde) 
richting voor plaatjes van natuurverschijnselen en van mensen.
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat verder door op het idee dat het toeschrijven van agency aan een 
bovennatuurlijke macht geassocieerd is met het toeschrijven van minder agency aan 
mensen. Meer specifiek richtte Hoofdstuk 4 zich op de vraag of het toeschrijven van 
agency aan een hogere macht de waargenomen verantwoordelijkheid van een dader kan 
verminderen, en daardoor vergeving kan faciliteren. Een dergelijk mechanisme zou ten 
grondslag kunnen liggen aan de welbekende relatie tussen religie en vergeving.
 Vergeving is in alle grote wereldreligies een belangrijk thema (e.g., Rye et al., 2000). 
Verscheidene studies laten een positief verband zien tussen de mate van religiositeit en 
vergeving (Tsang, McCullough, & Hoyt, 2005). Vergeving wordt o.a. gefaciliteerd wanneer de 
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transgressie aan externe omstandigheden wordt toegeschreven (Fincham, 2000). Aangezien 
een kenmerk van de meeste wereldreligies is dat gebeurtenissen aan hogere machten, 
zoals God of goden, worden toegeschreven (Barrett & Lanman, 2008), was het doel van 
Hoofdstuk 4 om te onderzoeken of deze bovennatuurlijke attributie een rol speelt bij de 
relatie tussen religie en vergeving. Immers, wanneer een deel van de verantwoordelijkheid 
wordt toegeschreven aan een hogere macht, zou hierdoor de dader minder vrije wil kunnen 
worden toegedicht wat vergeving van een dader zou faciliteren.
 In twee experimenten is een priming procedure gebruikt om religieuze concepten 
tijdelijk meer toegankelijk te maken. Experiment 4.1 maakte gebruik van een krantenartikel 
van de schietpartij in Colorado om het effect van religieuze priming op vergeving te testen. 
Het krantenartikel stelt dat de verdachte later die dag wordt voorgeleid. Verdachte Holmes 
wordt ervan beschuldigd twaalf mensen dood geschoten te hebben die zaten te kijken 
naar de Batmanfilm The Dark Knight Rises. Achtenvijftig mensen raakten gewond. Het 
motief van de verdachte is de politie onduidelijk. Alvorens het artikel te lezen, werd de helft 
van de deelnemers gevraagd om drie open vragen te beantwoorden over hun religieuze 
of spirituele opvattingen. De andere helft van de deelnemers kreeg dezelfde vragen aan 
het einde van het experiment en waren, als gevolg daarvan, niet geprimed met religie 
tijdens het lezen van het krantenartikel. Na het lezen van het krantenartikel werd aan de 
deelnemers gevraagd om op een Likert-schaal van 1 tot 9 aan te geven in hoeverre ze 
de dader verantwoordelijk hielden voor de schietpartij, in hoeverre ze de dader konden 
vergeven, en hoe zwaar de dader gestraft moest worden. Vervolgens werden twee vragen 
met betrekking tot bovennatuurlijke attributies gesteld, namelijk in hoeverre deelnemers 
dachten dat de acties van de dader beïnvloed kunnen zijn door een hogere macht, en 
of gebeurtenissen zoals deze schietpartij mogelijk een hoger (bovennatuurlijk) doel 
kunnen dienen. Aan het eind van het experiment werd bij alle deelnemers een vragenlijst 
afgenomen om te meten in hoeverre zij een positief / liefdevol Godsbeeld hadden of een 
negatief / straffend Godsbeeld (Shariff and Noren zayan, 2011). Resultaten lieten geen 
significante verschillen zien tussen de groep die geprimed was met religie en de groep die 
niet geprimed was met religie op de vragen naar de verantwoordelijkheid van de dader 
en de straf. De vraag naar vergeving liet een klein, maar niet statistisch significant, verschil 
zien tussen de groepen. Deelnemers die geprimed waren met vragen over religie leken 
iets meer vergevingsgezind te zijn. In tegenstelling tot de verwachting had de groep die 
geprimed was met religie echter minder sterk het idee dat de acties van de dader beïnvloed 
zouden kunnen zijn door een hogere macht. Interessant genoeg werd ook gevonden dat de 
deelnemers een sterk liefdevol beeld van God hadden, en dat de groep die geprimed was 
met religie een positiever, liefdevoller Godsbeeld had dan de groep die niet geprimed was 
met religie. Dit kan een verklaring bieden voor het onverwachte effect dat de geprimede 
groep minder sterk het idee had dat de acties van de dader beïnvloed zouden kunnen zijn 
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door een hogere macht. Het lijkt erop dat het positieve Godsbeeld van deze deelnemers 
conflicteert met deze gewelddadige gebeurtenis en (een liefdevolle) God hier niet voor 
verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden.
Wel vonden we op het niveau van individuele verschillen dat wanneer deelnemers 
bovennatuurlijke attributies toekenden aan de Colorado shooting dit positief samenhing 
met de mate van vergeving, negatief samenhing met de hoeveel straf die redelijk werd 
geacht, en negatief samenhing met de verantwoordelijkheid die toegeschreven werd aan 
de dader. Hoe meer deelnemers dachten dat een hogere macht mogelijk van invloed was 
geweest op de gebeurtenis, hoe minder verantwoordelijk ze de dader hielden voor de 
schietpartij, en des te minder straf ze redelijk vonden. Echter, de relatie tussen de mate 
van bovennatuurlijke attributie en vergeving van de dader bleek niet gemedieerd door de 
hoeveelheid verantwoordelijkheid die toegeschreven werd aan de dader. 
 Een probleem van Experiment 4.1 lijkt te zijn dat deelnemers hun positieve Godsbeeld niet 
wilden associëren met de negatieve gevolgen van de schietpartij en dat als gevolg daarvan 
de voorgestelde relatie tussen bovennatuurlijke attributie, en de verantwoordelijkheid 
en vergeving van de dader niet inzichtelijk kon worden. Eerder onderzoek liet echter zien 
dat mensen die geloven in een controlerende God wel geneigd zijn bovennatuurlijke 
attributies maken (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). In Experiment 4.2 is op 
twee manieren geprobeerd om het concept van een controlerende God te activeren. Ten 
eerste werd er een vraag toegevoegd aan de religie prime die specifiek informeerde naar 
het geloof in controlerende God/ hogere machten. Daarnaast heeft onderzoek van Kay, 
Gaucher, McGregor, en Nash (2010) laten zien dat het toeschrijven van gebeurtenissen aan 
hogere machten met name plaats vindt in situaties waar men weinig controle over ervaart. 
In Experiment 4.2 werden deelnemers daarom willekeurig toegewezen aan een lage- versus 
hoge-controle conditie. Controle werd gemanipuleerd door deelnemers te vragen om 
een negatieve gebeurtenis op te schrijven waarover ze veel of weinig controle ervoeren. 
Vervolgens werd voor beide condities de helft van de deelnemers toegewezen aan de 
religie prime conditie en de andere helft aan de neutrale prime conditie. De religie prime 
conditie bestond uit het invullen van een vragenlijst van 8 items waarvan 4 items over religie 
gingen (bijv. “Geloof je in een hogere werkelijkheid?”). De andere 4 items waren neutrale (‘filler’) 
items (bijv. “Hoeveel sport je gemiddeld?”). De neutrale prime conditie bestond uit dezelfde 
neutrale (‘filler’) items aangevuld met 4 soortgelijke neutrale vragen. Voor het experiment 
werd gebruik gemaakt van 25 plaatjes. Op elk plaatje stond een geweldsituatie afgebeeld 
met zowel een dader als een slachtoffer. Deelnemers werd gevraagd op een Likert schaal 
van 1 (“helemaal niet”) tot en met 9 (“helemaal wel”) voor elke afbeelding aan te geven in 
hoeverre ze dachten dat: “de dader uit vrije wil handelde”. Vervolgens werden alle plaatjes 
nogmaals aangeboden en dit keer werd aan de deelnemers gevraagd zich in te leven in het 
slachtoffer en voor elke afbeelding aan te geven in hoeverre ze “de dader zouden kunnen 
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vergeven”. Tenslotte werden voor een laatste maal alle plaatjes aangeboden en nu werd aan 
de deelnemers gevraagd aan te geven in hoeverre ze dachten dat het mogelijk was dat “een 
hogere macht invloed heeft gehad op de gebeurtenis die was afgebeeld”. 
 De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4 bevestigden deels onze hypothesen. Deelnemers in de 
lage-controle conditie die geprimed waren met religie waren het meest vergevingsgezind. 
Verrassend was echter de bevinding dat deelnemers in de hoge-controle conditie die 
geprimed waren met religie minder vergevingsgezind waren dan deelnemers die niet 
geprimed waren met religie. Een mediatie analyse liet zien dat het effect van de controle 
conditie en prime conditie op vergevingsgezindheid werd gemedieerd door de mate 
waarin deelnemers veronderstelden dat een hogere macht invloed had gehad op de 
situatie. Er waren geen effecten van de religie prime op vrije wil. 
 Deze resultaten zijn in lijn met de hypothese dat in het bijzonder in situaties waarover 
men weinig controle ervaart, men vatbaar is voor de invloed van een religie prime. Een deel 
van de verantwoordelijkheid lijkt dan te worden toegeschreven aan een hogere macht. 
Religie lijkt daarmee als compensatoir controle mechanisme te fungeren. Een gevolg van 
deze bovennatuurlijke attributie is dat in dader-slachtoffer situaties, daders makkelijker 
worden vergeven. Een opmerkelijke bevinding was dat wanneer men zelf veel controle 
ervaart en een religieprime krijgt aangeboden, men minder vergeeft. Het zou kunnen 
zijn dat wanneer men een sterk gevoel van controle heeft, men zich juist eerder tegen 
een religieprime afzet. Het idee van (controlerende) hogere machten wordt dan juist 
verwerpelijk.
 In Hoofdstuk 4 vinden we geen bewijs dat de bovennatuurlijke attributie ten koste gaat 
van de vrije wil die toegeschreven wordt aan de dader. Mogelijk wordt een gebeurtenis, 
wanneer de invloed van een hogere macht wordt verondersteld, waargenomen als deel 
van een ‘hoger plan’. Deze interpretatie van de gebeurtenis zou tot een bepaalde mate van 
berusting kunnen leiden, waardoor vergeving van een dader makkelijker wordt. 
  
Conclusie: dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan het wetenschappelijk begrip 
van het religieuze denken en de invloed ervan op het waarnemen en interpreteren van 
gebeurtenissen in de wereld. De bevindingen van het onderzoek suggereren dat de 
waargenomen invloed van het bovennatuurlijke op het alledaagse variabel is en wordt 
beïnvloed door meerdere factoren, zoals de ontologische aard van stimuli (natuurverschijnsel 
of agent), de bedreiging van stimuli, de hoeveelheid controle die iemand ervaart, en het 
persoonlijke beeld (liefdevol of straffend) dat iemand van God (/hogere macht) heeft. 
Een nieuw model van Bovennatuurlijke Agent Attributies is gepresenteerd, waarin BAA 
agency in natuurverschijnselen doet toenemen, maar in mensen doet afnemen. Dit 
model kan worden gebruikt als een raamwerk om religieus denken en gedrag op het 
gebied van (bovennatuurlijke) attributies te verklaren en te voorspellen. Er is echter meer 
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onderzoek nodig om het BAA-model te bevestigen. De gepresenteerde set van studies 
is al enige tijd geleden uitgevoerd. Sommige van de studies hebben, bezien vanuit de 
huidige wetenschappelijke standaarden, te weinig deelnemers, en de hypotheses van de 
gepresenteerde studies zijn niet gepreregistreerd. Dit was destijds nog niet gebruikelijk. Ook 
roept het model veel nieuwe vragen op. Leiden bovennatuurlijke attributies altijd tot een 
verminderde perceptie van agency bij mensen, of kan dit variëren met de waargenomen 
controle van een persoon (bijvoorbeeld: hulpeloos slachtoffer versus krachtige dader)? Veel 
vragen zijn nu aan de deelnemer gesteld vanuit een toeschouwersperspectief; maar hoe 
ervaart een terrorist die handelt in overeenstemming met zijn Godsbeeld bijvoorbeeld 
zijn eigen verantwoordelijkheid? Meer onderzoek is nodig om inzicht te krijgen in de 
omstandigheden waaronder bovennatuurlijke attributies plaatsvinden en hoe zij onze 
waarneming van intentionaliteit en verantwoordelijkheid bij het monitoren van ons eigen 
en andermans gedrag beïnvloeden. Dit proefschrift biedt daartoe een uitgangspositie. 
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Dit hoofdstuk wordt wat later aangeleverd bij de drukker. Ik heb hier namelijk enorm 
mee geworsteld. Ik ben zo gezegend met zoveel lieve mensen om me heen dat iedereen 
afzonderlijk bedanken te veel van het goede werd (vond ik, na het in versie 4 geprobeerd 
te hebben).  Misschien ben ik vanwege mijn handicap wat meer dan gemiddeld mensen 
dankbaar, misschien ook doordat mijn promotietraject 10 jaar heeft geduurd. Gedurende die 
10 jaar zouden de verschillende versies van dit dankwoord er heel anders hebben uitgezien. 
Maar een paar mensen zouden in elke versie zijn teruggekomen, zij zijn onmisbaar geweest 
bij het voltooien van dit proefschrift. Laat ik met hen beginnen.
Nadat ik mijn eerste studie Neuro- en revalidatiepsychologie had afgerond, lukte het mij 
niet om werk te vinden. Veel werk in deze richting bracht ook wel een fysiek aspect met zich 
mee, zoals bij het afnemen van neuropsychologisch onderzoek. Ik besloot mede om die 
reden een research master te gaan volgen, zodat mijn handicap minder in de weg zou zitten 
bij het zoeken (en beoefenen) van een baan. Helaas ‘liep’ ik erg vaak tegen vooroordelen 
aan, en kreeg ik (met inmiddels 2 masters op zak) wel werkervaringsplekken aangeboden 
maar geen baan. Toen op de vakgroep van Sociale psychologie een plek vrijkwam voor dit 
promotietraject, was ik dan ook enorm zenuwachtig toen ik uitgenodigd werd op gesprek. 
Het voelde inmiddels als nu of nooit. Het sollicitatiegesprek met Daniël en Hein verliep tot mijn 
opluchting heel goed. Ook volgde een openlijk gesprek over mijn handicap. Ze vroegen zich 
bijvoorbeeld wel af hoe ik naar congressen in het buitenland zou gaan, maar laat reizen nou 
net mijn hobby zijn. Daar had ik wel oplossingen voor. Verder zagen zij geen moeilijkheden. 
Het enige probleem was dat ik de baan zo graag wilde, dat ik niet durfde te zeggen dat 
fulltime promoveren eigenlijk te zwaar voor mij was. Het duurde nog 3 jaar voordat ik dat 
durfde toe te geven, zowel aan mijzelf als aan mijn begeleiders. Natuurlijk maakte niemand 
hier een probleem van, behalve ik zelf. En zo ben ik om te beginnen Daniël en Hein al enorm 
dankbaar dat zij mij als eerste in mijn beginnende carrière deze kans hebben gegeven.
 Ik heb altijd erg veel plezier gehad in de afspraken met ons drieën. Die steevast uitliepen 
omdat we eerst altijd een half uur nodig hadden om bij te praten voordat we ons op de 
inhoud richtten. We konden goed discussiëren, waren kritisch en het niet altijd met elkaar 
eens. Maar het ging altijd op een prettige, opbouwende manier. Ik heb hier heel veel van 
geleerd. Ik zag ons ook echt als een team. Jullie bleven kritisch en gedetailleerd feedback 
geven, zelfs toen Daniël al Decaan was geworden en later zelfs voorzitter van het college 
van bestuur. Soms dacht ik weleens, neem er maar iets minder de tijd voor dan schiet het 
wat meer op… Maar dit heeft er wel voor gezorgd dat ik me tot het best van mijn kunnen 
op onderzoeksgebied ontwikkeld heb. Hein en ik hebben ook gezellige momenten in 
Amsterdam gehad toen hij bij mij logeerde voor een congres waar hij moest zijn. Dure 
momenten ook aangezien ik zijn kenteken verkeerd had ingetypt en hij 2 dagen op een rij 
een parkeerboete kreeg. Net die ene keer dat hij niet kritisch meekeek met wat ik typte… 
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 En dan Jacques. Toen ik begon was Jacques Janssen officieel nog mijn promotor. Kort 
nadat ik begonnen ben ging hij met emeritaat. Gelukkig heb ik nog een aantal keer met 
hem gesproken. Hij was een bevlogen en belezen man, en kon zeer inspirerend vertellen 
en college geven. Afgelopen september ontving ik het bericht dat hij geheel onverwachts 
overleden is. Wat had ik hem graag nog het eindresultaat van dit onderzoek laten zien. 
Zonder hem was dit onderzoek nooit tot stand gekomen.
 Mijn Phd-periode op de 9e heb ik als erg positief ervaren. Van mijn oud-collega’s van de 
9e wil ik Barbara en Simone nog expliciet noemen. Jullie zijn een grote steun geweest in 
mijn hele promotie traject. Jullie pepten me op als ik het even niet zag zitten, en hebben 
me tot het eind aan toe vaak geholpen, ook met praktische zaken. Daarnaast was het fijn 
om zulke gezellige collega’s te hebben, die inmiddels vrienden zijn geworden. Ik ben blij dat 
we samen met Isabelle nog steeds regelmatig etentjes hebben om elkaar te blijven zien. 
 Isabelle, jij was speciaal in deze periode en bent ook niet voor niks mijn paranimf. Samen 
deelden we een kamer, lief en leed, en uiteindelijk zelfs een huis. Je zou denken dat je elkaar 
dan wel een beetje zat wordt, maar niks was minder waar. Van jou kreeg ik positieve energie 
en werd ik een spraakwaterval. Ongeveer hetzelfde effect als jouw favoriete redbulltjes op 
mij hebben. Wat mee hielp was dat we dezelfde wansmaak voor foute tv-programma’s 
hadden/hebben, ik durf ze hier niet eens allemaal te benoemen…. Maar Isabelle, jij bent 
de beauty én de nerd! Jij stond me altijd bij met programmeer, analyseer, en kledingadvies! 
Zelf heb je het niet altijd makkelijk gehad in deze periode, en ik bewonder de moedige 
keuze die je hebt gemaakt om te stoppen. Zo knap wat je inmiddels met je wiskundebijles 
bedrijfje weer hebt opgebouwd (check it out: http://www.bijles-wiskunde-nijmegen.nl).
 Over mijn andere paranimf hoefde ik ook niet lang na te denken, want wij gaan samen 
al heel lang mee! Janneke, vanaf groep 5 tot ons eindexamen zaten we samen bij elkaar in 
de klas. En zelfs je man Alexis heb je ontmoet toen je een paar maanden bij mij in Nijmegen 
logeerde. Ik mocht getuige bij jullie bruiloft in Frankrijk zijn, een hele eer. (Intermezzo: 
Janneke!! Terwijl ik dit aan het typen ben staat radio 3fm op en draait Radiohead (echt waar, 
check het maar 18nov 15:50). Dat kan geen toeval zijn! Paranoid Android. “God loves his 
Children, yeah”). Wel jammer dat je nu zo ver weg woont, en we elkaar minder vaak zien. 
Maar dat jij niet in Nederland zou blijven was zelfs in groep 5 al duidelijk. Ik ben erg blij dat 
het contact ondanks de afstand nog zo goed is, en ben gezegend met een vriendin als jij 
met wie ik zoveel heb gedeeld.
  Al mijn vrienden wil ik bedanken voor het geduld de afgelopen jaren, de fijne etentjes, 
borrels en vakanties (extra bijzonder als je je bedenkt dat jullie dan de zorg op je namen). 
Maar ook voor het er zijn in de minder goede tijden, als ik weer eens met maagproblemen 
in het ziekenhuis lag, en voor het meeleven met de ontwikkelingen naar een medicijn voor 
SMA. Een speciaal bedankje voor mijn langste en trouwste vriendin Sophie. Als ik eind van 
de middag de telefoon hoor gaan weet ik bijna zeker dat jij het bent die in de auto zit en 
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belt om te kletsen. En voor Dennis niet te vergeten, die zich met recht mijn paranicht mag 
noemen.
Mams, diegene die indirect misschien nog wel het meest heeft bijgedragen aan mijn 
proefschrift, bij wie ik heul veel weekendjes op de bank heb zitten schrijven, terwijl zij kopjes 
thee en kruikjes kwam brengen. Altijd kwam ik na een week werken moe aan, en wist zij 
me weer op te lappen zodat ik “uitgerust” weer de deur uit kon en het circus weer opnieuw 
kon beginnen. Iris, jij bent nog met me mee geweest naar mijn eerste congres in Las Vegas. 
Erg leuk om dat samen te hebben gedaan. Je bent een echte grote zus, bij wie ik altijd 
terecht kan voor raad, en die soms een tikkeltje te bezorgd kan zijn. En dank je wel voor 
het ontwerpen van de mooie kaft van dit proefschrift. Dikke zuskus! Jelle, schat, ik ben heel 
blij dat ik jou 3 jaar geleden ben tegengekomen. Geweldig hoe jij met moeilijke situaties 
omgaat en altijd denkt in oplossingen. Dit helpt mij relativeren in periodes dat dit nodig is. 
Ik ben benieuwd hoe onze toekomst eruit gaat zien met de aankoop van je woonark! Ik kijk 
er erg naar uit.
Pap, tijdens het 3e jaar van mijn promotietraject ben jij overleden. Onverwachts maar 
toch ook weer niet. Je was mijn persoonlijke hulplijn voor het Engels als ik aan het schrijven 
was. Maar het meest denk ik terug aan hoe verschrikkelijk trots je altijd op me was en dit aan 
de hele wereld wilde laten weten. 
 Twee maanden voor zijn overlijden stuurde hij dit mailtje naar de Lucille Werner 
foundation:
“Hallo,
Dit is een uiterst bevooroordeeld stukje, omdat het over mijn dochter gaat.
Wieteke heeft de spierziekte SMA en zit al vanaf haar derde jaar in een electrische rolstoel. Wieteke 
is nu negenentwintig jaar oud, weegt iets van vijfentwintig kilo, en is ondanks haar scoliose 
operatie weer zo krom als een hoepeltje. Maar Wieteke heeft ook een andere kant. Wieteke heeft 
haar studie psychologie aan de Radboud Universiteit afgerond, gevolg door nog een master 
in gedragswetenschappen en heeft nu een promotieplaats aan de universiteit. Daarnaast reist 
Wieteke ondanks haar handicap de wereld rond, heeft een paar fantastische vriendinnen en 
woont ze zelfstandig in een focuswoning.
Kortom, ik ben zo trots als een aap op haar. Misschien kunnen jullie er iets mee omdat ik denk dat 
Wieteke een voorbeeld kan zijn voor andere mensen met een ernstige handicap.”
Wat zou hij trots zijn geweest… Pap, je wordt gemist. X
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Wieteke Nieuwboer was born on April 6st, 1981 in Wageningen. She completed her 
secondary education in 1999, and moved to Nijmegen to study Neuro- and Rehabilitation 
psychology at the Radboud University Nijmegen. After graduation in 2005, she was 
volunteering at the Sint Maartenskliniek on research about post-stroke depression. Because 
she wanted to become more skilled in doing psychological research, she enrolled in the 
Behavioural Science Research Master and she started to work as a research assistant on the 
department of Social- and Cultural psychology in 2006. After obtaining her research master 
degree in 2008, she started her PhD-project ‘the cognitive science of religion’ under the 
supervision of Jacques Janssen, Daniël Wigboldus and Hein van Schie in the department 
of Social- and Cultural psychology at the Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University. 
Leaving Nijmegen again, she worked as a Research Consultant at Zilveren Kruis in 2013 for 
three years. Currently, she is employed as a behavioural scientist at the innovation team of 
the municipality in Amsterdam.
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and forgiveness. Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion, 3(1), 85.
Nieuwboer, W., Van Schie, H. T., & Wigboldus, D. (2014). Priming with religion and supernatural 
agency enhances the attribution of intentionality to natural phenomena. Journal for the 
Cognitive Science of Religion, 2(2), 97-120.
Müller, B. C. N., Brass, M., Kühn, S., Tsai, C. C., Nieuwboer, W., Dijksterhuis, A., & van Baaren, R. 
B. (2011). When Pinocchio acts like a human, a wooden hand becomes embodied. Action 
co-representation for non-biological agents. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 1373-1377.
Vrijsen, J. N., Fleurkens, P., Nieuwboer, W., & Rinck, M. (2009). Attentional bias to moving 
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‘Existence of a higher reality questionnaire’ of Chapter 3 Experiment 1:
1. There is a God who is personally involved with every human being
2. There is a God, who wants to be God for us 
3. There is such a thing as a higher power that controls life 
4. Our life is ultimately determined by the laws of nature
5. For me, God is nothing else than what is valued in mankind 
6. It is pure coincidence that human life has evolved on Earth
7. I believe in the existence of a supreme being 
8. According to me, there is no God or higher power
9. God is not up there, but simply in the hearts of people
10. Life is merely an evolutionary process
Answer categories:
(5=”totally confident”, 4= “confident”, 3= “unsure”, 2= “not confident”, 1=”not at all 
confident”, 0=”never thought about it”)
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Prime questions of Chapter 3 Experiment 2
1. I think that God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) has an influence on the events that happen in 
this world 
2. I think that God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) has an influence on my personal life
3. I think that God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) can be held responsible for events on this earth
4. I think that God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) can be held responsible for events in my personal 
life
5. I think God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) intervenes in events that happen in this world
6. I think God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) intervenes in events that happen in my personal life
7. I think that God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) controls the events that happen in this world
8. I think that God (or Gods / Allah,  etc.) controls the events that happen in my personal 
life
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Prime questions of Chapter 4 Experiment 2
1.  What is your political preference? 
 (“left,” “moderate left,” “center,” “moderate right,” “right”) 
*2.  Do you consider yourself religious or spiritual? 
 (“yes,” “no”) 
3.  Do you often go on a holiday or take a weekend off? 
 (“Often = at least four times a year,” “Regularly = at least 2 times a year,” “Sometimes = 
1 time per year,” “Practically never = less than once a year,” “Never”) 
4.  Do you still live at home with your parents or on your own? 
 (“With my parents,” “on my own,” “other “) 
*5.  Is death the definitive end or do you think there is life after death? 
 (“No, I think or suspect that there is no life after death,” “I have no idea about life after 
death,” “Yes, I think or suspect that there is something like a life after death”) 
6.  On average, how often do you play sports? 
 (“Often = at least 1 time per week,” “Regularly = at least 3 times a month,” “Fairly 
regularly = about 2 times a month,” “Sometimes = less than 2 times a month but at 
least six times a year,” “Practically never = less than six times a year,” “Never”) 
7.  How often do you go out? 
 (“Often = once a week or more often,” “Regularly = at least once per month,” “Sometimes 
= at least 6 times a year,” “Practically never = less than 6 times a year,” “Never”) 
*8.  Have you ever felt that your life was guided by a higher power or higher being, stronger 
than any other human being? 
 (“yes,” “no”) 
*9.  Do you believe in a higher power or higher being, something divine or a god? 
 (“No, there is neither a higher power or higher being, nor God,” “I do not know if a 
higher power or higher being or God exists,” “Yes, there is a higher power, higher 
being or God”) 
 *items only used in the religion prime condition
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